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ABSTRACT 
Secretary Michael Chertoff has said that the core principle that animates the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is risk management.  Risk management is a 
process of choosing trade-offs between available resources and the cost of minimizing the 
risk of unwanted consequences through an ongoing cycle of objective setting, risk 
assessment, alternatives evaluation, and implementation in a way that buys down risk 
over time.  The statements of national leaders, federal legislation, and the Department of 
Homeland Security’s own strategy documents have set risk management as homeland 
security policy.  Nonetheless, DHS has been challenged to implement a coordinated and 
integrated risk management program to include compatible risk assessment 
methodologies among its component agencies.  The National Infrastructure Protection 
Plan (NIPP), released in 2006, for the first time sets out a vision for a national risk 
management framework.  That vision now extends the application of risk management to 
the nation’s critical infrastructure owners and operators.  This paper explores the 
challenges involved in implementing the risk management framework under the NIPP, 
examines how implementation has been managed as strategic change through the lens of 
change management theory, and offers recommendations for improvement.  It is hoped 
this paper will motivate further study into homeland security strategic change. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT   
According to Director of National Intelligence John McConnell, the U.S. 
homeland faces a persistent and evolving terrorist threat over the next three years, 
especially from al-Qa’ida, which continues to focus on prominent political, economic, 
and infrastructure targets with the goal of producing mass casualties, dramatic 
destruction, and significant economic aftershocks.1  Comptroller General of the United 
States David Walker, on the other hand, has asserted that our nation’s fiscal policy is on 
an unsustainable course in that we face a large and growing deficit that will gradually 
erode our economy, our standard of living, and ultimately our national security.2  
Moreover, ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan add significantly to nation’s current 
security and fiscal challenges.   
With these issues as backdrop, federal homeland security spending continues to 
rise, with the president’s 2007 Budget for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
well over $42.7 billion.  Though this number is substantial, DHS Secretary Michael 
Chertoff acknowledges that actual funding requirements may be ten to fifteen times 
greater than the resources currently available.3  Given that there are not enough resources 
to address all homeland security needs, risk management and the priority allocation of 
resources against the greatest threats are central tenets of Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive–7 (HSPD-7) for critical infrastructure protection and the National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan (NIPP). 
 
1 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Intelligence Estimate — The Terrorist Threat 
to the US Homeland (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, July 2007), 6-7. 
2 Government Accountability Office, Homeland Security — Applying Risk Management Principles to 
Guide Federal Investments (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, February 7, 2007), 12. 
3 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Keynote Address by Secretary of Homeland Security 
Michael Chertoff to the 2006 Grants & Training National Conference (Washington, DC, November 28, 
2006), http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/sp_1164738645429.shtm [Accessed April 12, 2007]. 
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Unfortunately, DHS efforts to implement homeland security risk management 
policy and practices over the last several years have been challenged by the absence of a 
common theoretical framework and well-established professional discipline, a diversity 
of incompatible approaches advanced independently by its component agencies, and 
recurring changes in organizational structure and senior leadership.  Despite its 
importance to the nation, there is not a long-term, overarching strategy for the 
development and coordination of risk management initiatives across DHS.   With the 
issuance of the NIPP in 2006, the problem has become even more acute and now extends 
more broadly to the larger homeland security community.   
The NIPP establishes an unprecedented public/private sector partnership and 
creates a vision for a risk management framework to guide decision-making and resource 
allocation for the protection of the nation’s Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources 
(CI/KR).  Though the plan clearly delegates responsibility for advancing risk 
management programs within each of the seventeen CI/KR sectors, it does not provide 
much else in support of that vision.  Problems that have plagued internal DHS risk 
management efforts persist and are now multiplied across the seventeen industry sectors.  
There is still no common theoretical framework, no set of professional standards, no 
commonly accepted risk assessment best practices, and no risk management 
implementation structure.  More significantly, perhaps, there is no long-term, overarching 
strategy to guide the implementation of the NIPP risk management framework as a 
significant strategic change in national homeland security policy. 
Development and initial implementation of the NIPP has been a remarkable 
achievement in public-private sector homeland security collaboration.  However, if the 
implementation of the risk management framework as the cornerstone of the NIPP is not 
effectively managed as strategic change, the goals of the NIPP may not be fully realized. 
At best this might mean less than cost-effective application of limited homeland security 
resources. At worst, it could mean that significant homeland security risks go 
unaddressed, with the potential for catastrophic consequences. 
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B. RESEARCH QUESTION  
How has the implementation of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) 
risk management framework been handled as strategic change in homeland security 
policy?  How might change management theory and practice be applied to assess the 
implementation of that policy?  What lessons can be learned from this assessment that, if 
applied, may help ensure successful implementation and sustainability of the NIPP risk 
management framework over the long-term?    
C. PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM 
If a major U.S. corporation fails at strategic change and falls victim to the 
marketplace, there may be momentary consequences, but the economy rights itself and 
augers on.  If there is failure in the implementation of change in homeland security, 
vulnerabilities go unaddressed, precious resources are squandered or misapplied, and the 
likelihood of a major catastrophe, for which the nation is unprepared, only increases as 
the nature of the threat changes and adapts faster than our ability to respond.  The human, 
economic, and political consequences of such a failure could be enormous.   
Managing risk is the cornerstone of everything that is homeland security. 
Successful implementation of risk management policy will be largely determined by how 
well DHS manages strategic change overall.  Risk management policy implementation 
has thus far been problematic, and current efforts to advance the NIPP risk management 
framework only makes the situation that much more challenging.  If DHS is to get risk 
management policy right, it must candidly assess its approach to managing strategic 
change and adjust accordingly.  The stakes are just too high to do otherwise. 
This thesis will add to the body of knowledge about the implementation of risk 
management for critical infrastructure protection and the various challenges involved in 
advancing strategic change in homeland security policy.  It assesses implementation of 
the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) risk management framework through 
the lens of change management theory, and makes recommendations for improvement in 
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DHS change management strategies to increase the chances of success.  The lessons 
learned here may also be applied to other homeland security policy change initiatives. 
The target consumers for this thesis research are the Secretary and senior 
leadership of DHS, the heads of DHS agencies with risk management responsibilities, 
and other government policy-makers, to include members of Congress with oversight 
responsibility for homeland security.  This thesis is also intended to be of value to the 
community of research institutions, consultants and practitioners who are currently 
engaged in a wide variety of risk-management initiatives, not only within DHS but also 
across state and local government, academia, and the private sector. 
D. ORIENTATION TO THE RESEARCH 
Chapter II provides essential background on risk management and how it has 
evolved as homeland security policy, along with a review of basic definitions and 
concepts.  It describes the fundamental risk formula that underlies most homeland 
security risk assessment methodologies in use, and the basic risk management cycle.  The 
challenges associated with implementing homeland security risk management programs 
are also discussed, to include the uncertain nature of the threat.  The need for new 
methods for assessing the risk of low probability / high consequence events are described, 
along with recognition of the interdependence of homeland security risk management 
efforts with the political and public policy processes.  Related to the implementation of 
public policy are the challenges presented by our system of government and the concept 
of federalism.  Chapter II closes with an overview of the agencies and stakeholders with 
equities in homeland security risk management policy and programs, and the complex 
web of relationships and dependencies that make up the risk management landscape. 
Chapter III outlines current critical infrastructure protection and risk management 
efforts of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  National critical infrastructure 
protection policy is reviewed, with special emphasis on the National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan (NIPP).  Three critical elements of the NIPP, the Sector Partnership 
Model, Sector-Specific Plans, and the risk management framework are discussed in 
detail.  The risk assessment and risk management efforts of DHS are summarized, to 
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include national-level and asset-based risk assessment, and the various risk assessment 
methodologies in use by DHS component agencies.  The chapter ends with a summary of 
commentary on DHS risk management efforts by the GAO and other stakeholders, and a 
review of changing roles and responsibilities for risk management within the Department.   
As this research centers on an evaluation of risk management implementation as 
strategic change in homeland security policy, Chapter IV provides a primer on change 
management, public policy, and complexity theories, as these may apply to such an 
evaluation.  General concepts for managing strategic change are presented along with 
change management models that might assist homeland security leaders in planning for 
and managing major strategic change initiatives.   The likely causes of failure in strategic 
change efforts are reviewed, and step-by-step guidelines for successful change 
management are discussed.  As risk management represents public policy for homeland 
security, concepts for managing strategic change in a public policy context are also 
reviewed, culminating in a discussion of implementation efforts that have the potential 
for high ambiguity and high conflict, as is the case with homeland security risk 
management policy.  Rounding out this chapter is an overview of organizations as open 
systems, followed by discussions of complexity and organizational networks.   
Chapter V brings the research all together by integrating strategic change, public 
policy, and complexity theories into a hybrid template for evaluating the implementation 
of the NIPP risk management framework as strategic change in public policy.  A set of 
questions are adapted from the literature and then applied to assess potential gaps in 
implementation efforts to date.   Chapter VI summarizes the findings of this analysis and 
offers recommendations to DSH policymakers and planners for improvement. 
 6
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. OVERVIEW OF RISK MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS 
1. Society and Risk Assessment  
The notion of risk has been with us ever since the dawn of man.  It is rooted in our 
subconscious reasoning and behavior, and has been essential to our evolution and 
survival as a species.  Carlo Jaeger et al., describe risk not only as the analytical lens 
through which we anticipate consequences, but also as a new consciousness and a new 
way for society to view the world and assess the tremendous uncertainties of our future, 
from nuclear holocaust to global climate change.  Most significantly, these authors place 
risk at the center of rapidly growing and complex social and technological 
transformation, referring to it as the “imprimatur of our age.”4  According to Martin 
Shubnick, over the last half century there has been an explosive growth in the social and 
technical sciences and with it, commensurate growth in the way risk is analyzed.  Once 
restricted to use by technically sophisticated experts and decision makers, risk analysis 
has gradually made its way into social and political discourse as government leaders and 
the public wrestle with ever more complex issues of public policy.  This is especially true 
in programmatic and spending decisions related to national preparedness and homeland 
security.  As the notion of risk as a criterion for public policy decision-making continues 
to expand, the way risk is evaluated, communicated, and used will require ever greater 
focus. 5
A 2002 National Science Foundation (NSF) workshop on risk concluded that 
recent economic and technological advances have not only improved our quality of life, 
but have also produced new, more wide-ranging threats.  This is especially true given 
what the report cites as increased interconnectedness of our physical, economic, social, 
                                                 
4 Carlo Jaeger et al., Risk, Uncertainty, and Rational Action (London: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 
2001), 13-15. 
5 Martin Shubnick, ed., Risk, Organizations, and Society (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
1991), 7-10. 
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and communications infrastructures, and the susceptibility to cascading effects where an 
impact in one part of a system can reverberate and amplify across the entire system. 6  It 
is thus not surprising that the federal government is increasingly applying consideration 
of risk in its evaluation of domestic hazards and security threats, and especially to the 
uncertainties and consequences associated with global terrorism and potential terrorist 
use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  The NSF workshop report also stated that 
given the events of September 11, 2001, the public’s perception of the vulnerabilities 
associated with this growing complexity and system interdependency has increased 
sharply.  Not only is there greater consideration of risk internal to the government, but the 
continuing shadow of global terrorism, general fear and societal concern over 
government’s ability to protect the safety and security of its citizens has brought the 
concept of risk ever further into the public consciousness.  The statements of homeland 
security leaders, passionate political debate among members of Congress, and large-scale 
disasters like the Northeast Blackout of 2003, as well as hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 
2005, have further stimulated this consciousness. 
As described by Jaeger et al., risk assessment has its underpinnings in investment 
and insurance practices dating back a couple of centuries.  However, these authors state 
that the broader and more systematic application of risk is a product of modern times, 
with the rapid growth in science and technology, and the vulnerabilities and dangers that 
tend to accompany such advances.7  Modern risk assessment has developed over the last 
thirty years, beginning with design and safety studies in the nuclear power industry and 
various aerospace and military applications.  By the 1970s its use had expanded to the 
setting of federal safety regulations for the chemical industry and establishing 
environmental standards for air and water quality, as well as the mitigation of toxic 
hazards (i.e., clean-up of environmentally contaminated sites).  Its application to 
engineered systems soon followed, to include civil infrastructure.  Today, risk assessment 
is successfully applied in a wide variety of areas spanning medicine, business finance, 
environmental conservation, industrial safety, the social sciences, and more recently, 
                                                 
6 National Science Foundation, Integrated Research in Risk Analysis and Decision Making in a 
Democratic Society (Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation, July 2002), 16. 
7 Carlo Jaeger et al., Risk, Uncertainty, and Rational Action, 13-15. 
 8
natural disasters.8  According to Yacov Haimes, what we now know as risk assessment, 
and the theories, quantitative tools, and methods employed by risk analysts, have steadily 
evolved over the years and are an amalgamation of contributions from a diverse range of 
professional disciplines to include statisticians, mathematicians, health scientists, systems 
analysts, and engineers.  At the same time, he points out that social, behavioral, and 
organizational scientists have also contributed greatly to informing our understanding of 
the human dimensions of risk.  This includes risk perception, risk communication, and 
strategies for building trust, resolving conflict, and dealing with organizational and 
institutional barriers to the application of risk in public policy and decision-making. 9
A large and diverse community of risk analysts has been developing and applying 
systems-based risk methodologies for decades, and has had considerable success in 
identifying risks and assisting in the search for cost-effective solutions to mitigate them.  
In that time, risk assessment tools and approaches to risk management have become very 
sophisticated.  Nonetheless, such tools remain largely inadequate in coping with the low-
probability / high-consequence threats posed by the growing specter of global terrorism.  
The application of risk assessment to terrorism is a relatively new phenomenon and is 
posing both new opportunities and challenges.10  As discussion of risk becomes an 
increasing part of our public consideration of homeland security policy and investment, 
and as involvement in the application risk assessment practices extends well beyond the 
Department of Homeland Security to state and local government and the private sector, 
we will need to consider new ways to involve a larger group of stakeholders in the 
evolution of these practices and in risk-based policy and decision-making.  Building 
social trust, networking, and collaboration will be equally important considerations in the 
implementation of risk assessment policies and practices as risk theory and analytics. 
 
                                                 
8 Rae Zimmerman and Vicki Bier, “Risk Assessment of Extreme Events” (paper presented at the 
conference Risk Management Strategies in an Uncertain World, Palisades, New York, April 12-13, 2002), 1. 
9 Yacov Haimes, “Roadmap for Modeling Risks of Terrorism to the Homeland,” Journal of Infra-
structure Systems (June 2002): 35-41. 
10 Philip Auerswald, Lewis Branscomb, Todd La Porte, and Erwann Michel-Kerjan, “The Challenge 
of Protecting Critical Infrastructure” (working paper, Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes 
Center, University of Pennsylvania, October 2005), 7. 
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2. Risk Assessment as Homeland Security Policy 
A call for terrorism risk assessment predates September 11, 2001, when, in May 
1998, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive–63 (PDD-63) on Critical 
Infrastructure Protection.  That directive required the National Coordinator and the 
National Infrastructure Assurance Council to: 
…propose and develop ways to encourage private industry to perform 
periodic risk assessments of critical processes, including information and 
telecommunications systems… [and to]…offer their expertise to private 
owners and operators of critical infrastructure to develop security-related 
best practice standards. 11
In what was probably the first call for terrorism risk management before 9/11, 
Lieutenant Commander Thomas Rancich, USN, delivered a blistering commentary in 
Proceedings on the U.S. Navy’s counterterrorism preparedness following the terrorist 
attack on the USS Cole in October of 2000.  Rancich, recognizing that acts of terrorism 
are low-probability / high-impact events, recommended that the Navy establish a risk 
management program that would, in his words, “identify the most likely and highest 
impact possibilities and then detail actions taken / risks mitigated and actions not taken / 
risks not mitigated, along with a logical rationale for each” based on consideration of 
threat, probability, and political and fiscal restrictions 12
In its landmark report, the 9/11 Commission recommended that “homeland 
security assistance should be based on an assessment of risks and vulnerabilities.”  In 
addition, the Commission recommended that the federal government should require each 
state “to provide an analysis based on the same criteria and to justify the distribution of 
funds in that state.” 13  More importantly, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public 
Law 107-296), as the federal legislation that authorized the formation of the U.S. 
                                                 
11 William Clinton, Presidential Decision Directive-63 (PDD-63) – Critical Infrastructure Protection 
(Washington, DC: The White House, 1998), 18. 
12 Thomas Rancich, “Combating Terrorism,” Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute 126, no. 
11 (September-October, 2000): 25-32. 
13 The 9/11 Commission, The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of The National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2004), 396. 
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Department of Homeland Security (DHS), charged it with conducting critical 
infrastructure vulnerability and risk assessments as a core part of its mission.  
Specifically, the law requires DHS to: 
Conduct vulnerability and risk assessments of key resources and critical 
infrastructure to determine the risks posed by particular types of terrorist 
attacks, the probability of success of such attacks, and the feasibility and 
efficacy of various countermeasures.   
Integrate information, analyses, and vulnerability assessments by DHS or 
others to identify priorities for protective measures by DHS itself, other 
Federal, state and local government agencies and authorities, the private 
sector, and other entities.   
Develop a comprehensive national plan for securing the key resources and 
critical infrastructure (i.e., power, information technology, 
telecommunications, etc.) of the United States and the physical and 
technological assets that support such systems.  
Recommend measures necessary to protect key resources and critical 
infrastructure in coordination with other Federal agencies and in 
cooperation with State and local government agencies and authorities, the 
private sector, and others. 14
In February 2003, the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical 
Infrastructures and Key Assets reinforced the responsibility of DHS and other federal 
departments for pursuing risk-based approaches to critical infrastructure protection. 
The roles of the Federal lead departments and agencies are to assist state 
and local governments and private-sector partners in their efforts to:  
Identify and promote effective sector-specific, risk-management policies 
and protection practices and methodologies… 15   
Almost a year later, Homeland Security Presidential Directive–7 (HSPD-7) 
directed the DHS secretary take the federal lead to establish uniform policies, approaches,  
 
                                                 
14 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296, 107th Congress, 2nd Session, (November 25, 
2002), 2146. 
15 George Bush, The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key 
Assets, 17. 
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guidelines, and methodologies for integrating federal infrastructure protection and risk 
management activities within and across sectors, along with metrics and criteria for 
related programs and activities.16    
On publishing the Homeland Security Strategic Plan, the DHS secretary outlined 
his intent to comply with the president’s direction in HSPD-7 by issuing his own 
guidance to the department along these lines.  Two key objectives in the plan state that 
DHS will “conduct and sustain a complete, current and accurate assessment of our 
Nation’s infrastructure sectors and assets…” using risk-based analytic tools, and 
“…expand the Nation’s community risk management capabilities and reduce the Nation’s 
vulnerability to acts of terrorism and other disasters through effective vulnerability 
assessments and risk management programs.”  The plan describes risk management as a 
departmental priority in that “risks must be well understood, and risk management 
approaches developed, before solutions can be implemented.  Managing risk is a 
continuous process that requires constant vigilance.”17
According to Christine Wormuth, “assessing homeland security risks, which can 
stem from both terrorism and natural disasters, is an enormously complex undertaking, 
but is also a critical task if the Federal government seeks to marshal its finite resources 
effectively.” 18  Since the formation of DHS, considerable resources have been expended 
in the development and application of risk assessment methodologies to the threat of 
terrorism by a variety of its own agencies, other federal departments, state and local 
governments and authorities, academia, and the private sector.  However, these initiatives 
have yet to fully coalesce into the sort of coordinated national effort, under DHS 
auspices, called for in Public Law 107-296 or the department’s own strategic planning 
documents for homeland security and critical infrastructure protection.  Nonetheless, the 
importance of such an effort continues to be underscored by noted experts in the field, as 
                                                 
16 George Bush, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) - Critical Infrastructure 
Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, 1. 
17 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Securing Our Homeland, U. S. Department of Homeland 
Security Strategic Plan (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2004), 10-54. 
18 Christine Wormuth,“Homeland Security Risk Assessments: Key Issues and Challenges,” Testimony 
before the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment, Committee 
on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, (Washington, DC: November 17, 2005), 2. 
 12
expressed at various academic and professional conferences, in numerous studies on the 
matter, and in official testimony before various congressional committees. 
In 2005, Wormuth offered that a national risk assessment could strengthen 
homeland security policy development and resource allocation in three important ways: 
1) guiding homeland security planning as the basis for developing common interagency 
strategies to address specific homeland security challenges; 2) driving the resource 
allocation process by using risk assessments to not only set priorities for DHS but to also 
harmonize homeland security resource and policy decisions across the entire interagency, 
thus maximizing unity of effort; and 3) evaluating potential policy and programmatic 
options to direct where DHS and other agencies should invest marginal dollars in order to 
get greatest security return for the dollars invested.19   
In her advice to Congress, Wormuth suggested that, despite formidable 
challenges, the development of robust homeland security risk assessments to guide 
planning and policy development are “absolutely worth the time and effort.”  Even if 
based on imperfect information, risk assessment, she said, provides an ability to examine 
the complexities of terrorism risk in a structured way.  By focusing attention on the 
specific judgments made in the risk assessment process, issues can be “unpacked” to help 
decision makers better understand those issues and assess for themselves where 
differences of opinion among experts may lie before making policy decisions that could 
have profound implications for the security of the entire nation. 20
Beyond the realm of federal policy-makers, Howard Kunreuther sees a broader set 
of challenges and the need for a wider community of involvement in the implementation 
of homeland security risk assessment policies and programs.  Though successful 
implementation of risk assessment practices depends greatly on the development and use 
of new analytical tools, it also requires the formulation of a wide range of other 
supporting strategies to include methods for risk communication, economic incentives, 
                                                 
19 Wormuth,“Homeland Security Risk Assessments, 4. 
20 Wormuth,“Homeland Security Risk Assessments, 3. 
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standards, and regulations for managing the risks identified. 21  Given the complexity 
involved, the yet underdeveloped and untested nature of emerging risk assessment 
methodologies, and the highly interdependent character of critical infrastructure and the 
responsibility for its security, new inter-governmental and public-private-academic 
partnerships are needed across a wide range of stakeholders. 
3. Basic Definitions and Concepts  
One of the most significant challenges in addressing the concept of risk in any 
context is the absence of a commonly accepted lexicon and set of professional practices, 
particularly as relate to the relatively new field of homeland security risk.  As outlined by 
Robert Ross, there are many definitions of risk, each having utility within the context 
each was developed.22  Though Ross cites 17 different definitions, he acknowledges that 
the list is far from exhaustive.  For a contemporary definition, we can turn to Bilal Ayyub 
who defines risk as “the potential of losses and rewards resulting from exposure to a 
hazard or a result of a risk event.” 23  Jaeger et al., define risk somewhat differently, as “a 
situation or event in which something of human value (including humans themselves) has 
been put at stake and where the outcome is uncertain.” 24  Common throughout most of 
the definitions of risk are the notions of one or more threats, hazards, or unwanted events; 
a degree of perceived uncertainty about the probability or likelihood of the risk occurring; 
and a sense for the consequences in terms of cost or severity of loss.  Despite the lack of a 
commonly accepted lexicon for risk, the following terms and definitions are used 
throughout this paper and are offered for sake of consistency: 25
                                                 
21 Howard Kunreuther, “Risk Analysis” (working paper, Wharton Risk Management and Decision 
Processes Center, University of Pennsylvania, 2004): 9. 
22 Robert Ross, “Risk and Decision-Making in Homeland Security” (paper presented at the SRA 2006 
Annual Meeting - Risk Analysis in a Dynamic World: Making a Difference, Baltimore, Maryland 
December 3-6, 2006), 4. 
23 Bilal Ayyub, Risk Analysis in Engineering and Economics (Boca Raton: Chapman & Hall/CRC, 
2003), 35-36. 
24 Carlo Jaeger et al., Risk, Uncertainty, and Rational Action, 17-19. 
25 Vincent DeGiorgio, “Understanding Your Risk: The Risk Assessment Process, ArupRisk Consulting, 
June 26, 2002, http://www.nepss.org/presentations/Risk_26June02.ppt  [Accessed July 31, 2007]. 
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Risk Analysis – The development of a quantitative estimate of risk based on 
technical evaluation and mathematical techniques for combining estimates of 
incident likelihood and consequences.  
Risk Assessment – The process by which results of a risk analysis are used to 
make decisions, either through relative ranking of risks and risk reduction 
strategies or through comparison with risk targets.  
Risk Management – The ongoing process of planning, organizing, leading and 
controlling people, assets, and activities to minimize the potential consequences 
and/or probability of risks identified and appraised through risk assessment. 
 
In outlining the analytical process, Haimes uses the terms “risk assessment” and 
“risk management” in a way that better conforms to the definitions of “risk analysis” and 
“risk assessment” used above.  With this modification then, in conducting risk analysis as 
a prelude to assessment, the analyst works to answer the following three questions: 1) 
what can go wrong? 2) what is the likelihood that it will go wrong? and 3) what are the 
consequences if it does go wrong?  Answers to these questions, he says, help identify, 
quantify, and evaluate risks and their potential impacts.  Risk assessment as a prelude to 
risk management builds on this analysis, according to Haimes, by seeking answers to a 
second set of three questions: 1) what can be done and what options are available? 2) 
what are the trade-offs in terms of costs, benefits, and risks? and 3) what are the impacts 
of current management decisions on future options?26  As security analyst B.D. Jenkins 
points out, “security measures cannot assure 100% protection against all threats.”  
Though intelligence, risk, and security experts can evaluate potential threats, 
vulnerabilities, and consequences, only policy-makers and managers can make informed 
judgments on risk tolerance, priorities, and resource allocation as part of an ongoing risk 
management program to mitigate those risks.  Given limited resources, this process works 
to strike a cost-effective balance between the impact of risks and the cost of solutions to 
manage them. 27  The risk analysis, assessment, and management process is iterative, and 
performance is measured against actual or relative risk reduction, with the resulting data 
used to inform each iteration and drive needed changes in the strategies employed. 
                                                 
26 Yacov Haimes, “Roadmap for Modeling Risks of Terrorism to the Homeland,” 35-41. 
27 B. D. Jenkins, “Security Risk Analysis and Management – Risk Analysis Helps Establish a Good 
Security Posture; Risk Management Keeps It That Way,” (Countermeasures, Inc., 1998), 1-2.  
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Henry Willis et al., of RAND view terrorism risk as having three fundamental 
components: the threat to a target, the target’s vulnerability to the threat, and the 
consequences should the target be successfully attacked. 28  The threats to a target can be 
measured as the probability that a specific target will be attacked, in a specific way, 
during a specified period.  The example they cite is the estimated probability that a city’s 
football stadium will be subject to attack with a radiological dispersal device.  They 
define vulnerability as an estimate of the probability or likelihood that damage will occur 
from a given threat. Damages are expressed as fatalities, injuries, property damage, 
and/or direct and indirect economic loss.  The last of the three components is an estimate 
of consequences.  This is assessed as the type and magnitude of damage resulting from a 
successful terrorist attack. Risk is a function of all three components: threat, 
vulnerability, and consequence.  Simply put, risk is the product of the vulnerability and 
consequence of a risky event or threat. 
Risk  =  Threat  x  Vulnerability  x  Consequence 29
According to the NSF, “the last few decades have witnessed an explosion of 
innovative empirical, theoretical, and analytic methods and tools for analyzing risks and 
for making decisions under conditions of uncertainty.” 30  This is no less true for the 
relatively recent analytical science of terrorism risk.  Nonetheless, this basic formula lies 
at the heart of most of the methods for analyzing terrorism risk that are now emerging.  
Despite the claims to the contrary by some developers and consultants, this common 
formula provides the fundamental basis for realizing the common, compatible, and 
integrated risk management framework called for by the president, the Congress, and 
DHS strategy documents to date. 
 
 
                                                 
28 Henry Willis, Andrew R. Morral, Terrence K. Kelly, and Jamison Jo Medby. Estimating Terrorism 
Risk (Santa Monica CA: RAND Center for Risk Management Policy, 2005), xvi.  
29 Ibid., 10.  
30 National Science Foundation, Integrated Research in Risk Analysis and Decision Making in a 
Democratic Society, 5. 
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4. Managing Risk 
According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the basic risk 
management process is divided into five phases: (1) setting strategic goals and objectives 
while determining constraints; (2) assessing the risks; (3) evaluating alternatives for 
addressing these risks; (4) selecting the appropriate alternatives; and (5) implementing 
the alternatives and monitoring the progress made and the results achieved (see Figure 1). 
GAO cautions that the application of risk management to homeland security is new, and 
the process “will likely evolve as processes mature and lessons are learned.”  
 
Figure 1.   GAO Risk Management Framework. 31 
 
In proposing an approach to homeland security risk management, researcher Bin 
Jaing notes that the essence of risk analysis is to outline risk outcomes and probability 
distributions that frame risk management decisions for policymakers and managers. 32  
Citing the work of Preston Smith, he describes a risk map as one of the simplest tools 
                                                 
31 Government Accountability Office, Homeland Security - Applying Risk Management Principles to 
Guide Federal Investments, 8-9. 
32 Bin Jiang, “Risk Management and the Office of Homeland Security’s Antiterrorism Tasks,” Online 
Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution 4, no. 2 (2002): 30-36. 
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used by analysts in this regard.33  A risk map portrays the core elements of the risk 
equation in a way that facilitates decision-maker understanding of the relative urgency of 
risks, both individually and in relationship to one another.  It is presented here as a basic 
way to better illustrate for the reader what lies at the core of risk management thinking.   
Figure 2 is an adaptation of Smith’s risk map, and is an example of an approach 
used to frame terrorism security risk decision-making at the author’s own agency – the 
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.  It has also been successfully applied at 
over forty major transportation agencies across the country and elsewhere.  The vertical 
axis represents likelihood as a function of vulnerability, and the horizontal axis represents 
consequence.  Points are plotted on the risk map using a relative scale, derived from the 
risk arithmetics, for each target (i.e., critical infrastructure) and attack type (threat).   This 
couplet of target and attack type represents an individual risk (i.e., biological attack 
against an urban transit system).  Once all risks are plotted, a curved line of constant risk 
may be drawn to provide an arbitrary risk threshold.  Any risk above that threshold may 
be identified as a priority for risk management action. 34  Though risks below the line 
may still be managed, they might not receive priority attention or resources.  As indicated 
in Figure 2, countermeasures may be employed to lessen the likelihood by hardening the 
target, or the consequence by improving response, or some combination of the two. 
                                                 
33 Preston Smith, “Managing Risk as Product Development Schedules Shrink,” Research Technology 
Management 42, no. 5 (September / October, 1999): 25-32.  

























Figure 2.   Terrorism Risk Map. 
 
In referencing Smith, Jaing notes that the risk threshold line is set according to the 
risk tolerance of decision makers and can be moved higher or lower with changes in 
circumstances, to include changes in threat posture, availability of resources, and the 
assessed impact of previous risk reduction efforts.  Moved lower, more risks receive 
priority attention with an expected commensurate reduction in the overall risk profile but 
with a corresponding increase in cost; or, if resources are fixed, a smaller investment 
available per target.  Moved higher, a greater concentration of resources may be applied 
to a fewer number of risks, but with potentially greater effect.  Howard Kunreuther refers 
to a similar risk mapping approach as an “Exceedance Probability (EP) Curve.”35  
Whatever the method of presentation, the ultimate purpose of risk management is to drive 
down the risk profile of as many of the high priority targets as possible, as far as possible.  
                                                 
35 Howard Kunreuther, “Risk Analysis and Risk Management in an Uncertain World,” Risk Analysis 
22, no.4 (2002): 655-664. 
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Strategies are developed and executed based on the decisions made, risk reduction is then 
measured, and adjustments are implemented given the acceptability of risks identified. 36
Risk mapping is not the only technique available.  Decision-making can be guided 
by something as simple as a lineal ranking of the priority risks identified or the use of 
other more sophisticated analytical and modeling tools to more discretely assess how to 
achieve greatest risk reduction and cost benefit potential.  One such technique, 
particularly well suited to networked systems, is the Model-Based Vulnerability Analysis 
(MBVA) technique.  MBVA provides decision makers with answers to such questions as, 
how do these targets relate to one another?  What specific targets among them are most 
worth protecting?  How much will it cost?  Developer Ted Lewis describes it as the only 
known method that combines asset identification and quantitative analysis to reach a 
policy decision on how to most cost effectively mitigate risk. 37  Regardless of the 
techniques used, the process of risk management is never complete.  The threats to be 
guarded against are always changing and adapting, and new vulnerabilities are constantly 
emerging.  It is a never-ending process and likely will remain so for some time to come. 
If a national risk management framework is to be implemented to “buy-down” 
homeland security risk, there must be a broad-based national effort to develop 
standardized practices, procedures, and analytical tools to permit the integration and 
assessment of risk across industry sectors and between levels of government.  The 
challenges to doing so will need to be identified and overcome.  
B. THE CHALLENGES OF MANAGING SECURITY RISK 
1. Nature of the Threat and Infrastructure at Risk 
In assessing terrorism risk to private-sector infrastructure, Erwann Michel-Kerjan 
and Burkhard Pedell state that though catastrophic events are not new, the nature and 
scale seem to have changed in recent years.  In addition to the terrorist attacks of 
                                                 
36 George Baker, “A Vulnerability Assessment Methodology for Critical Infrastructure Sites” (paper 
presented at R&D Partnerships in Homeland Security, Boston, Massachusetts, April 27-28, 2005), 2. 
37 Ted Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection In Homeland Security: Defending a Networked 
Nation (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2006), ix-x. 
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September 11, 2001, they cite the Northeast Blackout of 2003, the Indian Ocean Tsunami 
in 2004, and the hurricanes that ravaged the Gulf Coast in 2005, all resulting in an 
“unprecedented scale of devastation.” 38  They point out that the character of terrorism 
has also changed dramatically, with the emergence of extremist, religious-based terrorist 
groups and an age of “mega-terrorism.”  A 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 
concerning the terrorist threat puts the issue much more bluntly: 39  
The U.S. Homeland will face a persistent and evolving terrorist threat over the 
next three years. The main threat comes from Islamic terrorist groups and cells, 
especially al-Qa’ida, driven by their undiminished intent to attack the Homeland. 
Al-Qa’ida is likely to continue to focus on prominent political, economic, and 
infrastructure targets with the goal of producing mass casualties, visually dramatic 
destruction, significant economic aftershocks, and/or fear among the U.S. 
population.  
Al-Qa’ida will continue to try to acquire and employ chemical, biological, 
radiological, or nuclear material in attacks and would not hesitate to use them if it 
develops what it deems is sufficient capability.       
A report by the NSF indicates that unlike traditional risk analysis, terrorism risk 
that arises from intentional actions designed to take lives and create social and economic 
disruption involve “intelligent actors” capable of changing their strategies and tactics to 
take advantage of perceived weaknesses. 40  Philip Auerswald et al., call this terrorist 
behavior “adaptive predation.”  Accordingly, they suggest that the likelihood and 
consequence of a terrorist attack are not determined by chance, but by a mix of strategies 
and counterstrategies, developed by various stakeholders (i.e., attackers and defenders), 
that are constantly changing over time.  Such “dynamic uncertainty makes the likelihood 
of future terrorist events extremely difficult to estimate and increases the difficulty of 
                                                 
38 Erwann Michel-Kerjan and Burkhard Pedell, “How Does the Corporate World Cope with Mega-
Terrorism? - Puzzling Evidence from Terrorism Insurance Markets” (working paper, Wharton Risk 
Management and Decision Processes Center, University of Pennsylvania, January 15, 2007), 4. 
39 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, National Intelligence Estimate - The Terrorist Threat 
to the US Homeland, 6-7. 
40 National Science Foundation, Integrated Research in Risk Analysis and Decision Making in a 
Democratic Society, 19. 
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measuring the economic efficiency of public policies and private strategies.” 41  Detlof 
von Winterfeldt reinforced this point in testimony before Congress when he suggested 
that, in contrast to risks from natural hazards and engineered systems that are “neutral” in 
character, terrorists are adversaries who deliberately seek out vulnerabilities and adjust 
their actions in response to any defenses that might be erected.  The non-random nature 
of terrorism, he says, greatly complicates risk assessment, and this requires development 
of new tools for analysis. 42       
As Kunreuther et al., see it, dynamic uncertainty and the changing nature of 
terrorism risk over time reflects an important difference from natural hazards. 43  One 
cannot induce an earthquake or a hurricane, for example; these events happen by chance.  
They also opine that mitigation measures can more easily be implemented to lessen the 
consequences of natural disasters. When it comes to reducing terrorism risk, it is 
unknown who the perpetrators are, what motivates them, how they will select their 
method of attack, or what their target will be.  Thus, it is difficult to know what counter-
measures to employ, where, and when.  Kunreuther suggests that, given the small 
likelihood of such events happening at any given time, place, or level of consequence, 
government must otherwise invest significant funds to protect a wide range of potential 
targets and provide public reassurance. 44  This may not be the most productive or cost 
effective way to use limited national resources, and in the long term it is not sustainable.  
Having been designed for efficiency, convenience, and competitiveness, Yacov 
Haimes describes the nation’s infrastructure as open and accessible, interconnected and 
vast, and intertwined with society and the global economy.  The design and function of 
that infrastructure is driven largely by the demands of a highly diverse range of owners, 
operators, and users, and it is controlled and secured by thousands of individuals, private-
                                                 
41 Philip Auerswald, Lewis Branscomb, Todd La Porte, and Erwann Michel-Kerjan, “The Challenge 
of Protecting Critical Infrastructure,”  8. 
42 Detlof von Winterfeldt, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment Committee on 
Homeland Security, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Intelligence, United States House of 
Representatives (Washington, DC: November 17, 2005), 1-2. 
43 Howard Kunreuther, Erwann Michel-Kerjan, and Beverly Porter, “Assessing, Managing and 
Financing Extreme Events: Dealing With Terrorism,” (working paper, Wharton Risk Management and 
Decision Processes Center, University of Pennsylvania, November 20, 2003), 7. 
44 Howard Kunreuther, “Risk Analysis and Risk Management in an Uncertain World,” 655-664. 
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sector companies, and state and local governments.45  These factors make the nation’s 
infrastructure vulnerable to attack. As the NSF risk workshop report underscores, the 
very strength of the nation — it is efficient, interdependent, highly integrated, and 
sophisticated civil and economic infrastructure — is its greatest potential weakness in 
that there are too many valuable targets and not enough resources to fully protect them 
all. 46    
Homeland security risk is not just a matter of analyzing terrorist threats.  Michel-
Kerjan points out that “of the 20 most costly catastrophes between 1970 and 2005 (a 
thirty-five-year period), ten of them occurred in just the last five years, and nine of these 
in the United States.  Hurricane Katrina alone inflicted nearly $150 billion of economic 
damage…and…major natural catastrophes worldwide inflicted $230 billion in economic 
damage in 2005, twice as much as in 2004, the previous record holder.”47  Both terrorist 
attacks and natural disasters have the potential to cause extreme losses, and there are a 
few similarities in the measures that can be taken to mitigate consequences as well as 
how disaster response is managed.  However, there are also some significant differences 
to be taken into account that may impact the approaches used to assess risk.  According 
to Kunreuther et al., these differences include the availability of historical data, the 
ambiguity of the risks involved, limits on information sharing, the potential to influence 
the probability of an event, and differences in the impact of mitigation measures. 48  New 
methods are needed to assess terrorism and all hazards risks in an integrated way. 
 
 
                                                 
45 Yacov Haimes, “On the Definition of Vulnerabilities in Measuring Risks to Infrastructures,” Risk 
Analysis 26, no. 2 (April 2006): 293-296.  
46 National Science Foundation, Integrated Research in Risk Analysis and Decision Making in a 
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47 Erwann Michel-Kerjan “Disasters and Public Policy: Can Market Lessons Help Address 
Government Failures?” (working paper, Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes Center, 
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2. Need for New Methods and Common Practices  
Regardless of the type of catastrophic risk, to make the hard choices necessary to 
help policymakers determine where to invest limited resources, George Baker states that 
there is a need for a “common, repeatable, systematic methodology” to understand 
vulnerabilities and comparative risks.49  Following a conference of leading academic 
experts on risk in 2002, Howard Kunreuther and Arthur Lerner-Lam concluded that 
although there are well-developed models for low-probability / high-consequence events 
like natural disasters, there is still considerable uncertainty regarding these risks.  Given 
that uncertainty, they highlighted the challenge of assessing risk concerning threats even 
more uncertain and ambiguous, like those associated with potential terrorist attacks. 50  
At that same conference, Rae Zimmerman and Vicki Bier recognized that current 
practices are based on flexible, systems-oriented methods capable of being adapted to a 
variety of risk conditions.  However, they agreed that traditional methods are challenged 
when applied to extreme events like terrorism, and thus require improvement. 51
In the NSF risk workshop report, Paul Slovic suggested that “some species of 
trouble — such as terrorism — greatly strain the capacity of quantitative risk analysis.”  
He acknowledged that, at least in 2002, current risk assessment models, if applied to such 
hazards, were too crude to permit precise and accurate predictions of risk.52  In that 
report, Susan Cutter characterized the knowledgebase in this area as fragmented and 
insufficient to advance an understanding of terrorism or hazards risk assessment, citing 
the need for new approaches and increased collaboration among the risk, disaster, and 
hazards research communities.53  The NSF workshop report, in part, concluded that 
“unnecessary divisions between risk analysts, decision scientists, and hazards researchers, 
as well as more traditional disciplinary divisions have impeded scientific progress.”  
                                                 
49 George Baker, “A Vulnerability Assessment Methodology for Critical Infrastructure Sites,” 2.  
50Howard Kunreuther and Arthur Lerner-Lam, Risk Assessment and Risk Management Strategies in an 
Uncertain World, 6.  
51 Rae Zimmerman and Vicki Bier, “Risk Assessment of Extreme Events”, 18-19.  
52 National Science Foundation, Integrated Research in Risk Analysis and Decision Making in a 
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Accordingly, the NSF report called for new inter-disciplinary and multidisciplinary 
research across the engineering, information science, natural science, and social science 
domains. 54  The need for an interdisciplinary approach extends to risk-based public 
policy and decision-making as well.  This is an issue that is even more acute in the 
relatively new arena of homeland security policy and decision-making.  Peter Orszag, 
another participant at the NSF workshop, quoted a senior federal official as saying that an 
“insufficient stock of off-the-shelf research on homeland security exists to inform policy-
making.”55  The 2002 NSF report found that analytic tools and findings produced by 
those involved in the risk sciences had not been used in policy decision-making as much 
as they could have been. 56  Clearly, integration and cross-fertilization of perspectives 
across a range of expert communities is needed to advance new methods for risk 
assessment of terrorism and other catastrophic events, and should be a priority. 
In a 2005 assessment of the state of terrorism risk assessment as applied to 
homeland security grant programs, Henry Willis et al., of RAND found that there was 
still no consistent and shared definition of terrorism risk or agreement on the 
methodologies to be applied to assess that risk, leaving stakeholders with different 
understandings of the concept and its application.  Though they found agreement among 
many of those stakeholders that DHS grants should reflect the measure of risk to which 
different jurisdictions are exposed, there was no consensus at that time by which 
methodology such risk should be determined.  In addition, there was, according to their 
research, no existing framework to guide the selection and combination of risk indicators. 
Nor did they find much effort directed toward how different risk estimates change with 
respect to a wide range of different assumptions about terrorist threats and capabilities.  
In their view, there was also an absence of information about how to measure the 
effectiveness of investments to reduce terrorism risk. 57  Though much has changed since 
2005, the need for a “common, repeatable, systematic methodology” remains.  
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According to GAO research in early 2007, DHS has not yet implemented a 
comprehensive risk management approach, as required by Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7).  The agency cautions that, as DHS components 
mature their individual risk management efforts, “the need for consistency and coherence 
becomes even greater.”58  In the absence of such guidance, the GAO sees the potential 
for fragmentation and conflict only increasing.  “Efforts to establish guidance to 
coordinate a risk-based approach…have been hampered by organizational restructuring.  
The challenges that remain are substantial and will take time, leadership, and attention to 
resolve.”59  However, these challenges go well beyond DHS itself.  The diversity and 
range of approaches, and the source, sequence, and timing of their development and 
implementation have resulted in a wide array of conceptual frameworks, incompatible 
methodologies, conflicting language, and confusion, not only among policy-makers and 
other stakeholders, but among security risk practitioners, both within and outside DHS. 
With specific regard to critical infrastructure protection, a major step forward was 
taken with the issuing of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) in 2006.  For 
the first time, the NIPP lays out a conceptual risk management framework that describes 
the general steps in the process and the roles and responsibilities of those involved.60  
The NIPP acknowledges that a variety of different methodologies are already in use by 
owners and operators of critical infrastructure.  However, it does not address the 
considerable institutional challenges associated with potentially incompatible approaches, 
but instead establishes only minimum baseline criteria.  Though it serves as an 
overarching plan for critical infrastructure risk management, it does not outline how 
congruence will be achieved across a nationwide community of risk and security 
analysts, critical infrastructure owners and operators, and federal, state, and local 
government agencies.  Nor does it describe how nationwide technical and professional 
standards and practices will be developed and maintained in this new and vital field. 
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3. Interdependence with the Public Policy Process 
It is difficult enough to build a national risk management framework among like-
minded risk and security analysts within DHS, but it is even more challenging to extend it 
to state and local public safety agencies and private-sector security organizations.  An 
added element of complexity is to involve elected officials, policy-makers, industry 
executives, and perhaps even the general public into the discussion of risk-based 
homeland security policies and programs. Risk management must be integral to the 
policy development and decision-making process if it is to be effective.  This occurs 
across at least fours layers of public policy discourse: a) among DHS, the president, and 
the Congress; b) within and among individual DHS agencies; c) among DHS and other 
federal, state and local agencies, and the private-sector; and d) with the American people, 
both as a body and through their elected representatives.  The nature and purpose of that 
discourse is different at each layer; nonetheless, challenges concerning confidentiality, 
risk characterization, risk communication, and public trust permeate all four.   
During the 2002 NSF risk workshop, Ralph Keeney, in reflecting on the 
fundamental objectives of risk analysis, posited that the adequacy of risk methodologies 
is not the relative weak point for achieving those objectives.  In his view, “our major 
weaknesses have to do with effectively applying what we know and effectively 
communicating the knowledge we have and insights that we can get from applying our 
knowledge.” 61  Paul Slovic points out that “risk assessment is a complex discipline, not 
fully understood by its practitioners, much less the lay public.” 62  Even within more 
traditional risk assessment applications, there is much debate over terminology and 
techniques, and this is certainly true of risk assessment for terrorism.  According to 
Slovic, the limitations of analysis and disagreements among risk experts exacerbate the 
already adversarial climate that often surrounds much discussion of risk.  He cautions that 
risk assessments are constructed from theoretical models that are based on assumptions 
and subjective judgments, and so communicating risk as a part of the public policy 
discourse “means finding comprehensible ways of presenting complex technical material 
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that is clouded in uncertainty.” 63  The remarks of Keeney and Slovic suggest that as 
much effort should go into developing, applying, and communicating risk information as 
goes into theory and methodology.  This has important implications for risk assessment 
as public policy, and the nature of the public policy process that supports it.   
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is 
dedicated to the sharing of best practices in domestic and international policy.  OECD 
recognizes the critical importance of focusing on the process of effective risk policy 
formulation, particularly pertaining to natural disasters, terrorism, and the failure of 
critical infrastructures.  From its perspective, government officials must not only assess, 
appraise, and manage risk in an effort to develop and implement suitable responses, but 
must also coordinate action among a variety of stakeholders and agencies; reconcile 
differing perspectives and goals; consider legal and historical context; and inform the 
public about the nature of risks and tradeoffs.  When viewed from this perspective, risk 
management is more about the process of decision-making and policy development than 
it is about the technical complexity of risk analysis and assessment practices. 64   
In its guidance on risk management, the Treasury Board of Canada emphasizes 
the need to effectively integrate risk into the public policy process, taking a consultative 
precautionary approach to improve predictability, credibility, and consistency of risk-
based policy across the government.  Internal to the government, risk communication 
promotes action, continuous learning, innovation, and teamwork.  Proactively involving 
elected officials creates opportunities for the exchange of different perspectives and helps 
ensure more informed, relevant, and effective policy options.  The guidance describes 
such risk communications as including “issue identification and assessment; analysis of 
the public environment (including stakeholder interests and concerns); development of 
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consultation and communications strategies; message development; working with the 
media; and monitoring and evaluating the public dialogue.” 65  See Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3.   Risk Management in Public Policy: A Decision-Making Process. 66 
Peter Adler and Jeremy Kranowitz see safety and security risks, and especially 
those perceived as a “possible erosion of civil liberties,” as involving the potential for 
differing perceptions of risk, risk tolerance, and/or social values, possibly causing conflict 
among different segments of society.  They suggest that identifying the types of demands 
that are faced by different stakeholders is “one of the key first steps to communicating 
and managing risk and building trust with the public.” 67  Facilitating the public policy 
discourse on homeland security risk will require maintaining a careful balance between 
need-to-know and need-to-share and acknowledging the imperative to proactively 
manage the involvement of policy-makers, elected officials, stakeholders, and the public.  
A national framework for risk management must therefore include a robust public policy 
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development and risk communications strategy.  The National Research Council defines 
risk communications as “a continuing discussion among risk assessors, risk managers, 
and stakeholders from start to finish.” 68  
4. Federalism and Distributed Responsibility  
In his introduction to the National Strategy for Homeland Security, President 
Bush makes the point that the strategy is national and not just federal in character.  The 
strategy emphasizes that homeland security is a “shared responsibility” stretching across 
the Congress, federal, state and local government, the private-sector, and the American 
people.  That strategy is based on the nation’s tradition of federalism and limited 
government, and is rooted in the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution which 
reserves to the states and to the people “all power not specifically delegated to the 
Federal government.”  It is assumed that, given these principles, organizations outside the 
federal government will, in many cases, need to take a lead role in implementing key 
elements of the strategy.  In the context of this sharing of power and responsibility, the 
strategy acknowledges that our nation’s governance is based on an “overlapping 
structure” of 87,000 federal, state, and local jurisdictions.  Accordingly, a key challenge 
in implementing homeland security strategy will be to develop “complementary systems 
that avoid duplication,” thus placing a premium on “collaboration and coordination,” not 
only among layers of government, but with business and industry, and other non-
governmental organizations as well. 69  
The National Strategy for Homeland Security outlines six critical mission areas: 
intelligence and warning, border and transportation security, domestic counter-terrorism, 
defending against catastrophic terrorism, emergency preparedness and response, and 
protecting critical infrastructure. 70  While the strategy sees the first four as dominantly 
federal responsibilities, the last two involve significant roles for the private sector and 
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state and local governments respectively.  Though the strategy is clear in its statement 
that state and local governments have primary responsibility for funding, preparing, and 
operating capabilities for emergency response, it is less clear concerning state and local 
responsibility for homeland security prevention activities across the other mission areas, 
especially the division of responsibility between federal and state governments in dealing 
with the private sector to address infrastructure protection needs.   
With specific regard to critical infrastructure protection, the strategy describes the 
Department of Homeland Security’s responsibility to develop and coordinate 
implementation of a comprehensive national plan to “provide a methodology for 
identifying and prioritizing critical assets, systems, and functions, and for sharing 
protection responsibility with state and local government and the private sector.”  It also 
outlines the federal organization mandate for “interacting with particular critical 
infrastructure sectors,” assigning responsibility across major federal departments and 
agencies. 71  The strategy asserts that the private sector has the “primary and substantial 
responsibility” to address public safety risks posed by their industries and that such 
responsibility naturally comes with “sound corporate governance.”  While the strategy 
cites the importance of tapping the potential of the private sector to support national 
homeland security efforts, it also states that government should only fund those activities 
that are not supplied, or are inadequately supplied in the marketplace, indicating that 
sufficient economic incentives exist for the private sector to provide itself with the 
security protection needed. 72  
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 authorized the creation of DHS and assigned 
it specific responsibilities related to the protection of the nation’s critical infrastructure.  
This included recommending “measures necessary to protect the key resources and 
critical infrastructure of the United States in coordination with other agencies of the 
Federal Government and in cooperation with state and local government agencies and 
authorities, the private sector, and other entities.” 73  In response, DHS issued the NIPP, 
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which outlines roles and responsibilities for carrying out critical infrastructure and key 
resource protection (CI/KR) activities.  In addition to its own overarching role to 
coordinate a national critical infrastructure protection framework, and the assignment of 
sector-specific responsibilities to various federal agencies, the NIPP assumes roles for 
non-federal partners as well, creating an extensive network of inter-governmental and 
public-private sector relationships and interdependencies to carry out the plan.  The NIPP 
assumes that: 
State, local, and tribal governments will develop and implement a CI/KR 
protection program as a component of their overarching homeland security 
programs. 
Boards, commissions, authorities, councils, and other entities will perform 
regulatory, advisory, policy, or business oversight functions related to various 
aspects of CI/KR operations and protection within and across sectors and 
jurisdictions. 
Private sector owners and operators will undertake CI/KR protection, restoration, 
coordination, and cooperation activities, and provide advice, recommendations, 
and subject matter expertise to the Federal government. 
Homeland Security Advisory Councils will provide advice, recommendations, and 
expertise to the government regarding protection policy and activities. 
Academia and research centers will provide CI/KR protection subject matter 
expertise, independent analysis, research and development (R&D), and educational 
programs. 74
A symposium sponsored by The Rockefeller Institute of Government in 2003 
focused on the issue of federalism and its implications for the role of state and local 
governments in homeland security.  Participants noted that there is no clear 
intergovernmental division of labor around most homeland security activities.  Though 
border protection is primarily a federal activity, responding to an incident after it has 
occurred is a local responsibility.  On the other hand, infrastructure protection is more 
complicated.  “Most vital infrastructure is owned by the private sector and regulatory 
responsibility for some industries is divided between levels of government in frequently 
complicated ways.  In other industries, it is unclear that any public agency has the legal 
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authority to set and enforce security standards.” 75  Participants concluded that 
considerable collaboration and cooperation is required; a significant challenge given 
traditional federal concerns of money, turf, and power.  In a 2006 review of homeland 
security funding programs, Peter Eisinger demonstrated that these concerns are still valid, 
and cited the complexities involved in finding an effective balance in the loose 
arrangement of highly decentralized homeland security partnerships under our current 
system of federalism. 76
C. A COMPLEX INSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPE 
1. U.S. Department of Homeland Security Agencies 
National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) – NPPD is the DHS 
organization responsible for championing overall risk-reduction efforts to counter both 
physical and cyber threats.  Within NPPD there are three key organizations that have 
special importance to risk assessment policy implementation.  These are the Office of 
Infrastructure Protection (OIP), Office of Risk Management and Analysis (RMA), and 
Office of Intergovernmental Programs (IGP). 77  Another important organization is the 
Homeland Security Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC), a joint agency of NPPD 
and the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (OIA).  
Office of Infrastructure Protection (OIP) – OIP facilitates the identification, 
prioritization, coordination, and protection of CI/KR in support of federal, state, local, 
territorial, and tribal governments, as well as the private sector.  It communicates threats, 
vulnerabilities, incidents, potential protective measures, and best practices to security 
partners, and is responsible for advancing implementation of the National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan (NIPP).  In accordance with the NIPP, OIP maintains a national CI/KR 
sector governance and information-sharing framework composed of industry sector 
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leaders, CI/KR owners and operators, and other key public and private sector 
stakeholders.  As part of its NIPP implementation efforts, OIP is also advancing risk 
assessment policies and methodologies to guide CI/KR protection plans and programs. 78
Office of Risk Management and Analysis (RMA) – RMA leads DHS efforts to 
establish a common framework for overall management and analysis of homeland 
security risk.  It also serves as the Department’s executive agent for national-level risk 
management analysis standards and metrics.  Within its charge is to develop and embed a 
consistent, standardized approach to risk, and develop a coordinated, collaborative 
approach to risk management by leveraging and integrating risk expertise across DHS 
components and external stakeholders.  RMA also assesses DHS-level risk performance 
to ensure that programs are measurably reducing risk across the country. 79   
Office of Intergovernmental Programs (IGP) – IGP’s mission is to promote an 
integrated national approach to homeland security by ensuring, coordinating, and 
advancing federal communication and interaction with, and acting as an advocate for, 
state, local, tribal, and territorial governments. It also coordinates and maintains 
awareness of various bilateral communications occurring regularly throughout DHS and 
between the Department’s agencies and its state, local, tribal, and territorial partners. 80
Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC) – HITRAC 
has a dual reporting relationship and serves both OIP and the Office of Intelligence 
Analysis (OIA).  It bridges the work of the intelligence community via OIA, 
infrastructure specialists within OIP, and other experts to identify sector-specific 
vulnerabilities and consequences of attack.  It then translates this work into strategic-level 
risk assessments for use by federal, state, and local authorities, and the private sector.  
HITRAC receives information about critical infrastructure through Information Sharing 
and Analysis Centers (ISACs) and through direct contacts with private and public sector 
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infrastructure owners established by OIP. 81  HITRAC is assuming an increasing role in 
managing CI/KR risk assessments in support of OIP and its implementation of the NIPP.   
Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) – S&T is responsible for identifying, 
enabling, and transitioning new state-of-the-art technology to DHS components and the 
public safety agencies of state, local, tribal and territorial governments.  Within S&T, two 
units have specific responsibilities that are germane to the focus of this paper.  The 
Infrastructure / Geophysical Division is responsible for technology projects focusing on 
critical infrastructure threats and vulnerabilities.  The Office of Operations Analysis 
manages risk analysis projects and oversees the Homeland Security Institute (HSI).  HSI 
is a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC), which, among other 
things, conducts a range of studies to support risk-based decision-making within DHS. 82
United States Coast Guard USCG – As a part of its homeland security role, the 
Coast Guard has a special responsibility to protect the flow of commerce, the nation’s 
marine transportation system, and especially its ports, from terrorism.  As a part of this 
responsibility, the Domestic Port Security Evaluation Division conducts a regular 
program of port-wide security assessments in support of Federal Maritime Security 
Coordinators (FMSCs).  FMSCs (the Coast Guard Captains of the Port) work with state 
and local agencies and private sector maritime interests to implement risk-based port-
wide security programs.  To aid these efforts, the Coast Guard has developed a port 
security risk assessment methodology used to establish risk-based profiles of potential 
port vulnerabilities, and to guide local port security planning and operations. 83   
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) – The Risk Analysis and Risk 
Reduction branches within the Mitigation Directorate of FEMA apply a variety of tools 
for all-hazards risk assessment and work with other federal, state, and local agencies to 
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advance all-hazards mitigation programs.  The Post-Katrina Emergency Management 
Reform Act transferred key elements of the former Preparedness Directorate to FEMA to 
include the Office of Grants and Training (G&T).  The new Office of Grant Programs 
administers a range of grants that are increasingly based on the application of risk 
assessment models and criteria.  Before its transfer to FEMA, G&T administered a 
Technical Assistance Program for Port and Transit Security Risk Assessment, and 
supported the assessment of roughly forty major transit properties across the country. 84
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) – TSA is responsible for security 
of the nation’s transportation systems, to include highways, railroads, buses, mass transit, 
maritime ports, and airports.  It does this in partnership with the private sector, and state, 
local, and regional governments and transportation agencies.  Under the NIPP, TSA has a 
lead role in identifying critical transportation assets and working with transportation 
security stakeholders to reduce the security risks associated with them. 85  In line with 
these efforts, TSA is pursuing development of risk assessment tools and techniques for 
application to threats against both surface transportation systems and air travel. 
2. Advisory Councils and Information Sharing Centers 
Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) – The HSAC is an advisory board 
that provides independent advice and recommendations to the secretary of Homeland 
Security to aid in the creation, coordination, implementation, and evaluation of policy 
and operational capacities.  HSAC prepares periodic reports on a range of issues, as 
requested by the secretary.  Membership is composed of senior leaders from state and 
local government, first responder communities, the private sector, and academia. 86  The 
HSAC has submitted roughly seventeen major reports to the secretary on a variety of  
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homeland security issues.  Among these is a January 2006 report on infrastructure 
protection, which included a range of recommendations related to risk assessment policy 
and practice. 87   
National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) – The NIAC provides the 
president, through the DHS secretary, with advice on issues related to the security of the 
nation’s critical infrastructure and associated information systems, as requested by the 
president.  The NIAC also advances efforts to enhance public / private sector cooperation 
in infrastructure security, and develop ways to encourage private industry to perform risk 
assessments of critical systems.  The NIAC is composed of members appointed by the 
president from private industry, academia, and state and local governments.88  The NIAC 
has submitted roughly thirteen major reports to the president related to infrastructure 
protection.  Two of these deal specifically with risk assessment and risk management. 89
Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC) – Under the NIPP 
Sector Partnership Model, the CIPAC facilitates coordination between federal 
infrastructure protection programs and the efforts of the private sector, as well as those of 
state, local, territorial, and tribal governments. 90  CIPAC membership includes CI/KR 
owner/operators and designated trade organizations that participate as members of Sector 
Coordinating Councils (SCCs) for each CI/KR sector.  It also includes representatives 
from federal, state, local, and tribal governments as members of Government 
Coordinating Councils (GCCs) for each sector.  There are coordinating councils for 
sixteen CI/KR sectors, and within those councils there are over 380 individual 
owner/operators and other industry interests represented.  In addition, another 130 entities 
represent governmental agencies or interests across the councils. 91  Accordingly, the 
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CIPAC sector partnership consists of over five hundred individual member entities 
representing a substantial cross-section of public and private sector CI/KR security 
stakeholders.  It is a far-reaching collaborative network that is largely self-managed, 
diverse in character, and national in scope.  The Partnership Model is described in greater 
detail in Chapter III. 
Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security (PCIS) – PCIS is a non-profit 
organization formed in 1999 to address cross-sector critical infrastructure protection and 
interdependency issues of concern to critical infrastructure owners and operators.  A key 
element of the CIPAC, PCIS strives to build collaborative relationships and advance a 
non-regulatory approach to CI/KR security and resiliency.  Membership consists of the 
leadership of sixteen of the seventeen sector coordinating councils.  In 2006, PCIS was 
recognized by DHS as the private sector cross-sector council in the NIPP. 92
Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) – Originally established in 
1999, the concept of Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs) was expanded in 
the 2003 National Strategy for Homeland Security.  ISACs are government or industry 
sponsored collaborations dedicated to the mutual protection of critical infrastructure from 
cyber and/or physical security threats by, as the name implies, sharing related information 
and analysis within the industry and with the government.  Though sponsorship and 
organization may vary, ISACs generally provide: a forum for information on threats, 
risks, vulnerabilities, and security solutions; a 24x7 threat detection and warning system; 
and a forum for information exchange. 93  Some ISACs have been active in establishing 
security standards and working with local governments on emergency readiness issues. 
3. Research, Academic, and Professional Organizations 
Homeland Security Institute (HSI) – HSI is a Federally Funded Research and 
Development Center (FFRDC) that delivers independent analysis and advice to DHS in 
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support of policy development, decision-making, analysis of alternative approaches, and 
the evaluation of new ideas.  HSI is operated under contract by Analytic Services Inc., 
with oversight from DHS Science and Technology (S&T). 94  Threat and risk analysis are 
listed as among its core capabilities.  Since 2004, HSI has completed over twenty major 
projects, three of which specifically deal with risk assessment and/or risk management.  
In addition, HSI developed and is now employing a risk-based decision model to guide 
S&T research and development investment decisions.  According to HSI, the model is 
currently being considered for DHS-wide application. 95  Though it has conducted risk-
related projects, its research agenda does not seem to be guided by the need to support 
implementation of a national risk management framework as outlined in the NIPP. 
Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism Events (CREATE) – 
CREATE was the first university-based center of excellence chartered and funded by the 
DHS Science and Technology Directorate.  The Center is focused on improving the 
nation’s security through the development of models and tools for the evaluation of the 
risks, costs, and consequences of terrorism. 96   Based at the University of Southern 
California, it has partnerships with New York University and the University of Wisconsin 
at Madison.  Its advisory board includes 65 members from government and 8 members 
from the scientific community.  CREATE’s agenda involves research, education, and 
outreach to inform and support risk-based decision-making. 97  Like HSI, its agenda does 
not seem to include work related to implementation of the NIPP risk framework. 
Critical Infrastructure Protection Program, George Mason University (GMU) – 
This program pursues basic and applied research related to a full range of issues attendant 
to critical infrastructure and key resource protection.  The GMU Critical Infrastructure 
Protection (CIP) program provides direct assistance to the DHS Office of Infrastructure 
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Protection (OIP), the Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security (PCIS), and private 
industry in support of NIPP implementation.  It has also advanced work in support of 
state and local government CI/KR protection efforts to include the National Capital 
Region Critical Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment Project on behalf of the 
Commonwealth of Virginia, the State of Maryland, and the District of Columbia. 98
National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center (NISAC) – A joint 
initiative of Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and the Los Alamos National 
Laboratory (LANL), NISAC provides modeling and simulation capabilities to support the 
analysis of critical infrastructure complexities, interdependencies, and vulnerabilities. 99  
Sponsored by OIP, the purpose of the Center is to aid decision-making in the areas of 
preparedness, consequence and risk analysis, policy analysis, investment and mitigation 
planning, and education and training.  SNL developed and offers a suite of security Risk 
Assessment Methodologies (RAM) for a range of applications.100  However, RAM 
methodologies do not seem to figure prominently in the NIPP risk framework. 
Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes Center – Over its twenty-year 
history, the Center has advanced basic and applied research related to the management of 
low-probability / high-consequence events involving safety, health, and the environment, 
in both private and public sector applications.  The Center’s portfolio includes work in 
the areas of critical infrastructure protection, mitigating the risks of large-scale natural 
disasters, and terrorism risk financing.  In particular, its research focuses on decision-
making to cope with technological and natural hazards and the effectiveness of related 
strategies, such as incentive systems, insurance, regulation, and the communication of 
risk information.  The Center lists DHS as one of its principal government partners. 101
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Center for Risk Management of Engineering Systems – Located at the University 
of Virginia, the Center develops theories, methodologies, and technologies to assist in the 
assessment and management of risk.  Among the areas of expertise listed by the Center 
are critical infrastructure protection and infrastructure interdependencies.  Its research 
agenda has included a variety of projects for the modeling and risk assessment of critical 
infrastructure at the request of industry, state government, Department of Defense (DoD), 
and DHS sponsors. 102  
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) – In May 2002, the ASME 
issued a position paper that affirmed the organization’s stance on the role of risk analysis 
in society; essentially, that “risk analysis is a technically sound and socially responsible 
method to facilitate decision-making by government, industry, and the general public.”  
A key tenet of the policy is that “consistent methods of risk analysis should be applied 
throughout government and the private sector.” 103  In line with this position, in 2004, the 
ASME Innovative Technologies Institute LLC partnered with DHS in developing the 
Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Assets Protection (RAMCAP) methodology.  
RAMCAPTM is cited in the NIPP as a principal approach to analyzing CI/KR risks.  
The Society for Risk Analysis (SRA) – SRA describes itself as a multi-
disciplinary, interdisciplinary, scholarly, international society that provides an open 
forum for all those who are interested in risk analysis, risk assessment, risk 
characterization, risk communication, and risk management.  The range of SRA activities 
is wide and spans risks of concern to individuals, to both public and private sector 
organizations, and to society in general. 104  It encourages the exchange of ideas through 
its publications and conferences, and its members include those advancing the state of 
knowledge and practice in risk assessment of large-scale natural disasters and terrorism. 
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Security Analysis and Risk Management Association (SARMA) – SARMA is a 
non-profit professional trade association serving those responsible for analyzing and 
managing security risks to systems, structures, operations and information systems from 
man-made threats.  SARMA’s purpose is to facilitate the development, standardization, 
and professionalization of the security analysis and risk management discipline by 
providing leadership, education, and certification for security analysis and risk 
management professionals. 105  Its membership includes individuals with risk manage-
ment experience in intelligence, defense, homeland security, and the private sector.   
4. State and Local Government, and the U.S. Congress 
State Homeland Security Advisors Council (HSAC) – The National Governors 
Association (NGA) formed the HSAC in June 2006 to provide a forum where homeland 
security advisors could discuss issues, share information and expertise, and keep their 
individual governors informed on matters related to the implementation of national 
homeland security policies impacting their state or territory. 106  As the chief homeland 
security official for their state or territory, homeland security advisors form an influential 
constituency.  A 2006 NGA survey of HSAC members found that “concern continues 
over the lack of state input into federal policy… [and] homeland security directors are 
nearly unanimous in their recommendation that the federal government coordinate with 
states prior to adopting and implementing policies.” 107    
According to the NGA survey, states do not feel they have adequate 
representation in the DHS policy-making process, and several homeland security 
directors noted that DHS consults with a limited number of handpicked state officials and 
then claims to produce policy based on broad state input.  The survey found that state 
advisors believe DHS often lacks transparency, and cites as a good example of this the 
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new risk-based funding formula and how states have little idea of how DHS defines risk.  
Also cited were the duplicative efforts of multiple federal agencies performing CI/KR 
protection roles; specifically, in the identification and listing of critical infrastructure and 
in performing vulnerability assessments. “Not only is this information not being shared 
with states, but it also appears… [that] various Federal agencies are not sharing their 
information on critical infrastructure with one another.” 108  Problems in risk assessment 
and information sharing would seem of particular concern because almost all of the state 
advisors indicated they were pursuing their own infrastructure protection planning efforts 
with public and private sector CI/KR owner and operators, and half were working in a 
similar way with surrounding regions. 
County, City, and Municipal Government – There are approximately 87,500 units 
of local government in the U.S., to include special districts and authorities.  Of that 
number, about 3,000 are county governments, and another 36,000 are municipal 
governments. 109  As a great deal of homeland security is local in nature, each of these 
entities has a role to play in mitigating risk and protecting the nation’s critical 
infrastructures and key resources.  An article by Kiki Caruson and Susan MacManus puts 
this challenge in a more on-the-ground perspective.  They suggest that, while the federal 
and state governments have dominant roles to play in making and implementing 
homeland security policy, local governments have to carry out that policy at a grass-roots 
level. 110  Caruson and MacManus point out that counties and cities have borne a 
considerable portion of the burden of financing and managing homeland security 
initiatives.  Local law enforcement and emergency first responders are most often directly 
involved in working with the private sector in their communities to coordinate critical 
infrastructure security and emergency response efforts.   
State and local working groups mandated by DHS grant guidance – As required 
by DHS, states and urban/port regions have implemented a variety of inter-governmental 
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working groups to pursue planning for homeland security, and more specifically for 
CI/KR protection.  In addition to any frameworks the states have established for overall 
homeland security planning, other working groups may also be in effect: an Urban Area 
Security Initiative Urban Area Working Group (UAWG); a Regional Transit Security 
Working Group (RTSWG); and possibly a port security planning working group under 
the Area Maritime Security Committee (AMSC).  In accordance with the NIPP risk 
management framework, states must implement a state-wide CI/KR protection program, 
and integrate it with planning by these other mandated working groups. 111  Since CI/KR 
planning must be risk-based, and DHS grant programs are largely guided by the 
application of risk-based formulas, these working groups, and their member agencies, 
have a significant stake in DHS CI/KR risk management policy. 
The United States Congress – As the peoples’ representatives, Congress has a 
significant role in shaping homeland security policy through the formulation of 
legislation and control over funding.  Since the creation of DHS, congressional legislation 
has increasingly used the language of risk to guide the evolution of DHS programs and to 
drive for greater effectiveness and accountability in the Department’s efforts to secure the 
nation.  It has been particularly focused on the application of risk assessment in the 
protection of critical infrastructure and the strengthening of state and local preparedness. 
Consistent with the 9/11 Commission’s recommendation that funding assistance to the 
states be based on risk and vulnerability, members of Congress have been especially 
vocal about the importance of taking a risk management approach to homeland security, 
to include the risk-based allocation of funding to the states and urban areas.   
According to a recent Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, a successive 
stream of bills have gradually attempted to reform perceived problems with homeland 
security grant programs, each time moving further away from guaranteed allotments to a 
greater percentage of funding allocated on the basis of risk.  As the CRS report points 
out, “To varying detail, each legislative initiative suggested definitions or approaches to 
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evaluate risk with regard to homeland security.” 112  What the CRS report stops just short 
of saying is that given the nature of congressional politics, a positive intention may not 
always come out in the form of well fashioned policy.  With each new definition or 
approach to risk assessment mandated by congressional fiat, DHS must respond, whether 
it makes sense to or not.  Due to what CRS calls the “lack of a coherent, long-term, 
overarching risk strategy,” DHS has no plan of its own to guide the more reasoned 
evolution of risk policy and practice.113  This is true, not only across the Department, but 
across the entire homeland security community; however, such a plan is necessary to 
implement the national risk management framework called for in the NIPP.  In the 
absence of a plan, Congress will provide guidance, well reasoned or not.  The best option 
is to get Congressional backing for a structured plan presented in advance, rather than 
wait for the next wave of guidance. 
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III. INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION AND RISK 
MANAGEMENT  
A. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION PROGRAMS 
1. National Critical Infrastructure Protection Policy  
President Clinton outlined the basic foundations for the Nation’s current policy on 
critical infrastructure and key resource (CI/KR) protection well over a decade ago, when 
in July 1996, he issued Executive Order 1301–Critical Infrastructure Protection (EO 
13010).  EO 13010 defined critical infrastructures as those “so vital that their incapacity 
or destruction would have a debilitating impact on the defense or economic security of 
the United States.” 114  Given that the vast majority of the nation’s CI/KR assets are 
owned by the private sector, the order stipulated that it is essential for the government 
and private sector to work together to protect those assets and assure their continued 
operation.  The order also established the President's Commission on Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) to assess CI/KR vulnerabilities and threats and to 
recommend a national policy and implementation strategy for CI/KR protection.  
The PCCIP report – Critical Foundations: Protecting America’s Infrastructures – 
was issued on October 13, 1997.  In addition to outlining the nature and extent of the 
challenge, the report cited potential vulnerabilities and what it called “shared threats and 
shared responsibility” in the recognition of governments’ interdependence with the 
private sector.  Along these lines, it recommended a “real partnership between 
infrastructure owners and operators and the government” to include “collaborative public 
and private organizational arrangements that challenge our conventional way of thinking 
about government and private sector interaction.”  115  Following the PCCIP report, in 
May of 1998, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63), 
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establishing a national critical infrastructure protection policy and a government 
framework to develop and implement infrastructure protection measures.  PDD-63 
identified industry sectors and designated lead federal agencies to work with each to 
jointly advance CI/KR protection efforts.  To assist the private sector in achieving and 
maintaining infrastructure security, it directed the National Coordinator for Security, 
Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism to “propose and develop ways to 
encourage private industry to perform periodic risk assessments.” 116
The USA Patriot Act of 2001 defined critical infrastructure more broadly to mean 
“systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the 
incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on 
security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any 
combination.” 117  The Act reiterated the policy of public-private partnership involving 
corporate and non-governmental organizations. Two of eight major initiatives in the 
National Strategy for Homeland Security of July 2002 are to “build and maintain a 
complete and accurate assessment of America’s critical infrastructure and key assets” and 
“enable effective partnership with state and local governments and the private sector.”  
The strategy reinforced the belief that a close partnership between government and the 
private sector is essential to national CI/KR protection efforts.  Accordingly, the vision 
for CI/KR protection expressed in the strategy called for the new Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) to “forge an unprecedented level of cooperation throughout all 
levels of government, with private industry and institutions.” 118  It also stated that DHS 
would establish a single office to work with state and local governments and the private 
sector to implement a comprehensive national plan for CI/KR protection.  The Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, signed late that year, created DHS and gave it responsibility for 
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leading the national critical infrastructure protection effort.  It also required DHS to 
develop a comprehensive national plan for CI/KR security. 119   
In February 2003, the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical 
Infrastructures and Key Assets set out specific national goals, objectives, and guiding 
principles for CI/KR protection.  Of special note here is what the strategy outlines as the 
key role of state government.  It specified that states should facilitate coordinated 
planning for CI/KR protection, applying unified criteria for determining criticality and 
prioritizing protection investments.  It also specified the need for DHS to work with state 
and local governments and the private sector to establish a uniform methodology for 
determining national-level criticality. 120  The strategy went on to describe a unifying 
organizational framework through which the public and private sectors could cooperate 
in national-level efforts to assess CI/KR vulnerabilities and advance protection efforts.  
Though the strategy references the need to coordinate and consolidate federal and state 
protection plans, it clearly emphasizes a direct national-level relationship between DHS, 
lead federal agencies, and the CI/KR industry sectors.121  Despite broad policy statements 
concerning collaboration with state and local government, the strategy begins to set the 
stage for what has emerged as DHS-dominated interaction with the CI/KR sectors.  This 
is concurrent with ongoing CI/KR protection initiatives by state and local agencies.  Such 
a dichotomy in policy has implications for the implementation of the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan, and especially the national risk assessment framework. 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) identified what are now the 
17 CI/KR sectors, further defined the overarching leadership and coordination role of 
DHS, and outlined the responsibilities of other federal departments and agencies with 
CI/KR sector-specific responsibilities.  Consistent with the Homeland Security Act of 
2002, HSPD-7 directed the DHS secretary to produce a comprehensive, integrated 
national plan for CI/KR protection by December 2004.  The Plan was to include a 
strategy to identify, prioritize, and coordinate CI/KR protection and a summary of 
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activities to define, prioritize, and reduce the vulnerability of CI/KR assets. 122  In 
response to HSPD-7, the Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan was published in 
February 2005.  It was issued to provide the framework to guide a coordinated national 
approach, as called for in the 2003 National Strategy for the Physical Protection of 
Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets.  DHS released other drafts of the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan for comment in November 2005 and January 2006. 123  The 
final National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) was published in June 2006. 
The NIPP has been described as a base plan or national blueprint for how DHS, 
Sector-Specific Agencies (SSAs), and other relevant stakeholders should advance and 
coordinate CI/KR protection initiatives within and across sectors.  The SSAs interact with 
their respective sectors through a sector partnership model in the form of the Critical 
Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC).  CIPAC is the organizing structure 
for coordinating joint government and private sector efforts to implement the NIPP.  That 
structure is composed of a mirror arrangement of industry sector coordinating councils 
and government coordinating councils for each sector.  The NIPP required individual 
SSAs for each sector to submit Sector-Specific Plans (SSPs) to DHS by the end of 
December 2006.  Following the guidance and basic outline established in the NIPP base 
plan, SSPs were to set out the means by which the sectors would identify critical assets, 
assess risks, set priorities, and develop protective measures for that sector.  Central to the 
entire concept of the NIPP, and at the heart of sector planning and implementation 
efforts, is the NIPP’s risk management framework.  That framework established basic 
principles and criteria for assessing CI/KR risks and formulating and managing the 
implementation of sector-specific security strategies. 124
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2. Sector Partnership Model 
In proposing collaborative approaches to addressing the complex problems in 
homeland security, researcher Thomas Stanton presented the Stakeholder Council Model 
in 2003 as an alternative to top-down federal interaction with state and local government 
and the private sector.  Stanton cites Lester Salamon when he says “the administration of 
government services is moving from a hierarchical structure to the management of 
organizational networks.” 125  Stanton suggests that to achieve national homeland 
security aims, the federal government must act through what Salamon has called third-
party government, consisting of state and local government and the private sector.  The 
Stakeholder Council Model provides a means for bringing many different stakeholders 
together to develop solutions to specific federal concerns.  He asserts that “the 
Stakeholder Council Model is based on years of experience with standard-setting groups 
in many sectors of the economy” including the Electronic Benefits Transfer Council and 
the delivery of government payments to clients (i.e., food stamps, etc.) by the states. 126  
Stanton describes the traditional federal model as being hierarchical, with the 
imposition of policy from above, often on the basis of limited consultation with the 
affected parties.  He posits that this is unlikely to be effective in dealing with complex 
homeland security problems, especially ones that call for management of complex 
networks.  The number of stakeholders, the variety of positions, and the range of 
differing values makes success difficult through a purely mandatory approach.  He 
acknowledges that state and local governments and the private sector have a better 
understanding of the critical facts needed to implement national homeland security 
strategy.  The Stakeholder Council Model as proposed by Stanton, while potentially more 
labor intensive and time-consuming in the deliberative phase, “may allow the 
development of more effective and comprehensive solutions for the longer term.”  127   
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Similar to what Stanton proposed in 2003, the NIPP sector partnership model 
provides a structure through which different levels of government and the private sector 
can collaborate in CI/KR protection planning and implementation efforts.  CIPAC 
supports the sector partnership model by “providing a legal framework” for members of 
the industry sector coordinating councils (SCCs) and government coordinating councils 
(GCCs) to engage in joint CI/KR protection-related activities.  Through this partnership, 
SSAs liaise with their industry sector and federal, state, and local government 
counterparts in the development and review of their respective SSPs.  Under the CIPAC, 
SCCs and GCCs are also empowered to advance policy initiatives unique to their 
individual sectors.  Beyond the SSPs themselves, the CIPAC serves as a forum for SCCs 
and GCCs to engage in ongoing CI/KR protection-related functions such as the 
implementation of security programs and coordination of incident response and recovery. 
CIPAC encourages all CI/KR owners and operators to use the SCC for their industry as 
























Figure 4.   Sector Partnership Model. 129 
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Membership in SCCs varies by sector, but is intended to be representative of all 
stakeholders within that sector.  GCCs, as government counterparts to each SCC, provide 
interagency and cross-jurisdictional coordination, and are comprised of members from 
across various levels of government as appropriate to each sector.  Providing “cross-
sector” coordination are the Private Sector Cross-Sector Council (the previously 
established Partnership for Critical Infrastructure Security or PCIS), and the Government 
Cross-Sector Council.  PCIS provides senior-level, strategic coordination with DHS and 
the SSAs.  The Government Cross-Sector Council is made up of two sub-councils: the 
Federal Senior Leadership Council (FSLC), and the State, Local, and Tribal Government 
Coordinating Council (SLTGCC).  The FSLC provides coordination between and among 
federal agencies.  The SLTGCC provides a structure to coordinate across state and local 
jurisdictions.  In addition, the NIPP partnership model makes provisions for Regional 
Coordinating Councils to enable CI/KR protection coordination within and across 
geographical areas and sectors. 130   
As described in Chapter II, the CIPAC sector partnership consists of over 500 
individual member entities representing a substantial cross-section of public and private 
sector CI/KR security stakeholders.  It is a far-reaching collaborative network-of-
networks that is largely self-managed, diverse in character, and national in scope (see 
Figure 4).   
3. Sector-Specific Plans  
The NIPP required that Sector-Specific Agencies (SSAs), as designated in HSPD-
7, develop Sector-Specific Plans (SSPs) to “provide details on how the CI/KR mission 
will be coordinated, developed, and implemented within the 17 CI/KR sectors.”  SSPs 
were to be developed in collaboration with SCCs and other security partners and 
submitted to DHS within 180 days of final approval of the NIPP (December 2006).   
Developed according to the basic requirements outlined in the NIPP, SSPs are tailored to 
the individual needs of the CI/KR sector for which they are written.  Basic requirements 
for SSPs include definition of sector security partners, authorities, regulatory basis, roles 
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and responsibilities, and interdependencies; procedures for sector interaction, information 
sharing, coordination, and partnership; goals and objectives for CI/KR protection; and a 
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Figure 5.   Sector-Specific Agencies and HSPD-7 Assigned CI/KR Sectors. 132 
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SSAs are responsible for leading and coordinating the development of SSPs in 
conjunction with the SCCs, GCCs and other security partners.  SSPs are to be updated as 
threats change and protective programs are implemented.  As a common risk 
management framework develops and becomes institutionalized, it will permit the 
assessment of performance in implementing CI/KR protection programs.  SSAs, in 
coordination with the GCCs and SCCs, are responsible for revising SSPs to reflect this 
performance and any other changes in overall security posture.  Having responsibility for 
national coordination for CI/KR protection, DHS monitors NIPP and SSP 
implementation and tracks progress toward achieving NIPP goals and objectives. 133  On 
May 21, 2007, the DHS secretary announced the completion of the 17 SSPs.  In making 
this announcement, Secretary Chertoff stated… “This is the first time in the history of the 
country that the government and the private sector have ever come together on such a 
large scale to develop a joint plan. And if you think about the literally millions of 
businesses and the millions of types of economic activity that occur every day, you'll 
begin to realize what a truly remarkable exercise this has been…” 134
A July 2007 review of the SSPs by the GAO found that nine SSPs generally met 
NIPP requirements and DHS supplemental guidance.  Most included the required 
elements of the NIPP risk management framework, but eight did not address incentives 
the sectors would use to encourage risk assessments by CI/KR owners.  GAO also found 
that some plans were more developed and comprehensive than others, largely depending 
on the maturity of those sectors and how they defined their assets and functions.  
According to GAO, given the differences in the plans to date, it is unclear to what extent 
DHS will be able to identify gaps and critical interdependencies across the sectors as part 
of any national roll-up.  Perhaps most significant among GAO findings was that 
representatives of the GCCs and SCCs had differing views regarding the value of sector-
specific plans and DHS review of those plans.  The report said that… “while 10 of the 32 
council representatives we interviewed reported that they saw the plans as 
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useful…representatives of eight councils disagreed because they believed the plans either 
did not represent a partnership among the necessary key stakeholders, especially the 
private sector, or were not valuable because the sector had already done so much work on 
its own and had progressed beyond the plan.” 135  As of this writing, the SSPs are still 
under review by DHS.  
4. Risk Management Framework 
In the keynote address to the DHS 2006 Grants & Training National Conference, 
DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff stated that “we all have to work together to protect our 
communities and our country, and we have to do it not by mandates from the top down 
but by networking from the bottom up…We have to have a common approach, a 
coordinated approach, across all of the phases of what we have to do to create homeland 
security.”  The secretary then emphasized a point he has made numerous times since 
taking office…“the core principle that animates what we do at DHS…is risk 
management.” 136  Indeed, in every public appearance and in most of his testimony 
before Congress, the DHS secretary has reiterated his strategic intent to implement risk-
based decision-making to guide homeland security at all levels of government, consistent 
with the guidance he has received from both the president and the Congress.  Nowhere is 
the application of risk management more fundamental than in the protection of the 
nation’s critical infrastructure.  Accordingly, the cornerstone of the NIPP is a risk 
management framework that sets out broad guidance for a process of continuous 
assessment and improvement in the security of the nation’s CI/KR assets.   
The NIPP risk management framework includes the basic steps of risk 
management: setting security goals; the identification of critical CI/KR assets; risk 
assessment; priority setting; implementation of protective measures; and the ongoing 
measurement of program effectiveness and the reprogramming of results as the cycle 
repeats itself.  The risk management cycle described in the NIPP is similar to the 
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framework outlined by the GAO for application to homeland security decision-making, 
as described in Chapter II.  The process is intended to drive cooperative CI/KR risk-
reduction and risk management efforts by DHS, the SSAs, SCCs, and other security 
partners that share responsibility for CI/KR protection.  According to the NIPP, the risk 
management framework can be applied at an asset, system, network, or functional level, 
depending on the individual CI/KR sector.  In some cases it may be applied bottom-up, 
asset-by-asset, or top-down, taking a broader business-wide or continuity approach. 137  
Figure 6.   NIPP Risk Management Framework. 138 
The NIPP assigns SSAs the responsibility for leading sector-specific risk manage-
ment programs and for ensuring that the tailored, sector-specific application of the risk 
management framework is addressed in their respective SSPs.  The NIPP describes DHS 
responsibility as supporting the efforts of the SSAs by providing guidance, tools, and 
analytical support.  DHS is also responsible for integrating the results of sector-specific 
risk management efforts for cross-sector, national-level risk analysis and management 
activities. According to the NIPP, state governments are responsible for establishing 
security partnerships, facilitating coordinated information sharing, and enabling planning 
and preparedness for CI/KR protection within their jurisdictions.   The NIPP suggests that 
state efforts essentially mirror those of DHS and the SSAs to include developing a unified 
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approach to CI/KR risk management.  139  It further suggests that state and local 
governments participate in the NIPP sector partnership model and may pursue CI/KR 
protection initiatives as a regional coordinating council.  The NIPP considers such efforts 
as complementary and enhancing the implementation of the NIPP and the SSPs “by pro-
viding unique geographical focus and cross-sector coordination.”  140  A NIPP appendix 
addresses state and local concerns and provides advice on pursuing their own CI/KR 
protection programs. 141  
Though the NIPP outlines a basic risk management framework, it does not 
provide a common method or metrics for the most pivotal part of the process – the 
assessment of risk.  The NIPP essentially acknowledges that there are a variety of risk 
assessment methodologies in use across the various sectors and that these have varied 
widely in terms of assumptions, comprehensiveness, objectivity, and other dimensions.   
In the interest of supporting comparative risk analysis at a national level, a set of baseline 
criteria are set forth for methodologies that may be employed under the NIPP framework.  
There are seven baseline criteria to establish whether a methodology is both credible 
enough to stand up to objective evaluation, and comparable with other standard methods 
used. 142  There is no indication in the NIPP as to how the baseline criteria will be 
applied, what existing methodologies meet the criteria and are thus recommended for 
application, and what the process will be for advancing common standards and processes 
for risk assessments that are robust and compatible enough to support comparisons both 
within and across sectors as an essential component of the national risk management 
framework. 
Of the SSPs not restricted and available for public review, only the transportation 
and water sectors had a robust discussion of their approach to risk assessment.  The water 
sector described a suite of assessment tools available to and used extensively by that 
industry.  The transportation sector also outlined tools available for asset-level 
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assessment within individual sub-sectors.  However, the transportation SSP also outlined 
an overall approach to system-wide risk management in what it called the Systems-Based 
Risk Management Process (SBRM). 143   
B. HOMELAND SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT PROGRAMS  
1. National-Level Risk Assessment  
Despite successive statements of strategic intent by the president, the Congress, 
and two secretaries, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) continues to face 
challenges in advancing an integrated national program of risk assessment and risk 
management.  There are a number of practical reasons for this.  The concepts surrounding 
risk assessment for high consequence / low probability events, particularly for acts of 
terrorism, are new and complex.  The Department is large and still evolving.  It struggles 
with amalgamating the established cultures and practices of legacy agencies while having 
to build entirely new functions and integrate all of these into one unified organization.   It 
is also advancing a wide range of other programs, all national in scope, at the same time 
it is developing the policies, procedures, and practices necessary to support and sustain 
those programs.  Finally, it exists in a highly charged political climate where it is under 
constant scrutiny and its senior leaders are, by necessity, often engaged in defending its 
actions to a sometimes partisan and always impatient Congress as well as state and local 
elected leaders.  Despite progress made by individual DHS agencies in developing and 
implementing risk assessment initiatives, the Department’s evolution of risk management 
policies and programs overall has often been slow and painful, still in search of an over-
arching strategy and departmental and national-level coordination.  According to the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS), one of the central problems for DHS is that risk 
needs to be defined not only at the macro-level but on the micro-level as well. 144  
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Evaluation of risk at the macro-level is by geographic region and the nation as a 
whole.  At the micro-level, it is by specific critical assets or groupings of assets.  DHS 
describes its approach to these two types of risk assessment in a 2006 grant program fact 
sheet.  Geographically-based risk considers “…general characteristics of a geographic 
area, mostly independent of the assets that exist within that area…reported threats, law 
enforcement activity… suspicious incidents… the area’s proximity to international 
borders… the potential consequences of an attack on that area, including human health, 
economy, strategic mission, and psychological impacts.”  On the other hand, asset-based 
risk “...employs strategic threat estimates from the Intelligence Community of an 
adversary’s intent and capability to attack different types of assets… using different 
methods of attack… The vulnerability of each asset type to each attack method is 
analyzed to yield the form of attack most likely to be successful.” 145  The evolution of 
DHS risk assessment can therefore be viewed along these two different lines. 
In theory, risk assessment should guide overall homeland security strategy, 
programs, and investment priorities for both the federal interagency community and the 
rest of the nation.  Unfortunately, much of the national focus on risk assessment has 
centered on only a part of the total picture – allocations of grant funds to states and high-
threat urban areas for preparedness under the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP).  
CRS notes that, since the formation of DHS, many state and local leaders have expressed 
frustration with the risk assessment process and the Department’s method of allocating 
grant funds.  This is in addition to “a perceived lack of transparency regarding the risk 
assessment process.” 146  In the face of this frustration, and corresponding pressure from 
Congress, DHS has made incremental changes to its risk assessment formula to guide 
HSGP fund allocation.  
In its recent review of DHS grant programs and risk assessment methodologies, 
CRS outlined a basic evolution in the Department’s approach to macro-level risk 
assessment to drive the grant process.  As CRS describes it, from 2001, when the 
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Department of Justice (DOJ) had primary responsibility for assessing risk, to 2002-2003, 
when this responsibility was transferred to DHS, risk assessment was at an early stage 
and developmental in character, with risk generally assessed and measured according to 
population.  From 2003 to 2006, DHS began using a more sophisticated methodology 
that incorporated probability into its risk calculus, and by 2006 was expressing risk more 
fully as the product of threat, vulnerability, and consequence.  In so doing, it also began 
to consider risk to both geographic areas and critical assets within those areas. 147  
However, from its national perch, DHS had too distant a perspective to assess the actual 
criticality or vulnerability of individual assets, and came under fire for what was being 
characterized as “critical infrastructure” in the National Asset Database (NADB).   
The NADB should be a fundamental source of asset information for DHS risk 
assessment efforts.  However, an audit by the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) in 
2006 indicated that “the NADB is not yet comprehensive enough to support the 
management and resource allocation decision-making envisioned by the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP).  OIP has a substantial amount of work ahead to 
determine the ultimate disposition of the NADB’s contents and each asset’s importance 
to the country.” 148  Consequently, for 2007, CRS notes that “due to difficulties 
associated with differentiating vulnerability values across areas and states, according to 
DHS it has, in effect, assigned a value of one to vulnerability.  As a result, while three 
variables may formally remain in the formula, in effect only two exist… In addition, 
significant changes to the underlying elements of each variable were made.” 149  The 
absence of solid and reliable information in the NADB has thus blunted the ability of 
DHS, on its own, to consider asset vulnerability in performing asset-based risk 
assessments.  This is not surprising given the volume of data and the context in which 
this data was acquired.   
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Though the NADB began with an initial list of almost two thousand assets 
identified by DHS, it grew to a list of over seventy-seven thousand assets after two data 
calls to the states in 2003 and 2004.  According to the OIG, the database included assets 
that are “unusual, or out-of-place… and whose criticality is not readily apparent.” 150  
OIG also noted inconsistencies in the data from state to state.  The OIG report cites the 
remarks of Harold Rogers, then chairman of the House Appropriations, Subcommittee on 
Homeland Security who said, “Without a comprehensive and current inventory of our 
Nation’s critical infrastructure …the department’s efforts to implement the appropriate 
protective measures… and make the right decisions about grant allocations are severely 
hampered.” 151  Such an inventory cannot be developed without active involvement from 
state and local officials and the private sector, and clear guidelines applied uniformly 
across the nation.   
Given the sheer number of potential targets, no macro-level national risk 
assessment can be wholly reliable unless fed by bottom-up micro-level criticality, 
vulnerability, and risk assessments conducted by state and local governments and critical 
infrastructure owners and operators.  Of course, this assumes buy-in to a uniform and 
integrated national framework, one informed by the use of compatible risk assessment 
methodologies by these non-federal partners, as called for in the NIPP.  However, as of 
this writing, no such compatible set of methodologies exist, though various DHS agencies 
and others have advanced their own approaches to micro-level risk assessment along the 
way.  These approaches have evolved independently from the top-down macro-level 
methods used to drive the Homeland Security Grant Program. 
2. Asset-Based Risk Assessment  
In an effort to help DHS officials better understand the range of existing tools 
available to support risk-based decision-making, the Homeland Security Institute (HSI) 
reviewed over fifty different risk assessment methods and over thirty different risk 
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assessment frameworks from government, academia, and private industry.  These were 
distilled into twenty-five discrete approaches, each chosen for its use in, or promise to, 
homeland security.  These twenty-five approaches were offered by HSI as basic 
“primers” to support further development of DHS risk assessment programs. 152  The 
range of methods and frameworks outlined in the HSI study underscores the complex 
challenge DHS decision makers have in pursuing a common and integrated approach to 
risk assessment consistent with the guidance concerning a national risk management 
framework in the NIPP.  That challenge may either be further aided or complicated by 
risk assessment initiatives advanced by several of its component agencies working within 
the transportation sector, one of the largest sectors in the NIPP.  This includes the Coast 
Guard and ODP (now Grant Programs) and their respective port and transit risk 
assessment activities that pre-date the NIPP.  Driven by both the strategic guidance from 
above and the practical need to advance risk-based decision-making in their individual 
mission areas, various DHS agencies have, on their own and in the absence of an overall 
department-wide risk strategy, advanced efforts to develop and employ asset-based risk 
assessment methodologies.  Each of these initiatives has been pursued on different 
timelines, using diverse approaches, for various (sometimes overlapping) customers, and 
with varying degrees of success. 
The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) was the first federal agency after 9/11 to develop 
and employ a terrorism risk assessment methodology with its introduction of the Port 
Security Risk Assessment Tool (PS-RAT) and the National Risk Assessment Tool (N-
RAT) in late 2001, well before the formation of DHS and the passage of the Maritime 
Transportation Security Act of 2002. 153  The Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) 
soon followed in 2002 with its production of the Special Needs Jurisdiction Tool Kit 
(SNJTK) for transportation infrastructure, which it applied for the first time with the Port 
Authority of New York and New Jersey, a multimodal regional transportation authority, 
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and owners and operators of the World Trade Center.154  Not too far behind was the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA).  That agency advanced an entirely 
separate risk assessment regime to include the Transportation Risk Assessment and 
Vulnerability Evaluation (TRAVEL) Tool for transportation assets, and the Vulnerability 
Identification Self-Assessment Tool (VISAT) for mass transit.  Add to these the TSA 
Maritime Self-Assessment Risk Module (TMSARM). 155   
After several years of development, The USCG PS-RAT evolved into the 
Maritime Security Risk Assessment Model (MSRAM).  Likewise, ODP’s SNJTK 
evolved into two newer methods, the Transit Risk Assessment Module (TRAM) toolkit 
and the Maritime Assessment and Strategy Toolkit (MAST).  TRAM and MAST are 
compatible methodologies, and each goes beyond basic risk assessment by enabling the 
comparison of the risk reduction potential of various countermeasures across different 
assets.  They also allow the evaluation of the relative cost-benefit potential of different 
classes of countermeasures.  ODP has conducted TRAM assessments at over thirty of the 
nation’s major transit properties under a Risk Assessment Technical Assistance program.  
MAST is now being used to amplify MSRAM results and aid in the transition to a 
maritime security risk management regime.  Thus far, the USCG has conducted MSRAM 
assessments at over 70 of the nation’s ports.  MAST assessments (a more involved and 
lengthy process) have been conducted at some of the nation’s largest port regions – Los 
Angeles and Long Beach, Baltimore, and New York.  Both TRAM and MSRAM/MAST 
assessments continue to be conducted for ports and transit agencies across the country.  
More recently, TSA has entered into a cooperative agreement with Boeing to develop a 
Risk Management Assessment Tool (RMAT) for the commercial aviation system.  The 
agreement continues joint TSA / Boeing collaboration to evaluate the costs and benefits 
of proposed security measures. 156   
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In the New York / New Jersey port region, risk assessments conducted by the 
Coast Guard, covering all critical infrastructure along the waterfront, have overlapped 
with ODP-supported risk assessments performed by the Port Authority of New York and 
New Jersey for its own port, bridge, tunnel, transit, and airport facilities in the same 
jurisdiction.  The assessments have neither been coordinated nor the results integrated.  
The same facilities have been assessed through different methodologies, by different 
agencies, with different results, for different purposes. 
In 2003, through a grant from the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP), and 
under the oversight the Office of Infrastructure Protection (OIP), the American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Innovative Technologies Institute LLC (ITI) was 
commissioned to create the Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection 
(RAMCAPTM) program. 157  The purpose of the RAMCAPTM initiative was to develop a 
common framework for evaluating consequences, vulnerability, and risk based on 
common terminology, common metrics for comparing risks, and a common basis for 
reporting results across all CI/KR sectors. 158  Though it is the only risk assessment tool 
identified in the NIPP for use across all sectors, RAMCAP™ has not yet enjoyed wide 
acceptance, for reasons not readily apparent from the available literature.  As noted by 
Congresswomen Carolyn Maloney in a letter to the DHS Secretary, to date RAMCAP™ 
has only been adopted for use in three of seventeen CI/KR sectors: chemical 
manufacturing, nuclear power and energy.  Two more are underway – water and 
wastewater treatment, and dams. 159   
As of this writing, the future application of RAMCAP™ across the remaining 
twelve CI/KR sectors is uncertain.  OIP has recently tasked the Oak Ridge Institute for 
Science and Education (ORISE) to conduct expert panels to identify and evaluate risk 
assessment methodologies available for use by the various CI/KR sectors.  According to a 
project fact sheet, deliverables include “a list and brief description of available risk 
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assessment methodologies and results of an initial evaluation of each method against the 
NIPP Baseline Criteria and a listing of the methods currently used by the sectors.” 160  So 
the search for CI/KR risk assessment methodologies goes on, despite prior DHS 
investment in RAMCAP™ and other sector-specific methodologies. 
3. Commentary on Homeland Security Risk Assessment  
Even before September 11, 2001, the GAO had been advocating the use of risk 
management practices to set priorities and facilitate decisions on the allocation of federal 
funds for counter-terrorism activities.  Since then, the GAO and the CRS have issued 
numerous reports to Congress on the progress of DHS risk management efforts.  In 
testimony before Congress in October 2001, the GAO outlined basic risk management 
principles and strongly urged lawmakers to ensure that the Office of Homeland Security 
(OHS) embraced this practice.161  In addressing the challenges associated with critical 
infrastructure protection a year later, GAO emphasized again the importance of 
proactively managing security risk. 162  In December 2002, a CRS report provided a 
primer for Congress on risk assessment as outlined in the National Strategy for Homeland 
Security.  CRS noted that the Homeland Security Act of 2002 assigned risk analysis 
activities to the HSI as well as to other components of DHS.  CRS suggested options for 
Congress to include requiring the establishment of guidelines and conditioning grants on 
state and local completion of risk assessments. 163   
During September 2003, in what would become a nearly annual report on risk 
management and critical infrastructure protection, CRS noted that DHS responsibility for 
coordinating critical infrastructure protection had been delegated to Information Analysis 
and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP).  In particular, IAIP was tasked with integrating 
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threat and vulnerability assessments to identify and manage risk and help set priorities.  
CRS pointed out that similar activities were being undertaken by other agencies and by 
the private sector and state and local governments.  CRS again suggested that DHS 
develop a protocol outlining the specific steps to be taken in the risk management process 
to ensure consistency in carrying out assessments and in making decisions.  A February 
2005 CRS report essentially cited the same issues and options. 164
In June of 2003, GAO was asked by Congress to review the state of security 
efforts across the nation’s transportation system.  In its report, the agency noted efforts by 
some transportation operators to apply risk management practices.  It also noted the 
TSA’s intent to incorporate risk management into its decision-making and that it was in 
the process of developing standardized criticality, threat, and vulnerability assessment 
tools. 165  One year later, in a GAO review of aviation security, it found that although the 
TSA was conducting airport vulnerability assessments, it would benefit from a more 
comprehensive risk management approach. 166  In a follow-up review of TSA in February 
2005, the GAO found that it still had not implemented a comprehensive risk management 
program.  Throughout the course of GAO’s work, “one theme consistently surfaced – the 
need for TSA to fully utilize and integrate a risk management approach into its decision 
making processes.” 167  
With increasing national concern over rail system security, a GAO report in 
October 2005 found that, notwithstanding risk assessments of passenger rail systems 
conducted by the ODP, TSA had only just begun to establish a risk methodology, and 
that TSA efforts may be unnecessarily duplicating risk management activities already 
underway at other agencies.  Like CRS, GAO noted the overlapping risk assessment 
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work of ODP, TSA and IAIP, the latter having overarching responsibility for risk 
management across all CI/KR sectors.  GAO also reported that DHS had not yet 
developed common and consistent risk assessment practices: “Until this framework is 
complete, it will not be possible for information from different sectors to be reconciled to 
allow for a meaningful comparison of risk — a goal outlined in DHS’s interim NIPP.” 168
In December of 2005, GAO looked beyond the domain of TSA and examined 
how three other DHS components — the Coast Guard, ODP and IAIP — were carrying 
out efforts to advance risk management for port security.  GAO identified the Coast 
Guard as being furthest along and that it, and ODP, had a relatively robust methodology 
in place for assessing risk.  As the newest of the three components, IAIP had made the 
least progress, but clearly had the most complex task — addressing not just ports but all 
CI/KR sectors.  GAO noted that IAIP was still developing its methodology and that the 
agency had several setbacks in completing the task.  Though some progress had been 
made in conducting risk assessments of individual assets, there was little progress on 
comparisons and priority setting across ports or other infrastructure sectors — the type of 
assessments IAIP was set up to do.  GAO opined that progress would depend on how 
these activities were coordinated across agencies, since current approaches are neither 
consistent nor comparable.  GAO went on to suggest that the need for “consistency and 
coherence” becomes greater as individual risk management efforts mature, since the 
likelihood only increases that disparate programs will “fragment, clash, and work at cross 
purposes.” 169
In its March 2006 review of federal response to Hurricane Katrina, GAO 
extended its call for risk management approaches to large-scale natural disasters.  GAO 
said that “the stand-up and sustaining of capabilities should be based on a risk assessment 
that would call for examining what vulnerabilities from a potential catastrophic disaster 
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require attention and how they should be addressed within available resources.” 170  In 
May 2006, GAO reinforced its push for critical infrastructure protection guidance and the 
need to assess the progress being made, highlighting the importance of risk management 
in that regard.171  This was followed by a more in-depth report in September 2006 in 
which the GAO recommended a comprehensive national framework be established to 
address the full spectrum of catastrophic disasters by taking an “all-hazards approach” to 
risk management.  GAO envisioned risk management being applied to guide decision-
making at the federal, state, and local level. 172   
In a review of homeland security efforts to that point, a January 2007 GAO report 
found that “while much attention has been focused on mitigating the specific risks of 
9/11, other critical assets…are also at risk of terrorist attack.”  GAO’s review showed that 
while various risk assessment approaches were in use, they were neither consistent nor 
comparable, and that there was still no common framework “to evaluate risk assessments 
within sectors or across sectors.” 173  GAO cautioned that implementing a national risk 
management framework would rest heavily on how well DHS coordinates homeland 
security risk management efforts with other federal departments as well as with state, 
local, and private-sector partners.  DHS acknowledged that it could not yet assess how 
effective federal investments had been in mitigating risk because they did not have the 
metrics to do so.  GAO also found that “efforts to establish guidance to coordinate a risk-
based approach across DHS components have been hampered by organizational 
restructuring.” 174
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In January 2007, CRS was also pointing out to Congress that DHS had still not 
implemented a “consistent systematic approach for identifying nationally critical assets, 
assessing the risks they pose, and using that information to inform cost-effective 
allocation of resources.”  Though CRS did note that “the NIPP appears to provide a 
framework…that outlines…the steps taken in the risk assessment and risk management 
process…it is not clear how transparent the implementation of the plan will be.” 175  In a 
detailed report on the evolution of DHS risk assessment practices and homeland security 
grant program allocation formulas, CRS cautioned Congress that… 
The lack of a coherent, long-term, overarching risk strategy…could have 
negative repercussions for buying down risk.  Without a clearly articulated 
risk methodology…a baseline understanding of the Nation’s risk profile 
may never be achieved and the…process could potentially be vulnerable 
to budget fluctuations and political influence.  This is especially important 
given the apparent division of risk assessment responsibilities throughout 
various offices and directorates within the department. 176
CRS went on to say that, as states and localities continue to provide information 
to the risk assessment process, the need to develop a national risk assessment strategy at 
all levels of government becomes even stronger.  CRS suggested several procedural and 
organizational options for Congress to consider, among them to further enhance 
transparency of risk management policy and processes; develop a risk strategy within 
DHS and throughout all government agencies; appoint a DHS Risk Assessment Manager; 
create a Risk Advisory Board; and establish a permanent Risk Assessment Center.  These 
recommendations were similar to those made by the president’s own National 
Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) in October 2005.   
NIAC investigated whether private sector risk management experience could 
provide meaningful guidance on planning and programs for critical infrastructure 
protection.  The three principal findings of the report were that standard methodologies 
maximize the effectiveness of risk management programs; empowered leadership and a 
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supportive culture and organization are likewise essential to success; and, independent 
oversight of risk management enhances overall strategic direction, focus, and 
accountability.  Accordingly, the report recommended standardization of risk 
management approaches; establishment of a risk management leadership role; and an 
oversight function to ensure accountability, promote standards, and set resource 
priorities.177   
The task of developing and implementing a national risk assessment framework 
and associated policy and practices in support of the NIPP is immensely challenging and 
fraught with its own risk.  However, the findings of both the GAO and CRS over the 
years, and the relative success of at least two DHS components in establishing risk 
assessment programs in their own mission areas, would seem to indicate that 
implementation may have more to do with organizational and institutional issues rather 
than matters of mechanics or methodology, as complex as these maybe.     
4. Changing Roles and Responsibilities  
Roles and responsibilities for leading risk assessment and risk management 
functions within DHS have evolved a number of times since its formation on March 1, 
2003.  The Homeland Security Act of 2002 assigned DHS responsibility for coordinating 
the protection of the nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR).  Much of 
this role was delegated to the newly created Information Analysis and Infrastructure 
Protection (IA/IP) Directorate.  IAIP was charged with carrying out vulnerability and risk 
assessments, preparing a national plan for CI/KR protection, and recommending specific 
protection measures as necessary. 178  The Homeland Security Act of 2002 also directed 
that the Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP), transferred into DHS from the 
Department of Justice (DOJ), be responsible for coordinating federal preparedness efforts  
 
 
                                                 
177 National Infrastructure Advisory Council, Risk Management Approaches to Protection - Final 
Report and Recommendations by the Council (October 2005), 4-19. 
178 Homeland Security Act of 2002, 2145-2146.  
 71
and working with state, local, and tribal governments and the private sector on all matters 
related to combating terrorism, to include coordinating risk analysis and risk management 
activities. 179   
The president’s strategic intent with regard to the application of risk assessment 
and risk management practices by the new DHS was initially outlined within the National 
Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets, issued in 
February 2003.   The strategy suggested that risk assessment and risk management had to 
be closely integrated and coordinated, and that industries and institutions would need to 
be guided by common vocabulary and standards.  It also emphasized that close 
cooperation among all levels of government and the private sector would be essential to a 
shared vernacular and vision.  Accordingly, the strategy called for DHS to work in 
collaboration with other key stakeholders to develop a “uniform methodology for 
identifying facilities, systems, and functions with national-level criticality to help 
establish Federal, state, and local government, and the private-sector protection 
priorities.” 180  In so doing, it charged DHS with coordinating the sharing of risk 
management best practices between government and the private sector to build a common 
assessment framework.   This responsibility was reiterated in late 2003 with HSPD-7.  
HSPD-7 directed the DHS secretary to establish “uniform policies, approaches, 
guidelines, and methodologies for integrating Federal infrastructure protection and risk 
management activities within and across sectors along with metrics and criteria.” 181  It 
also directed SSAs to collaborate with federal departments, state and local government 
and the private sector to pursue vulnerability assessments and encourage risk 
management strategies to advance CI/KR protection efforts.  
After taking office, Secretary Michael Chertoff initiated a systematic evaluation 
of the Department’s operations, policies and structures.   That second stage review was 
completed in June 2005.  In his remarks before Congress, the secretary emphasized that 
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homeland security priorities needed to be driven by risk and that a new focus on 
preparedness would be guided by objective measures of risk and performance. 
Accordingly, the secretary outlined a major reorganization that consolidated all planning, 
training, exercising, and funding activities into a new Preparedness Directorate, to 
include the Infrastructure Protection half of the former IAIP.  What was the Information 
Analysis (IA) half of IAIP would become the new Office of Intelligence and Analysis 
(OIA). 182  With major changes in the alignment of DHS components, missions, and 
leadership came changes in the continuity and direction of risk management programs as 
well.  But these would not be the only changes.  Hurricane Katrina would be the unlikely 
catalyst for yet another major DHS reorganization the following year. 
The Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act was signed into law in October 2006, as 
part of the Homeland Security Appropriations Act of FY 2007.  In January 2007, the 
DHS secretary implemented the requirements of the Act by directing organizational 
changes that abolished the Preparedness Directorate, just over a year old, and reallocated 
a number of other key DHS components to FEMA.  Those reassigned functions included 
what was Grants and Training (G&T) under the Preparedness Directorate, formerly ODP 
when the Department was first created.  G&T would become simply Grant Programs 
under an expanded FEMA, taking along its risk assessment technical assistance initiative.  
While complying with the Act, the secretary also made other organizational changes, the 
most significant of which was the creation of the new National Protection and Programs 
Directorate (NPPD).  NPPD is currently made up of the US-VISIT program; the Office of 
Intergovernmental Programs; the Office of Cyber Security and Communications; the 
Office of Infrastructure Protection (OIP); and the new Office of Risk Management and 
Analysis (RMA). 183  Established in April 2007, RMA assumed the lead role for 
coordinating all DHS risk management efforts from OIP.  Another recently created 
organization with a major role in national risk assessment and management efforts is the 
Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC).  An overview of 
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current risk assessment and risk management roles and responsibilities of these DHS 
components follows.  This information was primarily obtained from recent DHS briefing 
materials and a report to Congress on the status of DHS risk management efforts. 
Office of Risk Management and Analysis (RMA) – RMA is now tasked with 
leading DHS efforts to establish a common framework to address the overall 
management and analysis of homeland security risk by coordinating national risk policy, 
risk analysis and assessment methodologies as well as risk management efforts by 
synchronizing and leveraging assets across DHS.  RMA is to support federal, state, local, 
and private sector efforts to implement and institutionalize risk-based programs by 
promoting cross-department and interagency coordination on risk issues, promoting 
generally accepted risk assessment and management principles, and developing a 
common vocabulary for risk analysis and risk management.  Subordinate functions within 
RMA include risk doctrine and policy, risk analysis, risk management, and risk 
performance.  DHS executive guidance and direction to RMA is to come from a Risk 
Steering Committee chaired by the undersecretary for National Protection and Programs 
and whose membership is drawn from the various components of the Department. 184  
Newly established, as of this writing, RMA is still in its formative stages, developing its 
organization and building its staff.   
Office of Infrastructure Protection (OIP) – OIP is in a state of transition with 
regard to DHS risk assessment and risk management efforts.  Initially responsible for 
taking the lead on risk assessment and management across DHS, its role has been steadily 
refocused with successive changes in DHS organization to include the creation and then 
abolition of the Preparedness Directorate, followed by the formation of NPPD and RMA.  
As has been its mission, OIP has conducted threat and risk analysis across CI/KR sectors, 
at the sector, geographic, and national levels for federal, state, local, and private sector 
partners. A major product for senior-level homeland security decision makers is the 
National CI/KR Protection Annual Report which includes the National CI/KR Risk 
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Profile. 185  In addition to the above, much of OIP’s current work portfolio revolves 
around the implementation of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), to 
include a national risk management framework for CI/KR protection. 
The Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection (RAMCAP™) 
initiative has been one of OIP’s main strategies for advancing the NIPP risk management 
framework.  RAMCAP™ is intended to facilitate the DHS partnership with industry to 
implement a common and compatible risk assessment regime across industry sectors and 
levels of government.  However, the program has yet to obtain broad acceptance.  To 
date, RAMCAP™ has been adopted for use in three of seventeen CI/KR sectors: 
chemical manufacturing, nuclear power and energy.  Two more are reported to be 
underway; water and wastewater treatment, and dams. 186  As previously stated, the 
future application of RAMCAP™ across the remaining twelve CI/KR sectors is 
uncertain.  Moreover, it appears that some functions, previously the domain of units 
internal to OIP, are in transition to another new DHS organization – HITRAC.   
Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC) – HITRAC 
is a unique joint program office shared by OIA and OIP and designed to integrate the 
intelligence and infrastructure capabilities and expertise of these two components.  Its 
purpose is to create and disseminate risk-informed analytic products to influence the 
prioritization of strategies designed to attain the greatest reduction of risk and best 
investment of national resources for the protection of critical infrastructure.  This 
blending of intelligence and critical infrastructure protection functions was an intent 
never realized in the original IAIP and, by default, all but abandoned with the creation of 
the Preparedness Directorate in 2005.  HITRAC products are intended to “support the 
security planning of state and local governments and CI/KR owners and operators, as 
well as an integrated national response to emergent threats or immediate incidents.” 187 
                                                 
185 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Improving Use of Risk-Informed Decision-Making in DHS 
- Report to Congress in Response to House Report 109-476 to the Fiscal Year 2007 Department of Homeland 
Security Appropriations Bill” (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, March 2007), 9-10. 
186 Carolyn Maloney, letter. 
187 Melissa Smislova and Brandon Wales, “The Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis 
Center” (briefing presented at the First Annual Conference of the Security Analysis and Risk Management 
Association, Washington, DC, May 22, 2007) 3-4.
 75
As a joint program of OIA and OIP, direction is set by an executive board that consists of 
the undersecretary of the NPPD, the assistant secretaries of OIA and OIP, and the deputy 
assistant secretary of Intelligence and Analysis for Intelligence, or their designees.   
Two primary functions within HITRAC are the Infrastructure Analysis Branch 
and the Risk Integration and Analysis Branch.  Infrastructure Analysis analyzes threats 
and risks to critical infrastructure by sector and sub-sector and prepares reports in 
coordination with and in support of federal, state and local authorities and the private 
sector.  Risk Integration and Analysis coordinates and develops the National CI/KR Risk 
Profile and the Strategic Homeland Infrastructure Risk Assessment (SHIRA).  It develops 
lists of the most critical CI/KR assets to support DHS grant programs; lists that serve as 
the focal point of OIP’s critical infrastructure protection planning activities with all of its 
stakeholders.  The branch also identifies new and improved risk methodologies to support 
new or updated infrastructure risk analysis and other CI/KR risk-related programs. 188   
Based on the limited information obtained to date, it is yet unclear as to what the 
relationship and division of labor is between HITRAC functions and the role of RMA and 
OIP.  This is particularly important as it relates to the identification and implementation 
of new risk assessment methodologies and coordination with non-federal partners in the 
implementation of the NIPP risk management framework.  Nor is it clear how risk 
practices established at the national level and in use by HITRAC will integrate with, and 
both inform and be informed by, risk practices in use by or to be implemented within 
individual CI/KR sectors and/or by other DHS components (i.e., ODP, TSA, and USCG).  
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IV. STRATEGIC CHANGE, PUBLIC POLICY, AND 
COMPLEXITY 
A. MANAGING STRATEGIC CHANGE 
1. Change and Strategic Management in the Public Sector 
In his seminal work Leading Change, John Kotter describes the powerful social 
and economic forces at work that drive major strategic change in organizations.  Though 
he acknowledges how major change efforts have helped some organizations adapt to the 
new realities of a volatile marketplace, he also cautions that his study of over one 
hundred major change efforts reveals, more often than not, that change has “been 
disappointing and the carnage has been appalling, with wasted resources and burned-out, 
scared, and frustrated employees.” 189   In his view, however, much of this waste and 
anguish is avoidable if managers can learn from the most common mistakes of the past.  
In a similar way, Rick Jackson describes the results of a 2005 workshop of senior 
government and private sector leaders that addressed strategic change in the federal 
government.  He cites the numerous “transformation initiatives” under way by major 
governmental agencies and opines that, despite the best efforts of the people involved, 
many of these initiatives will not survive changes in leadership and what he calls the 
“gravitational pull of the status quo.” 190  Like Kotter, he too acknowledges that there 
have been success stories, but reinforces the need to learn from the past.   
A white paper by the Public Governance Institute, in association with noted 
change consultant Daryl Conner, provides another stark and sobering view of the realities 
of achieving large-scale change, particularly in the public sector and as it relates to 
homeland security policy.  The paper describes how when major changes are announced, 
typical senior policy-makers may see it as the end of their work when, in reality, the real 
struggle is just beginning, with a long hard road that stretches from the initial statement 
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of a policy’s intent to the realization of its aims.  It goes on to describe how the business 
landscape is “littered with the carcasses of impeccable solutions that either failed outright 
or achieved much less than was expected.” 191  A large number of change initiatives that 
failed to realize their original intent, it contends, end up on “history’s garbage heap” after 
accomplishing little.  Too often public policy change efforts to address critical problems 
fall short of what policy-makers, organizations, and/or government agencies originally 
intended.  The reason the paper gives is poor implementation and a failure of the leaders 
responsible to understand the dynamics involved in managing these changes effectively.  
Both private and public sector strategic change in this modern age involve increasing 
levels of organizational complexity and are, more often than not, conducted in an 
environment that is turbulent and often hostile to the change intended.   
According to Theodore Poister and Gregory Streib, strategic management is vital 
to good public governance in that it integrates all major activities and functions and 
directs them toward advancing an organization’s strategic change agenda, particularly as 
it relates to substantive policy.  In their view, strategic management provides a 
“systematic, coherent, and effective approach to establishing, attaining, monitoring, and 
updating an agency’s strategic objectives.” 
192
  Strategic management, they say  (a) 
focuses attention across functional boundaries and organizational levels on common 
goals, themes, and issues; (b) ties internal management processes and program initiatives 
to desired outcomes in the external environment; and (c) links operational, tactical, day-
to-day decisions to longer-term strategic objectives.  Though Poister and Streib state that 
public sector managers have a number of options for influencing people and programs 
and bringing about organizational change, they suggest that these options cannot be used 
effectively without the clear sense of vision, mission, values, and strategy that comes 
from strategic management.  It provides them with the ability they need to identify 
emerging issues and understand their implications; craft viable strategies and mobilize 
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support; communicate the vision in a compelling way; and build the relationships and 
management structure needed to implement and sustain change. 
In Lewis Carol’s Alice in Wonderland, the Cheshire cat says to Alice, “If you 
don’t know where you are going, any road will take you there.”  A strategic management 
framework is an essential foundation from which to identify the need for and guide 
strategic change, whether an internal transformation effort or the implementation of a far-
reaching homeland security policy having national scope.  However, though essential, it 
is not in itself sufficient.  In undertaking any major public-policy change, whether it be 
health care reform or homeland security, it is vital for those involved in policy 
implementation to fully understand the political and organizational dynamics, the forces 
arrayed both for and against the change proposed, and what can reasonably be 
accomplished by which methods according to a certain time horizon.  It will also be vital 
to learn from prior experience and use of proven change management techniques. 
2. Models for Understanding and Guiding Strategic Change 
There are numerous theories and models related to the dynamics of organizational 
performance and change management.  Salvatore Falletta provides a useful guide which 
provides an overview of eleven of the most popular models employed by practitioners of 
organizational change.  These range from the older and better known Force Field 
Analysis by Kurt Lewin to the more comprehensive Technical Political Cultural (TPC) 
Framework by Noel Tichy and Causal Model of Organizational Performance and Change 
developed by Warner Burke and George Litwin, also known simply as the Burke-Litwin 
Model.  Organizational models are not designed to be an exact representation of an 
organization or organizational system, but instead are intended to help managers 
understand more clearly the range of dynamics at work in such systems and the 
relationship of these dynamics to one another.  Armed with this understanding, managers 
may then more deliberately and effectively assess an organizational system’s current state 
and design strategies to achieve the changes desired, either in the system’s performance 
or the implementation of new policy or both. According to Falletta, without such models, 
managers and change practitioners must rely on intuition and hunches as they deal with 
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the massive amounts of information and complexity associated with major organizational 
change efforts. 193  Doing so could lead to missing key factors and result in the failure of 
the change effort to achieve its aims. 
Models are not prescriptive and no single model can fully represent all of the 
factors relevant in all possible settings.  Some models may fit a particular circumstance 
and some may not.  Likewise, using just one model runs the risk of seeing the challenge 
from only one perspective and thus it may be appropriate to apply multiple approaches to 
gain alternative views.  It is with this caution that only two approaches – the Burke-
Litwin Model and the TPC Framework – are highlighted here as representative of the 


























Figure 7.   Burke-Litwin Model of Organizational Performance and Change. 
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As discussed by Falletta, the Burke-Litwin Model is relatively new and includes 
several key features which go beyond previous approaches (see Figure 7).  As described 
by Burke and Litwin, it identifies twelve organizational variables; depicts the difference 
between the culture and the climate of an organization; distinguishes transformational 
from transactional dynamics; specifies the nature and direction of influence of the 
variables; and is well grounded in organizational development theory and practice. 194   
With the realistic recognition of influences coming from the external environment, and 
the representation of a feedback loop, the model demonstrates the “open systems” theory 
that underlies its design.  It is particularly well suited to understanding organizational 
performance issues and guiding organizational transformation efforts within a single 
organization. 
Less complicated, and perhaps more germane to the discussion of organizational 
and strategic change issues related to public policy implementation, is Tichy’s Technical 
Political Cultural (TPC) Framework or what he also refers to as The Network Model.  In 
this model, Tichy views organizational systems not as management hierarchies, but as 
systems of social networks or clusters of people joined together by a variety of formal 
and informal relationships, with only part of the structure officially prescribed.  He 
suggests that the dynamic relationships among the various parts of this system, and the 
degree to which the system is aligned, must be assessed from three different perspectives: 
technical, political, and cultural. 195  These perspectives are closely interrelated and, to 
underscore this point, Tichy uses the metaphor of a rope where each of these perspectives 
represents an individual strand.  Most significant in the TCP Framework is his emphasis 
on the importance of “emergent networks” (see Figure 8). 
Tichy recognizes that unplanned, informal social structures or networks emerge in 
all organizational settings.  He sees them as having both desirable and undesirable 
characteristics for change, depending on how they are managed.  Informal networks often 
emerge because formal structures are unresponsive, too slow, or perhaps even 
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counterproductive to the need for change.  To paraphrase Tichy, individuals may develop 
informal relationships to reformulate or reinterpret the mission or policy, change 
prescribed processes, alter technology or methods, and otherwise differentially respond to 
changing environmental conditions. 196  Such networks can hinder strategic change, but 



















Figure 8.   Technical Political Cultural (TPC) Framework. 
Emergent networks breed emergent change.  Karl Weick takes the view that 
“planned transformational change, complete with its talk of revolution, discontinuity, and 
upheaval, presents a distorted view of how successful change works.” 197  This, he 
contends, has caused some to overestimate the problem of inertia and the centrality of 
managerial planning, and to underestimate the importance of innovative sense-making, 
the ability of small experiments to travel, and the extent to which change is actually a 
continuous process.  He makes the case that emergent, continuous change is a significant 
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factor predicting whether episodic change (i.e., a major transformation effort or 
implementation of national policy) will succeed or fail.  According to Weick, among the 
advantages of emergent change are its capability to increase readiness for and 
receptiveness to planned change; sensitivity to local contingencies; suitability for 
experimentation, learning, and sense-making; likelihood of satisfying needs for 
autonomy, control, and expression; proneness to swift implementation; the ability to 
exploit tacit knowledge; and shortened feedback loops from results to action.  He adds 
that actual change is less management-induced and more a function of the choices and 
actions of frontline stakeholders.  Weick concludes his discussion by suggesting that 
managers must recognize the power of emergent change within the context of their 
planned change efforts.  Thus, understanding the nature of emergent networks, avoiding 
their negative aspects, and exploiting their full potential can be vital to success in dealing 
with the complexity of large-scale change. 
3. Determinants for Success in Strategic Change 
In 1995, John Kotter published an article in the Harvard Business Review entitled 
“Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail.”  Compared to much of the 
theoretical leadership and organizational development literature of the time, it posed a 
commonsense analysis of why change efforts rarely achieve their desired results and what 
practical steps might be taken to increase the chances of success.  More than a decade 
later, this HBR article and his book, Leading Change, remain fundamental guides for 
change agents in both private and public sector organizations. 198  In Kotter’s study of 
over 100 large-scale change efforts, he found that only a few were actually successful, a 
few others were utter failures, and most fell somewhere in between, with most not being 
very successful at all.  His analysis of those efforts resulted in the identification of eight 
common mistakes leaders make in implementing change and strategies to avoid them.   
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1.  Establishing a Sense of Urgency
 - Examining the market and competitive realities 
 - Identifying and discussing crises, potential crises, or major opportunities 
2.  Creating the Guiding Coalition
 - Putting together a group with enough power to lead the change 
 - Getting the group to work together like a team 
3.  Developing a Vision and Strategy
 - Creating a vision to help direct the change effort 
 - Developing strategies for achieving that vision 
4.  Communicating the Change Vision
 - Using every vehicle possible to constantly communicate the new vision and strategies 
 - Having the guiding coalition role model the behavior expected of employees 
5.  Empowering Broad-Based Action
 - Getting rid of obstacles 
 - Changing systems or structures that undermine the change vision 
 - Encouraging risk taking and nontraditional ideas, activities, and actions 
6.  Generating Short-Term Wins
 - Planning for visible improvements in performance, or “wins” 
 - Creating those wins 
 - Visibly recognizing and rewarding people who made the wins possible 
7.  Consolidating Gains and Producing More Change
 - Using increased credibility to change all systems, structures, and policies that don’t 
fit together and don’t fit the transformation vision 
 - Hiring, promoting, and developing people who can implement the change vision 
 - Reinvigorating the process with new projects, themes, and change agents
 
8.  Anchoring New Approaches in the Culture
 - Creating better performance through customer- and productivity-oriented behavior, 
more and better leadership, and more effective management 
 - Articulating the connections between new behaviors and organizational success 
 - Developing means to ensure leadership development and succession
Figure 9.   The Eight-Stage Process of Creating Major Change. 199 
 
In presenting his Eight-Stage Process for Creating Major Change, Kotter states 
that the common mistakes he outlines are not inevitable and that the key lies in 
understanding the dynamics involved, how a deliberate multi-stage process can mitigate 
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potential errors, and more significantly, how strong effective leadership is required 
throughout.  The underlying theme of his work is that managers tend to underestimate the 
level of effort involved, and the fact that change is a people process that must be led 
rather than simply managed.  Moreover, he emphasizes that this process must move 
through deliberate stages and that bypassing any stage, or getting too far out of phase, 
always creates difficulty and could sow the seeds of failure (see Figure 9). 200   
Kotter acknowledges that, unlike his other research, the concepts contained in his 
work on Leading Change are not drawn from the ideas of others but on his own firsthand 
experience and extensive analysis of real-world, large-scale strategic change efforts.  
However, his eight-stage process has received further support through the work of Sergio 
Fernandez and Hal Rainey, who have done an extensive review of organizational change 
research as it may apply to large-scale planned strategic change in the public sector.  
These authors cite the lack of current research on organizational change in government 
and the complex, confusing, and sometimes conflicting array of research findings and 
theories that serve to confound public sector managers looking for guidance.   
In response to the need for clear advice to public sector managers, Fernandez and 
Rainey have assessed the major theoretical perspectives on organizational change to 
include a range of change management models and frameworks such as those discussed 
in the previous section. They also considered research related to governmental reform, 
innovation, and policy implementation as a way to filter out factors that are most relevant 
to large-scale strategic change in the public sector.  Finding significant congruence on 
key points within the research literature, they developed a set of Determinants for 
Successful Implementation of Organizational Change in the Public Sector. 201  These 
eight propositions are very similar to the eight-stage process proposed by Kotter, but have 
been synthesized from the research and tailored to the public sector (see Figure 10).  This 
list is adapted from the original presented by Fernandez and Rainey, and has been edited 
for purposes of brevity.  Though elements of both lists have merit, like the organizational 
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change models, they are only a guide, and various elements may be more salient in some 
situations and not others.  Public sector leaders will need to adapt their use accordingly. 
Ensure the Need - Convince organizational members of the need and 
desirability for change.  Managerial leaders must verify and persuasively 
communicate the need for change. - Craft a compelling vision of change. 
- Communicate the need for change. 
Provide a Plan - Devise a strategy, with milestones and a plan. 
  Managerial leaders must develop a course of 
action or strategy for implementing change. 
- The strategy should be clear and specific. 
- The strategy should rest on sound causal theory 
for achieving the desired end state. 
Build Internal Support / Overcome Resistance - Encourage participation and open discussion. 
  Managerial leaders must build internal support 
and reduce resistance to change through 
widespread participation in the change process. 
- Avoid criticism, threats, and coercion. 
- Commit sufficient time, effort and resources to    
manage participation effectively. 
Ensure Management Support / Commitment - An “idea champion” or guiding coalition should 
advocate for and lead the transformation process.  An individual or group within the organization 
should champion the cause for change. - Should have the skills needed to marshal support. 
- Political appointees should support the change.  
Build External Support - Build support for and commitment to the change 
among political overseers.  Managerial leaders must develop and ensure 
support from political overseers and key external 
stakeholders. 
- Build support and commitment among interest 
groups with a stake in the organization. 
Provide Resources - Provide adequate financial, technological, and 
human resources to implement change.  Successful change usually requires adequate 
resources to support the change process. - Avoid overtaxing organizational members. 
- Capitalize on synergies in resources.  
Institutionalize Change - Displace old behaviors; institutionalize new ones. 
 Managers and employees must effectively 
institutionalize the changes. 
- Monitor the implementation of change. 
- Institutionalize change before shifts in leadership 
cause commitment and support to diminish.  
  
Pursue Comprehensive Change - Implement a comprehensive and consistent set of 
changes to the subsystems of the organization.  Managerial leaders must develop an integrative, 
comprehensive, approach to change that 
achieves subsystem congruence. 
- Analyze and understand interconnections between 
subsystems before pursuing congruence. 
Figure 10.   Determinants of Successful Organizational Change in the Public Sector. 202 
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4. Leadership and Strategic Change  
As can be seen from the organizational change models and the determinants of 
success
Jay Conger takes the traditional view that top-led strategic change has a far better 
chance
direct involvement of top management with the power to make things happen. 
                             
 discussed on the preceding pages, central to any major large-scale strategic 
change effort is leadership.  Determining what kind of leadership is exercised by whom, 
under what circumstances, and when, is truly the art of executing any transformation, 
even one to bring about a new public policy or program.  Establishing a vision, 
organizing resources, motivating and guiding participation, overcoming resistance, and 
maintaining accountability for success are all vital leadership tasks.  Though much has 
been written on the matter of leadership, and specifically on leading large-scale strategic 
change, there are still differing views on which approaches are most effective.   
 of success than that driven by lower levels of an organization.  He argues top-led 
strategic change generally results from major shifts in strategy or the reengineering of 
core processes.  Given the magnitude of such change, the level of investment, and the 
high stakes involved, he states that top executives are in a much better position to lead it.  
Conger cites three factors that support top-led strategic change. 203  First, members of top 
management have a “breadth of perspective” and a vantage point that permits them to see 
the change in all its dimensions.  Second are the “attributions of leadership,” where senior 
executive positions have symbolic importance that permit them to use events and their 
own behaviors to send messages about what is important and where attention should be 
placed.  Third, Conger notes they have “power of position”; while this is the most 
obvious factor and often overestimated, is more than that of subordinates.  Despite 
political influences that can limit their power, senior executives still have the ability to set 
priorities, allocate resources, and hire, fire, reward, and sanction behavior as necessary to 
shape the direction and dynamics of change.  Though he favors top-led change, Conger 
does not underestimate the value of a team approach or engaging lower levels of the 
organization as active participants.  Important here is his emphasis on the continuous and 
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Celebrated author and consultant on leadership Warren Bennis observes that the 
vision of the single heroic leader is a myth, one tied to our own tendency to deify social, 
political, and industrial icons.  He states that a society as complex and technologically 
sophist
s, tem
oubt that executive 
leadership is essential to change management. 205  However, as traditional, vertically 
integrated, bureaucratic orga
                                                
icated as ours requires leadership and contributions from all levels and all spheres.  
According to Bennis, in any large-scale endeavor, there are too many problems to be 
solved and too many connections to be made to think that any one leader could influence 
it all.  He sees the top-down leadership model as “maladaptive” in an environment of 
extraordinary complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty.  He further opines that “exemplary 
leadership and organizational change are impossible without the full inclusion, initiative, 
and cooperation of followers.” 204  Going beyond simple participation, Bennis suggests 
that complex messy problems, involving many stakeholders, require complex and diverse 
alliances.  He points out that, as today’s organizational structures are evolving into 
networks, cross-functional team porary systems, and ad hoc task-forces, leaders 
must have not the loudest voice but the most attentive ear and exercise leadership that 
values and encourages participation, diversity of views, and dissent.  
The paradox of top-down versus participative leadership is that both views are 
correct.  In assessing this paradox, Dexter Dumphy leaves no d
nizations become a thing of the past, they are being 
increasingly replaced by alliances, interest groups, and temporary fluid relationships.  As 
such, the nature of leadership must change as well.  Dumphy reiterates the call by Bennis 
for a new kind of alliance between the leaders and the led.  He also supports the 
continued need for a unified executive team to develop strategic intent, but goes on to 
suggest that the executive team must also invest the time and resources necessary to 
create the environment and structure for such participation.  They must systematically 
invest in key personnel, professional, and corporate capabilities that support meaningful 
participation.  So leadership is still vital to change, but in a different way. 
 
205 Dexter Dumphy, “Embracing Paradox,” in Breaking the Code of Change, ed. Michael Beer and 
Nitin Nohria (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2000), 123-135. 
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The discussion of leadership on the preceding pages is somewhat limited in that it 
mostly addresses change from within single organizations, and mostly from a private 
sector b
 
hout authority is alien 
to us, a
requires mobilizing stakeholders in support as a growing base of legitimacy. 
usiness perspective.  Traditional views of top-down leadership of strategic change 
are even less valid in the inter-agency public sector arena, and especially so regarding the 
implementation of strategic change in the form of major homeland security public policy.  
Most officials in government bureaucracies have the power of legislation and regulation 
to influence compliance with new public policy, but this is not always so for homeland 
security policy, which requires the often voluntary compliance of others. Though not 
faced with the same leadership challenges of a Gandhi or Martin Luther King, when 
working simultaneously across federal departments, down through layers of government, 
and with private sector industry, homeland security leaders must often lead without 
authority and find ways to influence change through other means.   
Richard Heifetz points out that since we are used to seeing leadership and 
authority as two sides to the same coin, the notion of leadership wit
nd as such, analysts have generally not paid much attention to the problems and 
opportunities of mobilizing work from positions of little or no authority.  Leadership, he 
states, is primarily about engaging people to address problems. Since addressing 
problems requires learning, the task of leadership is primarily one of education; 
choreographing and directing that process through introducing new ideas and changing 
attitudes and behaviors.  According to Heifetz, leading without authority often involves 
raising questions that disturb the status quo, focusing on a single issue and not having to 
contend with meeting the expectations of multiple constituencies all at once, and getting 
closer to stakeholders to obtain frontline information necessary to achieve the leader’s 
aims.  This is essential since the leader has little control over the environment.  As 
Heifetz puts it, one can shape the stimulus, but one cannot manage the response. 206  He 
thus describes leadership without authority as a process of modulating provocation.  It 
requires attracting attention to an issue and directing that energy to the questions that 
must be addressed, while at the same time providing a context for action. This also 
                                                 
206 Ronald Heifetz, Leadership Without Easy Answers (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard 
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B. IMPLEMENTING PUBLIC POLICY 
1. The Public Policy Process 
Through their research, Deborah McFarlane and Marilyn Gruebel make the point 
that public management and public policy implementation are inextricably linked.  An 
understanding of the process of public policy implementation and the factors that decide 
success
olicy to 
achieve its aims is to blame the implementers of that policy, whether justified or not. 210  
These researchers point out that public policy implementation is to a great degree 
      
 or failure are vital to effective governance.  Public agency executives and policy 
makers need to know “what levers to pull” to successfully implement programs to 
achieve public policy aims. 207  Thomas Birkland sees the study of public policy as 
encompassing “those decisions made (or implicitly accepted) by government and non-
governmental actors to address a problem that a significant number of people and groups 
consider to be important and in need of a solution.” 208  Though he acknowledges that 
there is no consensus on a definition of public policy, he lists some basic definitions 
offered by other researchers.  A melding of a few of those definitions may serve to set the 
stage for the discussion that follows.  Accordingly, public policy can be defined as 
“…political decisions for implementing programs to achieve societal goals…” and 
represents “…the sum of government activities, whether acting directly or through 
agents, as it has an influence on the life of citizens.” 209  It is firmly grounded in the 
political process, the exercise of power, interplay among interests groups, the institutions 
that make policy, and the ways in which policy is formulated and implemented.  
In their book on public policy implementation, Michael Hill and Peter Hupe 
acknowledge that the results of policy implementation are sometimes disappointing, and 
perhaps even worse.  They state that the standard reaction to a failure of public p
                                           
207 Deborah McFarlane and Marilyn Gruebel, Public Management and Policy Implementation: 
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l and Peter Hupe, Implementing Public Policy (London: Sage Publications, 2002), 161. 
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tions of the policy and its implications.  To 
manage these issues, Hill and Hupe offer an adaptive approach to governance of the 
public 
                                                
d by the context in which the policy will be implemented and the way policy 
objectives are understood or interpreted by policy framers, implementers, and the 
frontline stakeholders, the latter being the actors who must put the policy in effect.  Hill 
and Hupe opine that policies as formulated at the national level may be seen as less clear 
and directive to implementers and front-line stakeholders than the original policy-makers 
may think.  Policies are also often a matter of politics and compromise and, as these 
researchers suggest, are “seldom the fruit of pure intellectual cognition.” 211  As such, 
Hill and Hupe state that the messages to implementers can be ambiguous and that it is 
little wonder that there is difficulty in knowing not only what to implement but how to 
implement a given policy.   
If implementers in the middle are uncertain about ambiguous policy objectives, so 
too will be those actors on the front line who must put that policy into practice.  This 
difficulty is compounded by the number of horizontal and vertical relationships that may 
be involved, and differing agendas and percep
policy implementation process across three levels of activity: managing the policy 
process, managing inter-organizational relations, and managing internal and external 
contacts.  Depending on the contingencies involved, they recommend three basic 
perspectives for implementers to consider when formulating implementation strategy.  
Governance-by-authority is an enforcement perspective and implies well-defined policy 
objectives, explicit responsibility, clarity on procedures, and an ability to motivate 
compliance.  In governance-by-transaction, implementation is from a performance 
perspective, where emphasis is on prescribed outputs and managing contract compliance.  
As such, the focus is on interfaces and inter-organizational relations and clarity of 
expectations in the performance contract itself.  When the policy objectives and methods 
are less clear, governance-by-persuasion becomes the appropriate implementation 
perspective.  It emphasizes co-production, with a focus on managing outcomes as shared 
results.  This perspective involves forming partnerships, inviting stakeholders to 
participate, and allowing discretion in achieving implementation objectives and 
 
211 Hill and Hupe, Implementing Public Policy, 162-163. 
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coordinated service delivery.  It also involves professionalization, institutionalizing 
participation, peer assessment, and mutually agreed upon procedures for compliance. 212
Birkland describes a set of public policy models that have evolved over time as 
representations of what is otherwise a chaotic and sometimes unpredictable process of 
development and implementation.  The Systems Model of politics and policy he 
describes is represented by a simple set of inputs, policy-making, and outputs.  Inputs 
include issues, pressures, information, and the influence of decision makers, and outputs 
are the
ized 
anarchies, the process or technology involved is not clearly understood, and learning is 
through
these streams occasionally converge to form what Kingdom calls a “policy window” 
     
 resulting decisions, procedures, regulations, and laws.  In between is a political 
“blackbox” that transforms political policy intent through structural, social, political, and 
economic environments that influence policy-making activity.  Another representation of 
the policy process outlined by Birkland is the Stages Model where policy activity moves 
through a cycle of issue emergence, agenda setting, alternative selection, enactment, 
implementation, and evaluation. 213  Though useful as simple metaphors for the policy 
process, such models may be overly simplistic to be of much use in understanding 
formulation of complex policy such as that related to homeland security.   
John Kingdom goes beyond the Stages Model in assessing the research and relates 
the policy process to “organized anarchy,” which he describes as having three general 
properties: problematic preferences, unclear technology, and fluid participation. As more 
precision is applied to initially “fuzzy” political goals, conflict emerges.  In organ
 trial and error.  With regard to policymaking, Kingdom describes three streams 
of activity: problem recognition, the formation and refining of policy proposals, and 
politics.  Involved, according to Kingdom, are a diverse range of actors – bureaucrats, 
Hill staffers, academicians, special interest groups, and researchers, all with their own 
perspective on the issues and solutions to them.  This process goes on, as he describes it, 
in a political environment shaped by swings in national mood, election results, changes in 
administration, and interest group pressure campaigns.  In such a chaotic environment, 
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when the conditions are right for implementation.  Miss the window and stakeholders 
must wait for the next opportunity.  Thus policy implementation is not only dependent on 
understanding a chaotic process, but a matter of timing opportunity as well. 214
2. Alternative Perspectives on Public Policy Implementation  
In a review of policy implementation research, Richard Matland outlines a 
decision model offering alternative strategies to guide successful management of public 
policy implementation, and frames these strategies relative to the degree of ambiguity 
and conflict associated with the policy’s original intent.  Not unlike the approaches to 
organiz nal  schools of 
thought in the policy implementation literature as top-down and bottom-up.  According to 
Matlan
approach argues that local discretion is so great that it is simply unrealistic for a central 
                                                
atio leadership previously discussed, he describes the two basic
d, the top-down approach emphasizes that policy designers alone are the central 
actors, policy goals should be clear and consistent, and responsibility for implementation 
should lie with the central agency most supportive of the policy’s goals.  Implementation 
is for the most part administrative in nature, and political influence is ignored or 
somehow eliminated, with local actors seen as potential impediments that need to be 
controlled. 215  He notes that legislation often requires ambiguous language and 
contradictory goals to obtain support and win its passage, and that it is rarely possible to 
separate politics and special interests from policy administration.  He further cautions that 
attempts to insulate inherently political subject matter from politics may lead directly to 
policy failure.  This would logically include not only elected leaders and inter-agency 
politics, but outside stakeholder influence as well. 
As Matland describes it, the alternative bottom-up view is based on the premise 
that policy is really made at the local level and that local actors have expertise and 
knowledge of the issues essential to successful policy implementation.  The bottom-up 
 
214 John Kingdom, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2nd ed. (New York: Addison-Wesley 
Educational Publishers Inc., 2003), 84-89. 
215 Richard E. Matland, “Synthesizing the Implementation Literature: The Ambiguity-Conflict Model 
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authority to control the action.  Matland indicates that bottom-up theorists see policy 
implementation, by necessity, occurring at two levels.  Central actors devise a program to 
implement a policy and then local actors react to those plans, possibly developing and 
implem
tion.” 216  
Success, bottom-uppers argue, depends on the knowledge and abilities of local actors 
who can ad
ct 
inherent in any initial statement of public policy may be a significant factor in 
determining how to organize and m
                                                
enting their own programs in response.  He cites research which suggests that 
most problems arise in the implementation of policy by local actors, with central actors 
(i.e., federal agencies) only indirectly influencing local factors.  Matland concludes, there 
can be wide variation in how national policy is implemented at the local level.   
Matland goes on to say that, according to bottom-up theorists, local context can 
dominate the implementation of policy, leaving central actors unable to fully control the 
process.  These theorists see implementation as anything but context free in that it 
actually takes place as a function of the interaction of policy and its local implementation 
setting.  Thus “the goals, strategies, activities, and contacts of the actors involved in the 
implementation process must be understood in order to understand implementa
apt policy to local conditions.  Central authority, they believe, actually has 
little influence on the final outcome. Absence of local freedom to adapt the program, they 
argue, will likely be another factor that could cause implementation of a policy to fail.  
In the literature on leading strategic change, there exists a paradox of top-down 
versus bottom-up approaches in the implementation of national public policy that must be 
considered by federal policy-makers and public sector managers.  Public policy at the 
national level is complex and fraught with potential disagreement.  The initial strategic 
intent of such policy may be ambiguous and uncertain, and central implementers may 
have little idea about how to carry out this intent.  The degree of ambiguity and confli
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3. Ambiguity and Conflict in Policy Implementation  
According to Matland’s research on policy implementation, policy conflict will 
exist when the actors involved are interdependent with one another, one or more sees the 
policy as directly relevant to its interests, and/or when there are differing views over the 
olicy’s objectives or the manner in which the policy is to be carried out. The intensity of 
onflict increases with an increase in incompatibility of concerns, and with an increase in 
the perceived ore aggressive the 
behavior.  It is possible to make some policies more acceptable by limiting or otherwise 
adjustin
ict because some actors 
essentia
                                                
p
c
stakes for each actor; the higher the stakes, the m
g the scope or rate of change, or by creating incentives for the parties involved.  
However, Matland goes on to state that some policies are, by their nature, controversial 
and it is not possible to adjust them to entirely avoid conflict.  He suggests that, 
depending on the level of conflict, approaches to resolution may vary.  If the level of 
conflict is low, simple analytical or problem solving methods may suffice.  If the level of 
conflict is high, bargaining and coercion are common strategies. 217
Matland contends that ambiguity in policy implementation falls into two broad 
categories: ambiguity of goals and ambiguity of means.  For some researchers, the clarity 
of a policy goal is seen as an important factor in achieving policy success.  Ambiguity, 
they argue, leads to misunderstanding, uncertainty, and ultimately failure to implement 
the policy and achieve its objectives.  However, ambiguity of goals also has a positive 
side.  Matland posits that one way to limit conflict is through ambiguity.  He suggests that 
if a policy goal is too precise, it is more likely to trigger confl
l to implementation become more aware of their own self-interests, and may act 
to inhibit implementation.  Matland notes that ambiguity is often a prerequisite for getting 
a new policy adopted.  Likewise, he says that there may be ambiguity of means when the 
methods or technology needed to implement a policy and achieve its goals do not exist, 
or it is uncertain what roles various actors are to play.  He further states that means are 
also ambiguous when the degree of complexity present makes it difficult to know which 
tools to use, how to use them, and what the effects of their use will be. 
 
217 Matland, “Synthesizing the Implementation Literature, 155-157.  
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Matland describes how policy compromise often depends on the ambiguity that 
permits various actors to assume their own understanding of goals and means; what he 
describes as “a natural and inevitable result of the working of political process.”  It is 
important to note here that beyond their broad strategic intent, legislators and senior 
policymakers are often too far removed from the action to know precisely what goals are 
achievable or in precisely what way.  These questions are often left to implementing 
agencies and other stakeholders.  Matland cites John Tukey who in 1962 noted, “Far 
better an approximate answer to the right question, which is often very vague, than an 
exact answer to the wrong question, which can always be made precise.” 218  In 
referencing other research, he describes policy implementation as a process of discovery, 
learning, and experimentation.  Policy implementation, he suggests, not only provides an 
opportunity to learn new methods, it also provides an opportunity to reach new goals, 
testing the vision, principles, and state of technological knowledge along the way. 
Figure 11.   Ambiguity-Conflict Matrix: Policy Implementation Process. 219 
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As depicted in Figure 11, Matland offers a model that attempts to characterize 
policy in the context of the degree of ambiguity and conflict such policy may present.  In 
doing so he offers a window through which implementers may develop strategies to 
ensure greatest chance of success.  Each pane in that window suggests the principle 
influe te.   
Low Ambiguity and Low Conflict – Administrative Implementation: Under 
these conditions Matland’s research suggests the conditions are appropriate for a rational 
decision-making process.  Explicit policy goals are given and the means for achieving 
them are known and agreed to.  In such a setting, outcomes are determined largely by the 
simple availability of resources.  Roles, responsibilities and methods are clearly spelled 
out. Implementation occurs in a top-down manner and the central authority has the 
information, resources, and power necessary to achieve success.  Given the stable nature 
of the system, outcomes are predictable and uniform across agencies and at the lowest 
levels of implementation.  Matland opines that under these conditions, compliance is 
largely a function of carrying out orders already perceived as legitimate by those charged 
with implementation.  In those cases where compliance is an issue, the central authority 
has the power to either threaten sanctions or provide other incentives. 220
Low Ambiguity and High Conflict – Political Implementation: This setting is 
described by Matland and the research he cites as typical of political decision making.  
Though goals are clearly defined, there is disagreement and dissension among those 
involved; conflict that naturally extends to the means of implementation as well.  This 
conflict emerges early and can be vigorous as implementation develops.  In low 
ambiguity and high conflict situations, outcomes are decided by power – who has it and 
how it is used.  Here Matland suggests that a single actor or coalition may have the power 
needed to force implementation from either direction, or at least to wield sufficient 
influence to drive bargaining and compromise on goals and/or means.  Actors essential to 
implementation may not fully comply and may even refuse to participate.  Often 
compliance is reached through negotiated agreement forced from the top. 221
                                                
nces and possible pitfalls involved, and what approach may be more appropria
 
220 Matland, “Synthesizing the Implementation Literature, 160-163. 
221 Ibid., 163-165. 
 97
High Ambiguity and Low Conflict – Experimental Implementation: 
According to Matland, when these factors are present, outcomes will depend largely on 
the parties most involved and what resources they bring to the table.  Since that 
involvement is fluid and may vary widely, a range of outcomes can be expected.  He 
describes a process having “streams of actors, problems, solutions, and choice 
opportunities combining to produce outcomes that are hard to predict.” 222  This can 
result in different organizations im
.  He describes 
coalitional strength at the local level as a key determinant of success.  Differing 
perspec
                                                
plementing different versions of the policy.  Matland 
goes on to say that these mutations can be viewed as “experiments” and learning 
opportunities that can help shape policy goals and means, so bottom-up implementation 
is favored under these conditions.  However, he warns that ambiguity can also breed gaps 
in accountability and spawn small fiefdoms with individual actors pursuing their own 
interests, which may have little, if any, connection to the broader public good.  Learning 
is likely random and, thus, monitoring, evaluation, and feedback are vital.  
High Ambiguity and High Conflict – Symbolic Implementation: Though 
Matland cites research suggesting ambiguity can lessen conflict, at least initially, he also 
outlines other cases where highly significant symbols (important public policy matters) 
can produce a high degree of conflict even when the policy is vague
tives and competition over the “vision” will develop, and variations in coalition 
strength and dominance will result in variations in implementation.  He states that 
professions are likely to play an important role in this vacuum because stakeholders with 
professional training will advance solutions rooted in their own disciplines.  Competition 
among professional camps, Matland suggests, form the core of competing coalitions, with 
the battles likely being long and bitter.  Disagreements, he says, are resolved through 
coercion or bargaining.  Though central authority does exercise influence by offering 
resources and incentives, and by focusing attention on the issue, the process is likely to 
be highly political and dominated by local actors.  A necessary dynamic tension and 
balance between both top-down and bottom-up approaches is thus indicated here. 223
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4. Public Policy Implementation Challenges 
At the risk of oversimplifying the matter, challenges associated with public policy 
implementation can be roughly divided into two distinct categories – definition of success 
and the definition of the means to achieve that success.  With regard to the definition of 
success, Matland again differentiates between the views of top-down and bottom-up 
theorists. He sees the pivotal question as being whether implementation of the policy 
designers’ plan itself is the goal, or rather what matters more is the ultimate outcome of 
the policy once implemented (i.e., whether it achieved its intended effects). This is not a 
trivial distinction because it is not uncommon for central policy implementers to take a 
top-down view of implementation as complying with the letter of the policy’s intent as 
originally expressed by a statute, an elected official, or an agency’s chief executive.   




     
ltimately a function of a policy’s “positive effects.”  This should not be 
surprising since those closest to the action, those who must expend time, resources and 
political capital to implement the policy at the grass roots level, are most impacted by the 
perception of its success or failure among their own constituencies.  Thus they have a 
greater stake in actual results.  Assuming there is no doubt that the definition of success 
should be the ultimate performance of the policy, and that the participation and 
commitment of local actors in shaping the policy and its implementation are essential to 
that aim, then the question becomes one of how that participation and commitment is 
achieved. 224  According to Harold Seidman, 
Straight lines of authority from the President down through department 
heads with no entity exercising power independent of its superior are not 
adapted to current circumstance.  Straight lines of authority and 
accountability cannot be established in what has become in major degree a 
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on third parties who are not legally responsible to the President and 
subject to his direction.  Federal powers are limited to those agreed upon 
                                                
and specified in grants and contracts. 225
Lester Salamon sees government administration as transitioning from a traditional 
hierarchical structure to the management of organizational networks.  He describes this 
network view as “third-party government” based on the intimate inter-relationships and 
interdependencies that exist among federal, state and local governments and the private 
sector.  Nowhere is this network of relationships more apparent than in the arena of 
homeland security policy.  Salamon cautions that “third party government” poses major 
challenges that are not fully appreciated by public administration researchers or public 
sector managers. 226   
As Thomas Stanton puts it, the problem is more than just power and control.  He 
suggests that state and local governments and the private sector may possess a more 
sophisticated understanding of many of the critical facts that the federal government must 
know to do its job well, particularly in the area of homeland security.  He further suggests 
that the hierarchical model of federal administration, with its imposition of policy from 
above, “often on the basis of limited consultation with the affected parties,” is unlikely to 
be effective in dealing with the complex problems associated with this domain.227  The 
challenge instead calls for an understanding of systems thinking, complexity, and the 
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C. 
 and Complexity 
the system’s individual parts and as well as the system as a whole 
within its external environment.  As that interchange occurs, the system adapts and new 
propert
means.  Open systems 
theory not only reinforces the fact that organizations operate in and interact with the 
external environment, but that they are also embedded in another, larger system.  That 
system consists of other organizations and external processes that exert various political, 
social, technological, and/or economic forces on the organization, which in turn 
influences performance, change, and organizational survival.  A system that changes its 
                                                
OPEN SYSTEMS, COMPLEXITY, AND NETWORKS 
1. Organizations as Open Systems
The rubric of systems theory has evolved over the years as a way to better 
understand all manner of scientific, engineering, biological, and social constructs.  In its 
simplest form, a system is an organized set of parts or subsystems that are related to 
accomplish a common purpose.  It has various inputs, processes and outputs.  The parts 
or subsystems are interdependent so if one part of the system is changed, the nature of the 
overall system will often change as well. 228  With regard to its application in the 
sociology of organizations, the systems approach emphasizes the dynamic inter-
relationships between 
ies emerge.  Thus systems theory provides “a view of organizations that focuses 
on the arrangement of roles and responsibilities, internal operations, and boundary-
spanning activities that enable the organization to persist and evolve over time.” 229    
Stephen Littlejohn defines an open system as…“a set of objects with attributes 
that interrelate in an environment. The system possesses qualities of wholeness, 
interdependence, hierarchy, self-regulation, environmental interchange, equilibrium, 
adaptability, and equifinality.” 230  Equifinality is the theory that organizations, using the 
same inputs, can arrive at the same end or goal through different 
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behavior in response to its environment is often known as an adaptive system.  Open 
systems theory is well suited to understanding complex public sector organizations and 
the bureaucratic structures responsible for th  policy, in that the 
sole pu
 
2. Complex Adaptive Systems and Emergence 
All have niches they can exploit, filling up one niche often opens up new ones 
that can be exploited; thus they never reach equilibrium, and though they can 
e implementation of public
rpose of government is to be responsive to the public and the greater public good. 
Garnett Williams defines a complex system as one where numerous independent 
elements constantly interact and spontaneously organize and reorganize into more and 
more elaborate structures over time.  This complexity consists of a) a large number of 
similar but independent elements or agents; b) persistent movement and responses by 
these elements to other agents; c) adaptiveness so that the system adjusts to new 
situations to ensure survival; d) self-organization, in which order in the system forms
spontaneously; e) local rules that apply to each agent; and f) progression in complexity 
over time so that the system becomes larger and more sophisticated.  Accordingly, the 
behavior of such complex systems cannot be predicted and may evolve to a point 
somewhere between order and chaos. 231  
 
The concept of complex adaptive systems, like complexity and chaos theory 
before it, attempts to expand further the research on complex phenomena, especially in 
the social and organizational sciences.  John Holland, a leading researcher on complexity 
theory considers the following to be among the features of complex adaptive systems: 232
Many agents acting in parallel in an environment produced by its interactions with 
other agents in the system; because agents are constantly acting and reacting to 
each other, nothing in its environment is fixed;  
Control is highly dispersed and any coherent behavior there might be arises from 
competition and cooperation among the agents themselves; there are many levels 
of organization, with agents at one level serve as building blocks for the next; 
improve on some dimensions, they never optimize;  
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There is constant rearrangement as a result of learning, experience, evolution, and 
adaptation; the richness of the interactions within the system allows the system as 
a whole to undergo spontaneous adaptation and self-organization. 
Self-organization is a process “whereby new emergent structures, patterns and 
properties arise without being externally imposed on the system.  Not controlled by a 
centrali
 the people or groups involved.  According to 
Parson tion eople make adjustments to 
their own and each other’s behavior, and the environment around them. 234
e 
movem





the pre , and the consequences of the 
                                                
zed, hierarchical command-and-control center, self-organization is usually 
distributed throughout a system.” 233  To paraphrase consultant Beverly Parsons, self-
organizing systems are in a continuous state of disequilibrium, and exhibit behaviors that 
are unexpected.  She describes this state as characterized by contradiction and 
contentions, simultaneous cooperation and competition, and the coexistence of 
interdependence and independence.  Though there is no real overall control, patterns 
emerge as members make adjustments to each other and respond to changing conditions 
in their environment.  She posits that there may be agreement on the system’s general 
direction, but movement in that direction is largely self-motivated and relies on the 
independent and interdependent actions of
s, ac s and patterns naturally emerge over time as p
It is important for leaders to recognize and understand the nature of complex 
adaptive systems and especially the forces at work that build momentum in the direction 
of desired outcomes; outcomes that can neither be fully planned or controlled.  As 
Parsons suggests, leaders must align attention and resources to help accelerate th
ent in a natural direction even though it is unplanned or uncontrollable.  She also 
s two factors that researchers have identified 
ce of complexity on organizations.  Similar to the previous discussion of conflict 
biguity in public policy implementation, these factors are the degree of agreement 
ree of certainty present in the system.  Agreement refers to the shared sense of 
ence about the principles, purpose, and activities of the system.  Certainty refers to 
dictably of conditions, cause-and-effect relationships
 
233 Brenda Zimmerman, Curt Lindberg, Paul Plsek, Edgeware: Insights from Complexity Sciences for 
Health Care Leaders (Irving TX: VHA, Inc. 2001), 270. 
er 
pres arch 18, 2007).  
234 Beverly Parsons, “Attending to Self-Organizing Systems in Cluster/Initiative Evaluation” (pap




      
’s behavior.  Parsons indicates that complexity researchers see these factors as 
ining the orderliness of the system and the implications for decision-making. 
Drawing on the work of others, Parsons offers a graphic (Figure 12 below) which 
attempts to depict the general relationships between levels of agreement and certainty in a 
system and the nature of organizational behavior that results from variations in those 
dimensions.  When levels of certainty and agreement are high, the situation is generally 
stable, organized, and predictable.   
When levels of certainty and agreement are low, the situation is random and 
unorganized; a state of chaos. As Parsons describes it, a system may be far from being 
stable and organized but not yet totally unorganized or entering a state of chaos.  In 
between exists a region of complexity and complex adaptive systems.  In this region, 
dissent, learning, experimentation, evolution, and adaptation will emerge, with or without 
leader influence.  It is a region fertile for change. 
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235 Beverly Parsons, “Attending to Self-Organizing Systems in Cluster/Initiative Evaluation” 2. 
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Organizational systems rarely fall neatly within any one particular category, as 
different elements may operate at different levels of complexity at different times.  As 
Parsons puts it, these three variations in dynamics — organized, self-organizing, and 
unorga
, stimulate, and facilitate the kind of dissent, 
learnin
y 
Comp mplex and seemingly 
intractable problem bber originated the 
ichey, wicked 
problem oral, 
political, and/or -dependent, he suggests there 
is often little consensus as to the r how it should be resolved. 236  
Rooted in complexity, Richey sees  as sets of “complex, interacting 
issues evolving in a dynamic social context” constantly in motion, with new wicked 
problems emerging as a result of the system trying to understand and solve existing ones.  
Rittel and Webber define wicked problems as meeting most or all of the following ten 
criteria: 237
                                                
nized — can be thought of as “extensively over-lapping and entangled.”  
Nonetheless, as a general framework, it helps provide some understanding of system 
behavior under complex conditions, and may assist leaders and stakeholders to better 
assess and guide efforts to achieve organizational change.  The challenge for leaders will 
be to lead in non-traditional ways that foster
g, experimentation, evolution, and adaptation that naturally emerge in such 
systems.  Capitalizing on this emergence will require leaders to also be open to learning 
and adaptation themselves, understanding the need to be guided by the collective energy 
and intelligence inherent in the larger system.   
3. Wicked Problems and Complexit
lex systems almost by definition exist to deal with co
s.  In response, Horst Rittel and Melvin We
classification and study of “wicked problems.”  According to Tom R
s are typically “ill-defined, ambiguous and associated with strong m
 professional issues.”  Strongly stakeholder
nature  o of the problem
 wicked problems
 
236 Tom Ritchey, “Wicked Problems - Structuring Social Messes with Morphological Analysis” 
(2005), http://www.swemorph.com/pdf/wp.pdf [Accessed July 27, 2007]. 
237 Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” Policy Sciences 4, 
no. 2 (June 1973):155-169. 
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There is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem.  Formulating the 
problem and the solution are essentially the same thing.  Each attempt at 
creating a solution changes the understanding of the problem.  
Wicked problems have no stopping rule.  Since you cannot define the 
problem, it is difficult to tell when it is resolved.  The problem solving 
process ends when resources are depleted, stakeholders lose interest or 
political realities change.  
Solutions to wicked problems are not true-or-false but good-or-bad.  Since 
there are no unambiguous criteria for deciding if the problem is resolved, 
getting all stakeholders to agree that a resolution is ‘good enough’ can be a 
challenge.  
There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a wicked 
problem.  Solutions to wicked problems generate waves of consequences, 
and it is impossible to know how all of the consequences will eventually 
play out.  
Every implemented solution to a wicked problem has consequences.  Once 
er service package goes live, 
you can’t take back what was on-line or revert to the former customer 
causes of a wicked problem can be explained in numerous ways.  
There are many stakeholders who will have various and changing ideas 
about what might be a problem, what might be causing it, and how to 
resolve it.  
The planner (designer) has no right to be wrong.  A scientist is expected to 
formulate hypothesis, which may or may not be supportable by evidence.  
the web site is published or the new custom
database.  
Wicked problems do not have a well-described set of potential solutions.  
Various stakeholders will have differing views of acceptable solutions.  It 
is a matter of judgment as to when enough solutions have emerged and 
which should be pursued.  
Every wicked problem is essentially unique.  There are no ‘classes’ of 
solutions that can be applied to a specific case.  “Part of the art of dealing 
with wicked problems is the art of not knowing too early what type of 
solution to apply.”  
Every wicked problem can be considered a symptom of another problem.  
A wicked problem is a set of interlocking issues and constraints, which 
change over time, embedded in a dynamic social context.  
The 
A designer doesn’t have such a luxury, they are expected to get things 
right.  
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Jeff Conklin views complexity as contributing to fragmentation, “a condit
the people involved see themselves as more separate than united, and in 
ion in 
which which 
information and knowledge are chaotic and scattered.” 238 With problems becoming ever 
more c o that 
comple ective 
intelligen us virtually impossible.  As the network of players 
grows  is an 
expand ncies, 
organiz pecial interests, each with their own ideas on what the issues are and 
what n  each 
stakeho ves of 
the organization (or region) they represent.” 239
 sense 
of chao   
He cau n failing to recognize “wicked problems” for what they are, leaders 
persist t are 
inappro ty, he 
suggests, requires new understandings, processes, and tools that are better suited to the 
“funda lution 
of prob  that it 
reflects  
learning are closely interdependent and, accordi  
process d the 
problem ollaboration.  Just like 
linear olute 
folly w
           
omplex, the number and diversity of players increases, further adding t
xity.  According to Conklin, diversity of players makes harnessing coll
ce a challenge and consens
flatter and crosses social, organizational and technical boundaries, there
ing range of stakeholders representing different dogmas, disciplines, age
ations, and s
eeds to be achieved.  Conklin points out that in “many political situations,
lder’s position about what the problem is reflects the mission and objecti
Conklin muses that wicked problems have become so commonplace that the
s and futility that often accompanies them is sometimes accepted as inevitable.
tions that i
in applying traditional linear thinking and problem solving methods tha
priate for the complex and nonlinear challenges they face.  Such complexi
mentally social and conversational nature of work.”  Though the natural evo
lem solving in this realm may appear chaotic on the surface, Conklin opines
 a deeper natural order.  In pursuing answers to complexity, problem solving and
ng to Conklin, the flow of this learning
 is collaborative and opportunity-driven.  The harder and more unstructure
, the more learning involved and the greater the need for c
thinking, traditional top-down command-and-control style leadership is abs
hen dealing with wicked problems. 240
                                      
Jeff Conklin, “Wicked Problems and Social Complexity” (2006), 2, http://cognexus.org/wpf/
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Conklin recommends that the key to dealing with wicked problems, and the 
fragmentation associated with them, is to achieve coherence.  Coherence means that 
stakeholders have “shared meaning for key terms and concepts, that they are clear about 
their role in the effort, that together they have a shared understanding of the background 
for the project and what the issues are, and that they have a shared commitment to how 
the project will reach its objectives and achieve success.”  With increased coherence, 
more collective intelligence becomes available to deal with change and complexity. He 
suggests that leaders must understand collective intelligence as a natural property of 
complex social systems. 241  That intelligence — the experience, knowledge, expertise, 
and perspectives of stakeholders — if tapped, can be an enabler to collaboration that 
unleashes the creativity and resourcefulness needed to address the problem and advance 
change.  
4. Networking and Collaboration  
Laurence O'Toole has written of the growing need for and the emergence of 
networks and collaboration in public administration.  His review of the literature 
confirms that this trend is not a passing fad and that government leaders must 
increasingly deal with the sort of wicked problems defined by Rittel and Webber.  He 
reinforces the point that wicked problems, particularly in the area of complex and often 
ambitious public policy, cannot be addressed simply by dividing up the pieces and 
delegating authority.  According to O’Toole, given limits on the expertise and reach of 
government, public sector managers charged with developing and implementing public 
policy must often balance the need for central program authority with the practical and 
political demands for inclusion and broader influence.  This in turn suggests the use of 
networked structures in response.  However, though real-world examples of this sort of 
networking exist, O’Toole points out that there is no comprehensive theory to guide how 
public sector managers organize and lead networks.  He further suggests that, in the  
 
 
                                                 
241 Conklin, “Wicked Problems and Social Complexity,” 18. 
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absence
at motivates and moves the network toward its intended goals.  He further 
states that “managers in networked systems do not supervise most of those on whom their 
own performa e typically diffuse and unreliable, and 
common organizational culture exercises a limited and indirect influence.” 243  O’Toole 
caution
ites a growing body of research from her own examination of issues associated with the 
                                              
 of such theory, current efforts may either be relying on inappropriate 
organizational models or adapting conventional structures ill-suited to meet these 
challenging demands. 242
O’Toole echoes the previous discussion on complex adaptive systems when he 
posits that complexity and diffuse structure of authority makes behavior and performance 
somewhat unpredictable and the shared nature of network leadership extremely 
challenging.  Networks involve interdependent and often loosely organized relationships 
among multiple organizations, or parts of organizations, where there is little or no formal 
hierarchy, and where one element is not merely the subordinate of another in a way that 
compels compliance.  Multiple needs and interests of different actors must be addressed 
in a way th
nce relies, monitoring channels ar
s that public sector leaders cannot be expected to exercise direct control as a 
function of their official position.  He suggests that, to avoid being ineffectual, these 
leaders will need to adjust their conventional notion of management and be open to new 
networked organizations.  Given previous discussions in this chapter, the answer to what 
those organizations should look like and how they should function may lie within the 
larger stakeholder group itself, making not only the structure of the network important 
but also the nature of the interaction among stakeholders as well as the quality of 
collaboration. 
It is commonly understood that collaboration is based on the simple notion of the 
whole being greater than the sum of the parts, and that organizations and people can 
accomplish more collectively than they can independently.  Though, as O’Toole has 
stated, there is no unifying theory about networking in the public sector, Nancy Roberts 
c
   
242 Laurence O'Toole, Jr., “Treating Networks Seriously: Practical and Research-Based Agendas in 
Public Administration,” Public Administration Review 57, no. 1 (January– February 1997): 45-52. 
243 Ibid., 46-48. 
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intractable problem of wartime recovery in Afghanistan.  As she notes, the core of 
collaboration is achieving win-win solutions to shared problems – “rather than play a 
‘zero-sum game’ that seeks to distribute pie shares based on winners and losers, they 
assume a variable sum game that seeks to enlarge the pie for all parties involved.” 244 
Achieving collaboration to address wicked 
m and Siv Vangen outline three “media” through which collaborative 
leadership is exercised:  
 
problems is of course no easy task.  
From her own first-hand experience, Roberts suggests that people may need to 
first “fail” into collaboration before being willing to abandon more authoritative and 
competitive strategies.  This, she advises, is especially important for leaders and cultures 
that place a high premium on taking charge, making decisions, being competitive, and 
using authorities and experts to settle whatever disputes arise.  Roberts suggests three 
basic steps to facilitate collaboration.  First, avoid authoritative strategies where the 
situation is complex, conflict-ridden, and power is diffuse.  Second, get all the parties that 
make up the system into the same room to develop shared meaning about the problem 
and what has been referred to by Conklin as coherence.  Deciding on what the system is 
and which stakeholders are involved will be challenging, continuous, and evolve over 
time, and not all stakeholders may always agree.  However, it is a key formative step.  
Third, be open to self-organization and co-evolution. Leadership of complex adaptive 
systems operating at the edge of chaos requires courage and a willingness to trust the 
process, accepting emergent “experimentation, groping along and muddling through.” 245  
In a comprehensive study of the leadership role in collaboration spanning ten 
years, Chris Huxha
Structure relates to organizations and individuals involved and the 
connections between them.  It is a key driver in shaping agendas in that it 
determines who participates, who has power, and what resources are used.  
Alternative structures may emerge as members influence the agenda and 
they adapt to the complexity of the task. 
                                                 
244 Nancy Roberts, “Wicked Problems and Network Approaches to Resolution,” The International 
Public Management Review 1, no. 1 (2000): 1-19. 
245 Ibid., 12-19. 
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Processes they define as the formal and informal methods by which 
communications take place.  The type and frequency of communications 
influences the sharing of information and can either help or hinder 
common understanding of issues, empower members’ participation or 
strip power from them. 
Participants themselves exercise leadership in that those with power and 
know-how often take lead roles.  Though the leverage of official 
 
erever leaders achieved success, it was due to the 
they paid to championing the cause and managing the 
media o t that 
active as a 
determ
                                                
leadership is diminished, members may acknowledge leaders either by 
position, location in the organization having the lead, role as dominant 
convener, or through boards or committees. 246
Huxham and Vangen see three activities central to such leadership:  1) managing 
power and controlling the agenda by using position power to influence the action in an 
appropriate direction; 2) representing and mobilizing member organizations’ roles and 
ensuring that the needs of those organizations are represented; and 3) enthusing and 
empowering those who can deliver collaboration aims by getting buy-in to the role and 
purpose.  They have discovered that those leading are frequently confronted with 
challenges that inhibit success.  In almost all cases, these leaders had little real control 
over the media of collaboration.  In addition, the complexity of the task, the structure of 
collaboration, or the logistics involved proved key distractions.  Failure to get buy-in as 
well as not establishing trust were also factors, along with shifts in policy and changes in 
leadership.   
Huxham and Vangen conclude that successful collaboration requires significant 
energy, commitment, skill, and continual nurturing on the part of the leaders involved. 
These researchers conclude that wh
significant personal attention 
f collaborative leadership.247  They cite other studies that reinforce the poin
involvement (or the absence of it) by top public sector executives h
ining influence on the success or failure of any collaboration.  
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V. REVIEW OF RISK MANAGEMENT POLICY 
IMPLEMENTATION 
. NEED FOR A HYBRID MODEL OF CHANGE MANAGEMENT 
1. Integrating Strategic Change, Policy, and Systems Theories 
When considering the nature of homeland security and its tremendous 
terdependence with all aspects of American society, it becomes evident that homeland 
curity leaders will need new tools for understanding the challenges involved and 
ffectively influencing strategic change.  This means looking across prior research and 
xperience, adapting old models, developing new ones, and incorporating this learning 
to the way future homeland security policies and programs are conceived, developed, 
plemented, and m consider the public 
policy reflected in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) risk management 
framework as representative of homeland security strategic change and to apply current 
change management models, public policy constructs, and emerging open systems and 
complexity theory in a way that better informs its implementation and provides initial 
grist for additional research in this area.  In so doing, it is the intent of this paper to 
encourage homeland security leaders to consider the importance of managing the change 
process itself and applying relevant change management theory and lessons learned to 
advance the practice within this field.    
If leadership, in its simplest form, is getting people to do things that achieve a 
certain outcome, it is then by definition about transformation and making change.  In 
leading major strategic change, it is not uncommon for leaders, in any sector of society, 
to focus more on the financial, technological, and institutional aspects of the intended 
change than on leading the change process itself.  As Kotter points out in his review of 
over 100 large-scale change efforts, only a few such changes actually achieve their 







im aintained.  The central purpose of this paper is to 
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between. 2 et change 
right than in the implementati cy and programs.  If a major 
U.S. corporation fails at strategic change and falls victim to the marketplace, there may 
be momentary consequences, but the economy rights itself and augers on.  If there is 
ilities go 
unaddr ed, p hood of a 
major catastrophe, for which the nation is unprepared, only increases as the nature of the 
threat c
cial dimensions.  Transcending all of this is a 
rapidly
                                                
48  Nowhere in our public life as a nation is it more important to g
on of homeland security poli
failure in the implementation of change in homeland security, vulnerab
ess recious resources are squandered or misapplied, and the likeli
hanges and adapts faster than our ability to respond.  The human, economic, and 
political consequences of such a failure could be enormous.       
Chapter IV of this paper provides a brief overview of some of the current 
literature and perspectives on managing the implementation of large-scale change.  It 
summarizes the challenges involved and offers frameworks and approaches for leaders to 
consider when dealing with the complexity such change presents, often in the form of 
what are now referred to as wicked problems, the latter being typical of the sort of 
challenges the nation now confronts in the still-emerging field of homeland security.  
Given the emergent nature of homeland security, there is precious little in the research 
literature dealing specifically with homeland security leadership and change 
management.  There is however, a rich history of research on leadership in general to 
include managing strategic change, although this research has typically been conducted 
within corporate settings and not the public sector.  Most research addressing change 
management in government has had to do with the implementation of public policy, 
focusing on its greater political and so
 growing body of knowledge about organizations as open systems, complexity 
theory, adaptation and emergence, and social networking and collaboration.   
Like much in the leadership and change management literature, there are many 
definitions for the phrase “strategic change.”  For purposes of this paper, one definition 
that may fit best is viewing strategic change as “a difference in the form, quality, or state 
 
248 John Kotter, Leading Change, 3-4. 
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over time in an organization’s alignment with its external environment.” 249  In this 
context, many homeland security initiatives certainly qualify as strategic change.  This 
includes airline passenger screening, the Southern Border Initiative (SBI), and of course, 
critical infrastructure and key resource (CI/KR) protection through the implementation of 
the NIPP, the NIPP sector partnership model, and the risk management framework.  In 
addition to being strategic change, the NIPP is also significant public policy, and not just 
federal policy, but policy that is national in scope.   
Given that its purpose is to serve the people, government in general can be 
classified as an open system having tremendous interdependence with its external 
environ
 theory, as 
national public policy, and as a highly complex wicked problem.  In considering main-
stream 
Framework will be overlaid onto what is known of NIPP risk management framework 
                                                
ment.  Nowhere is this truer than in homeland security, and especially in the area 
of CI/KR protection.  As evidenced in the sector partnership model, implementation of 
the NIPP and the Sector-Specific Plans (SSPs) are highly interdependent with thousands 
of public and private sector CI/KR owners and operators across the country.   The highly 
networked nature of the nation’s critical infrastructure itself is reflected in the complex 
adaptive system formed under the NIPP – the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory 
Council (CIPAC).  This nationwide network of over five hundred member entities spread 
across thirty-six different councils and seventeen different CI/KR sectors requires 
public/private sector collaboration on a scale possibly not seen since World War II.  And 
certainly, all of this qualifies the implementation of the NIPP, and especially the 
implementation of the national risk management framework so central to its success, as a 
wicked problem.  
Implementation of the risk management framework outlined in the NIPP can be 
viewed through the multiple lenses of conventional change management
change management theory, a combination and adaptation of Kotter’s Eight-Stage 
Process and the Determinants of Successful Organizational Change offered by Fernandez 
and Rainey will be applied.  In addition, Tichy’s Technical Political Cultural (TPC) 
 
249 Nandini Rajagopalan and Gretchen Spreitzer, “Toward a Theory of Strategic Change: A Multi-lens 
Pers e Academy of Management Review 22, no. 1 (January 1997), 48-79. pective and Integrative Framework,” Th
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implementation to date.  In considering the risk management framework as public policy, 
change management issues will be explored using Matland’s Ambiguity – Conflict 
Matrix.  And finally, implementation of the NIPP risk management framework will be 
viewed through the lens of open systems theory, complexity, and wicked problems for 
additional insights on change management and leadership.   
2. Conventional Models Applied to Homeland Security Change  
, like empowering broad-based action, Fernandez and Rainey take a 
more conventional management approach with the expression of straightforward tasks.  
Nonetheless
                                                
In their review of the change management research, Sergio Fernandez and Hal 
Rainey identify points of consensus in the literature and offer a set of eight propositions 
that they describe as key determinants of successful organizational change in the public 
sector. 250   These propositions are very similar to the Eight-Stage Process of Creating 
Major Change presented by John Kotter, the most notable difference being that Kotter’s 
Eight-Stage Process was based on his own personal experience and research, while 
Fernandez and Rainey were later able to tie their change propositions directly to the 
research literature and the commonalities they identified across major theoretical 
perspectives. 251  Though risking over-simplification of a complex and dynamic process, 
the easy-to-understand checklist format all three of these authors present make it an 
attractive lens through which to assess strategic change in homeland security.   
While Kotter expresses his Eight-Step Process in terms that reflect more the art of 
change leadership
, there is much in common between the two lists, and both provide valuable 
insight into the elements of effective change.  Some elements of both translate almost 
directly:  developing a vision and strategy (Kotter) and providing a plan (Fernandez and 
Rainey), while others are unique to each list.  For example, Kotter emphasizes the need 
for generating short-term wins, while Fernandez and Rainey state the need to provide 
resources.  Though the article by Fernandez and Rainey is perhaps more grounded in the 
 
250 Sergio Fernandez and Hal Rainey, “Managing Successful Organizational Change in the Public 
Sector: An Agenda for Research and Practice,” 7. 
251 John Kotter, “Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail,” 61. 
 116
research of others, Kotter presents an important intangible quality based on his own 
extensive firsthand experience — that it is the role of the leader to energize, inspire, and 
influence the change process.  The following questions are based extensively on the work 
of Kotter and Fernandez and Rainey.  It is a blending of the two approaches, adapted in a 
way that might provide a simple generic guide tailored for use by homeland security 
leaders.  
of failing to act.  Articulate a com
ad 
the change process.  Manage the group outside the normal hierarchy and 
among all parties involved.  
Assessing Leadership of Strategic Change 
What is being done to ensure the need and establish a sense of urgency? 
Conduct a careful examination of the scope of the problem and the 
attendant issues and implications.  Identify internal and external 
stakeholders and their possible positions relative to the issues.  Formulate 
a cogent argument supporting the need for change and the consequences 
pelling vision and set of policy goals for 
what the change will achieve.  Persuasively communicate these in a way 
that wins the support of the influential leaders that will form a guiding 
coalition. 
Has a guiding coalition been established and policy-maker commitment 
obtained? 
Identify clear responsibility for being the advocate and “idea champion” 
for the change.  Organize the group to work as a team and ensure it has the 
power, authority, stature, skills, and resources needed to effectively le
provide it with the senior leadership support and protection necessary to 
deal with resistance.  Bring appointees, political leaders, and other policy-
makers on-board early and obtain their understanding and commitment. 
Has a refined vision been developed, and a change strategy and plan 
prepared? 
As the guiding coalition takes hold, it should refine the vision and develop 
an initial plan for achieving it, building shared ownership along the way.  
The plan must translate the vision and policy goals into specific 
objectives, strategies, milestones, accountabilities, and measures for 
success.  It must also demonstrate a sound causal link between the actions 
outlined and the outcomes desired to ensure consistency in approach, as 
well as provide a means for managing coordination and congruence 
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How is the vision being communicated and broad-based action mobilized?  
Constantly communicate the vision, policy goals, and strategy across all 
stakeholder groups, through every vehicle possible.  Senior leaders and the 
guiding coalition must walk-the-talk and role-model behaviors expected of 
those whose buy-in and participation are essential to success.  Encourage 
risk-taking and paradigm-breaking initiatives and ideas consistent with the 
vision, across as wide a front as possible.  Remove, neutralize, or by-pass 
obstacles (i.e., policies, people, systems) that undermine the change effort.   
Are needed r to overcome 
resistance? 
d 
Are steps being taken to breed success by generating short-term wins?  
 successes to drive and sustain the change effort.  These 
nstitutionalize the vision by using the credibility established 
What efforts are underway to anchor the new approaches in the system? 
how stakeholders the connections between the new way of doing things 
and the success achieved in attaining the vision and associated policy 
esources and support being marshaled 
As momentum builds, ensure adequate financial, technological, an
human resources to support and sustain the change.  Capitalize on 
synergies across stakeholder groups, and avoid overtaxing participants.  
Commit sufficient leadership time and effort to expanding internal and 
external support.  Reduce resistance to change by encouraging widespread 
participation and an environment conducive to the free and open exchange 
of ideas.  Develop support from political leaders, non-aligned 
stakeholders, and interest groups. 
Consistent with the vision and policy goals, deliberately plan for and 
achieve interim
short-term wins should not only be visible demonstrations of the efficacy 
of the change, but also provide clear examples of desired behaviors and 
outcomes.  Short-term wins should be widely publicized, the lessons-
learned shared, and those involved recognized.  As waypoints on the path 
to change, such wins provide opportunities for experimentation and 
organizational learning. 
 
How are gains being consolidated to expand and sustain the change? 
Begin to i
through short-term wins.  Systematically start to change the behaviors, 
systems, structures, and policies that don’t fit together and/or don’t fit the 
vision.  Constantly reinvigorate the process with new projects, themes, and 
people.  Hire, promote, develop and/or enlist the support of people who 
are capable of and committed to implementing the change.  Institutionalize 




goals.  Establish an enduring structure to sustain and adequately support 
what has been achieved for the long-term, and make the comprehensive 
system-wide adjustments necessary to ensure subsystem congruence (i.e., 
alignment of mission, people, processes, etc.).  Provide for leadership 
succession to maintain stability and continuous evolution consistent with 
the vision. 
Tichy’s TPC Framework provides another unique lens through which to assess 
implementation of the NIPP risk management framework as strategic change in public 









of the n zation 
as a ne t also 
their dy twork 
Model, t and 
constantly interacting with its environment.  That environment drives the organization’s 
mission t perform to 
carry o ludes 
nationa t and 
the Co  other 
elected tives, 
and the  will 
employ and the formal structure or, as Tichy refers to it, the prescribed networks, through 
           
  Of the various models of organizations as systems, the TPC Framework,
as the Network Model, seems to lend itself best to an examination of the 
ational networks of the type found in homeland security strategic change.252  
 efforts often involve complex social networks that are a combination of for
ed and informally structured relationships across levels of government, p
business and industry, elected officials, political interests, and other 
mental stakeholder groups.   
While the steps or determinants of successful change offered by K
dez and Rainey provide guidance on the process of change, Tichy’s represen
etwork model provides a way to look at the basic components of an organi
twork and examine not only the congruence between those components bu
namic interrelationships. 253  As Tichy describes the components of the Ne
 the organization or network exists as an open system and is interdependen
 and strategy, which in turn drives the tasks that the organization mus
ut that mission. 254  In a homeland security context, the environment inc
l-level assessments of threat and vulnerability, guidance from the presiden
ngress on program priorities and funding, and the opinions and actions of
 leaders, senior policy-makers, special interest groups, private sector execu
 public. As tasks are defined, they determine the processes the organization
                                      
252 -73. 
253 
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which i t have 
the flex given 
the natu sional 
oversig ain.   
ships will emerge and must be planned for. 
                                                                                                                                                
t is expected those tasks will be accomplished.  Government agencies do no
ibility of the private sector to rapidly change structure or realign processes, 
re of legislative mandates from Congress and the limits imposed by congres
ht and control of funding.  This is no less true for the homeland security dom
People are the central component in Tichy’s model, with the key dimensions 
being leadership and motivation.  The quality of that leadership, the level of management 
skill, and ability to motivate and inspire performance to achieve expected outcomes are 
critical determinants of success. 255  Homeland security, and especially the advancement 
of the NIPP and sector partnership model, requires the ability of leadership to motivate 
the commitment and contributions of a broad range of stakeholders, most of whom are 
outside the formal homeland security structure.  Those relationships may be made more 
formal through constructs such as the partnership model.  However, even with moves to 
formalize structure, informal relation
As change advances and the normal order of things is altered, new and unplanned 
relationships, alliances, structures and processes will emerge, both within the prescribed 
structure and outside of it.  These emergent networks occur as people tend to react to, 
formulate, reformulate, understand, abide by, and/or seek to alter the mission or intended 
change of the organization.  Emergent networks could have significant impact on the 
nature, direction, and degree of success of strategic change.  As Tichy points out, these 
emergent networks can have double-edged consequences and either work against or in 
support of the change. 256  Homeland security leaders will need to be aware of these 
dynamics and alert to the influence they may have on strategic change.  A key challenge 
will be to harness and direct that energy in a way that aligns it with the total effort.  
Tichy assesses the health of an organization, and thus its ability to manage 
strategic change, by looking carefully at the functioning of its technical, political, and 
cultural (TPC) subsystems.  The technical subsystem consists of those tangible aspects 
that are knowable, such as physical assets, technologies, processes, or resources.  The 
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political subsystem consists of the views and influence of dominant groups, both within 
and outside the organization or network.  The cultural subsystem consists of the shared 
symbols, beliefs, and values that make up the organizational culture and the culture of 
other groups active within the political subsystem.  The premise behind the model is that 
a well-designed organization should exhibit alignment between its components and 
subsystems. 257  Tichy examines this alignment from four perspectives that are outlined 
here to provide a way to look beyond the process orientation of Kotter and Fernanez and 
Rainey, and better appreciate TPC dynamics, as these may impact the change process.     
 
Assessing Organizational Alignment for Leading Strategic Change 
How well are the parts of the organization aligned with each other for 
solving the organization’s technical problems? 
How well are the parts of the organization aligned with each other for 
solving the organization’s political problems? 
How well are the parts of the organization aligned with each other for 
solving the organization’s cultural problems? 
How well aligned are the three subsystems of the organization, the 
technical, political, and cultural? 
3. Homeland Security Change and Public Policy Theory  
In his assessment of the public policy process, Guy Peters describes American 
central organizing principle. 
government as “a massive, complex, and often confusing set of institutions” that lack any 
 this 
complex and diffuse structure exacerbates the problems inherent in implementation, 
which i
                                                                                                                                                
258  The often ad hoc nature of American government has 
evolved to address particular problems at particular times.  According to Peters,
s the most vital step in the public policy process.  He further states that difficulties 
involved in public policy implementation are commonly underestimated, and as a result 
the process becomes one of either “threatening or cajoling organizations into complying 
with stated objectives or convincing those organizations that their goals can best be 
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accomplished through the programs that have been authorized.” 259  In his review of the 
research, Peters concludes that there is no single answer directing public policy 
implementation and suggests that “it all depends.” 260  He says that the real task for 
public policy implementers is to identify what factors serve as contingencies that 
determine the success or failure of implementation (i.e., political, organizational, etc.).  
Matland’s Ambiguity-Conflict Matrix (page 102) provides yet another lens 
through which to assess approaches to the implementation of homeland security policy as 
strategic change, in that it offers a construct to identify the sorts of contingencies 
suggested by Peters that may determine the success or failure of implementation.  As 
outlined in ion in the 
contex  exist 
there m  objectives, and a perceived 
zero-su n the 
objectives of the policy, the means of carrying out that policy, or both.  According to 
Matlan nd/or 
means and the perception of individual actors as to what and how much is at stake.  
Ambig ainty 
over ends and/or means. 261   The Ambiguity-Conflict Matrix offers insights into what 
implem tation.   
 the prior chapter, Matland describes public policy implementat
t of the extent of potential ambiguity and conflict.  He says that for conflict to
ust be interdependence of actors, an incompatibility of
m aspect to the interaction.  The conflict may arise due to differing views o
d, the level of conflict is related directly to the incompatibility over ends a
uity, he posits, can likewise be associated with the same two issues – uncert
enters may do to increase the opportunity for successful implemen
Situations involving low ambiguity and low conflict, as viewed by Matland, are 
administrative in nature with the focus largely on the management of resources.  The 
objectives are well-defined, authority is clear, and implementation is driven from the top.  
In a homeland security context, an example of policy in this category might be the 
implementation of the 3-1-1 rule for screening airline passenger carry-on baggage.   The 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) implemented the 3-1-1 policy “in response 
to the thwarted liquid explosive bomb plot in the United Kingdom in August of 2006. 
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Today, the wide-spread acceptance of that policy demonstrates the international 
understanding of the threat.” 262  In this case, the need was clear and widely accepted, 
TSA had the authority and a comprehensive plan to implement it, and there was 
considerable cooperation from local airport authorities and law enforcement agencies.   
Matland refers to implementation situations involving high ambiguity and low 
conflict as experimental in nature.  Homeland security examples would typically include 
activities in the realm of research and development or pilot programs.  One example is 
the need to detect and interdict radiological and nuclear devices to keep them from 
entering the U.S. and making their way into a major metropolitan center, as is the mission 
of the joint Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/New York Police Department 
((NYPD) Securing the Cities program. 263  There is little disagreement over the general 
intent, but there is not much known about either the precise strategy to pursue or the 
technical means to achieve that strategy.  In this case, context is what is important, and 
success depends greatly on ground-level implementation with select local actors having 
significant influence on the outcome.  Each iteration of the policy becomes an experiment 
that produces learning for the next.  However, as what began as an experiment becomes 
operationalized, ambiguity may go down but conflict over elements like cost, 
accountability, and jurisdictional prerogatives may increase. 264   
Matland classifies situations involving low ambiguity and high conflict as 
political in nature.  The goals and means may be known but there is disagreement over 
competing interests or values.  In such cases, outcomes are determined by the application 
of power, and policy is typically driven from the top down.  Homeland security examples 
might include controversial elements of the USA Patriot Act that are perceived to impact  
civil liberties. 265  Compliance with policy goals is through coercion.  Initial support won 
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in the policy adoption phase may have been a function of political pressure or not 
wanting to appear contrary to the dominant mood.  Such support, if not reinforced, could 
evaporate during implementation and result in undoing of the policy. 266  
Matland’s final cell in the matrix defines situations involving the potential for 
high po
of risk assessm
Ambiguity-Conflict Matrix would seem appropriate.  The questions below are derived 
from his discussion of symbolic (high ambiguity / high conflict) implementation. 268  
nt framework 
as i y. 
licy ambiguity and high policy conflict.  He classifies these situations as symbolic 
in nature and has posited that they are typically linked to important values and principles.  
With only a referential goal, differing perspectives and a proliferation of interpretations 
of the vision will emerge, according to Matland.  He suggests that substantial variation in 
programs and coalition strength will occur across locations (or stakeholder groups).  The 
strength of these coalitions, he says, is the determining factor in the success or failure of 
policy implementation.  As Matland describes it, in symbolic implementation, expert 
professions play an important role and provide direction and influence.  The conflicts that 
can emerge between expert professionals may be long and fierce.  He suggests that expert 
professionals may exercise their influence from the core of competing coalitions, 
exacerbating conflict and the degree of competition at the local (execution) level. 267
Though the NIPP lays out a vision for nationwide CI/KR protection, it is much 
less clear where the NIPP risk management framework is headed.  The burden and costs 
ent and CI/KR protection improvements fall almost entirely on the 
shoulders of CI/KR owners and operators, the great majority of whom are in the private 
sector and function in a highly competitive marketplace.  There are a number of different 
risk assessment approaches in use, but no clear standard.  Given this ambiguity and 
potential for conflict over long-term CI/KR protection initiatives, and the current policy 
regarding the NIPP risk management framework in particular, application of Matland’s 
They are offered here as a possible way to assess the NIPP risk manageme
mplementation of high ambiguity / high conflict public policy in homeland securit
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Assessing Leadership of Public Policy Implementation 
What local- or execution-level coalitions exist; what are their positions on 
the matter of the policy to be implemented; what power or influence do 
they exert; and what relative effect might they have on the implementation 
270
                                                                                                                                                
process? 
What expert professional or academic stakeholders may be involved; what 
are their positions on the matter of the policy to be implemented; with 
what local- or execution-level coalitions might they be aligned with and 
supporting? 
What steps are being taken to reduce the ambiguity surrounding the 
policy’s goals by working with both the originating policy-makers and 
political stakeholders on one end, and the various local- or execution-level 
constituencies on the other? 
What change management framework has been established to manage 
ambiguity and conflict by coordinating implementation efforts across 
governmental agencies, among execution-level coalitions, and between 
expert professional stakeholders? 
 
4. Homeland Security as a Complex Wicked Problem  
In his July 2006 paper on Risk and Decision-Making in Homeland Security, 
Robert Ross quoted General Alexander Haig who said, “When there is confusion in the 
center, there is chaos at the periphery.” 269  In assessing the confusion that seems to exist 
around the implementation of risk management policy in homeland security, Ross 
cogently describes the issues of complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity that surround 
questions associated with risk management decision-making as a wicked problem.  He 
puts his finger squarely on the matter when stating, “When potential alternative solutions 
adversely affect stakeholders representing legitimate but irreconcilably opposed public 
and/or private goods, ‘wickedness’ will be due not so much to the nature of the problem 
in a technical sense as to the environment in which the decision-maker must decide.”   
Though the technologies associated with risk assessment and management are 
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challenging enou oaches must be 
develo
to the 
implem f just about any other major strategic change in homeland security 
policy, ement 
framew nment 
and the private sector (see Figure 13).  He further suggests that the challenges faced by 
DHS d s in 
underst dency 
to add
conventional or “tam 271
his disc chaos 
and fut pt the 
situation as inevitable.  According to Conklin, leaders often fail to recognize wicked 
problem near thinking and 
problem-solving methods that are inappropriate for the complex and nonlinear challenges 
they fa
     
gh, it is also the social context in which these appr
ped and implemented that contributes greatly to making it a wicked problem.   
To illustrate his point, Ross provides a graphic that could easily apply 
entation o
 but is especially true concerning implementation of the NIPP risk manag
ork, one that is national in scope and must stretch across all levels of gover
ecision makers in addressing the complexity of risk, to include gap
anding and credibility among stakeholders, may have much to do with a ten
ress truly wicked problems with decision-making approaches more suited to 
e” problems.    This finding echoes the words of Jeff Conklin in 
ussion of wicked problems and complexity when he asserts that the sense of 
ility that often accompany wicked problems causes some leaders to acce
s for what they are and persist in applying traditional li
ce.  He suggests that this complexity requires new understandings, processes, and 
tools better suited to the “fundamentally social and conversational nature of work.” 272
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Figure 13.   The Homeland Security Decision-Making Environment 273 
To paraphrase John Holland, complex adaptive systems include these features: 
many agents constantly acting and reacting to each other; highly dispersed control with 
many levels or layers of interaction; all agents having niches to exploit which are 
constantly evolving or propagating so they never reach equilibrium; constant 
rearrangement as a function of learning, experience, evolution, and adaptation; and 
spontaneous self-organization. 274  By their nature, critical infrastructure and key 
source (CI/KR) protection efforts by private and public sector organizations across the 
nation, whether formally sponsored by DHS or not, represent a large-scale complex 
adaptive system.  Only one part of this system, albeit perhaps the most formal part, is 
represented in the sector partnership model under the NIPP, which itself is a complex 
adaptive system.  As such, the activities and outcomes associated with the sector 
partnership model can neither be fully planned nor controlled by DHS alone.  This 
includes the implementation of the NIPP risk management framework.  
As suggested by Beverly Parsons, leaders must align attention and resources in 
such a way as “to help accelerate the movement in a natural direction, even though it is 
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unplanned or uncontrolled.” 275  Parsons describes complex adaptive system
a world somewhere between being stable and organized, but not yet 
  In this in-between world, a complex adaptive system strives to self-org
and bring coherence through dissent, learning, experimentation, evolution, and 
adaptation, with new patterns constantly emerging, but in a way that is unpredictable and 
ntrollable.  In considering the problems and opportunities of m
 a position of little or no authority, Ronald Heifetz offers that that task of
ontext is primarily one of education, and choreographing and directing that 
learning through new ideas and the shaping of attitudes and behaviors. 276
that they do not have total control of outcomes, leaders must facilitate the
s as living in 
fully unorganized or 
in chaos. anize 
largely unco obilizing work 
from  leadership 
in such a c
  Recognizing 
 natural process 
of learning and adaptation by helping to generate agreement and certainty across the 
system. der and 
predict
ease the level of 
agreem
                                                
  The greater the level of agreement and certainty, the more or
ability will follow.  The less agreement and certainty, the more the system will 
tend toward chaos.   
Conklin points out that complexity contributes to fragmentation, where a large 
and diverse set of actors perceive themselves as more separate than united, and 
information and knowledge are chaotic and scattered, making the harnessing of collective 
intelligence and achieving consensus challenging or even virtually impossible. 277  He 
suggests that complexity, problem solving, and learning are closely interdependent and 
that the flow of this learning is collaborative and opportunity driven.  The harder the 
problem, the more organizational learning involved, the greater the need for 
collaboration.  To energize such learning and collaboration, the fragmentation of the 
system must be addressed by achieving coherence.  Coherence means fostering a 
collective sense of meaning, clarity about roles, a common understanding of the problem, 
and a shared sense of commitment to address it.  Coherence helps incr
ent and decrease uncertainty, as described by Parsons.  This makes it easier to 
advance collaboration and the sharing of collective intelligence, inherent across the larger 
 
275 Beverly Parsons, “Attending to Self-Organizing Systems in Cluster/Initiative Evaluation,” 3. 
cial Complexity,” 13. 
276 Ronald Heifetz, Leadership Without Easy Answers, 183-231. 
277 Jeff Conklin, “Wicked Problems and So
 128
system, as needed to solve the problem.  On leading collaborative networks in the face of 
complexity, Chris Huxham and Siv Vangen outline three media they view as essential to 
success.  Similar to Tichy’s Technical, Political, Cultural (TPC) framework, Huxham and 
Vangen suggest leaders focus on structure – how the network is arranged and what 
organizations and people participate; processes – formal and informal communications, 
and how and what information is transmitted and shared; and people – the roles they play 
and how leadership is acknowledged, distributed, and exercised. 278
Coherence, networking and collaboration, information sharing, and organizational 
learning are key to leading complex systems in the implementation of public policy as 
strategic change.  Absent any real prescriptive guide or even general theory for homeland 
security leaders to manage complex systems and address wicked problems, the following 
questions are offered based on the review of the ideas and research presented previously.  
Like the questions outlined earlier in this chapter, this list is by no means comprehensive 
or totally reflective of current theory.  It is simply provided as another lens through which 
to assess the implementation of strategic change in homeland security policy, and in this 
case, the implementation of the NIPP risk management framework. 
 
Assessing Leadership of Complex Adaptive Systems 
What strategies are in place to achieve shared meaning of key terms and 
concepts; clarify organizational and participant roles and responsibilities; 
ensure a common understanding of the problem; and generate a shared 
commitment to implementation? 
How are networking and collaboration being structured and facilitated; 
what groups, organizations, and individuals are involved; how is 
leadership being defined and distributed; and how are emergent networks 
being accommodated and encouraged? 
What mechanisms have been established for communication and 
information sharing; how are research, emerging concepts, and lessons-
learned being propagated; and what framework has been set up for 
knowledge management and organizational learning? 
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How much time and attention are leaders devoting to nurturing the social 
process of change as opposed to its mechanics; and how are leaders being 
prepared to lead others in a highly complex, often ambiguous, and 
potentially conflict-prone environment?  
B. ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT SITUATION 
1. The Challenge of Implementing Risk Management Policy 
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), Sector-Specific Plans (SSPs), 
and the
tate and local 
nfrastructures 
resent significant protection challenges.  The stakeholders and entities 
involved,  the level 
of understanding of roles and responsibilities varies.  The range of 
nationa or so 
entities odel, but thousands of individual public 
and pri tities 
represe ., the 
chemic mplementation is largely 
voluntary.  Nonetheless, the NIPP sector partnership model represents a framework for 
                                                
 NIPP risk management framework represent a translation of the strategic intent of 
both the president and the Congress as national policy for critical infrastructure and key 
resource (CI/KR) protection to include the implementation of a risk management 
approach.  The challenges involved in implementing this policy are well articulated in 
Kentucky’s State Official’s Guide to Critical Infrastructure Protection, produced in 2003. 
Implementing a comprehensive national critical infrastructure effort 
requires extraordinary organization, clarity of purpose, common 
understanding of roles and responsibilities, accountability, and a detailed 
and clear process of coordination.  The overlap of Federal, s
governance and the ownership structure of our critical i
p
both public and private, are multiple and diverse, and
protective activities that each must undertake is vast and changes across 
infrastructures. And the protection authorities across Federal, state and 
local jurisdictions overlap in many instances and vary greatly. 279
The implementation of the NIPP as well as its risk management framework as 
l policy requires the cooperation and commitment of not only the 500 
 participating in the sector partnership m
vate sector CI/KR owners and operators across the country that these en
nt.  Except in cases where new federal regulations have been enacted (i.e
al industry), non-federal participation in NIPP i
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public- ented 
in its s rdest 
part ma tnership may be emerging.   
at, given the differences in 
the plans to-date, it is unclear to what ex y gaps and 
critical interdependencies across the sectors as part of any national roll-up.  Perhaps most 
signific
discussion of the sector’s general approach to risk management.  However, neither 
describ  any 
risk ma o risk 
manage ment.  
Instead s that 
may be
rame-
work is f the president, the 
Congress, and the secretary for Homeland Security to implement a compatible national 
program
                                                
private sector networking and collaboration for homeland security unpreced
cope.  As remarkable as this partnership may be, there are signs that the ha
y be yet to come, and fault lines in the par
A July 2007 review of the SSPs by the GAO found th
tent DHS will be able to identif
ant among GAO findings was that there are differing views regarding the value of 
the SSPs.  The GAO report said that, while 10 of the 32 council representatives 
interviewed reported that they saw the plans as useful, representatives of 8 councils 
disagreed. 280  The central element of those plans is a sector-specific approach to the risk 
management framework guidance provided by DHS.  Of the SSPs not restricted and 
available for public review, only the transportation and water sectors had a robust 
ed a common and integrated approach to risk assessment, the core element of
nagement framework.  Though the NIPP itself outlines a basic approach t
ment, it does not provide a common method or metrics for risk assess
 it suggests only a set of baseline criteria for risk assessment methodologie
 employed by individual sectors, and little else.   
Notwithstanding the fact that implementing the NIPP risk management f
 a complex and truly wicked problem, it does reflect the will o
 for risk assessment and risk management.  Though some progress has been 
made within individual DHS components, development of unique and incompatible 
CI/KR risk methodologies continues, and efforts to coordinate integration have been 
fragmented and, at times, hindered by significant changes in organizational structure and 
leadership.  The bottom line is that, as of this date, other than the NIPP baseline criteria, 
there are no common lexicon, no organizing schema, and no national risk assessment 
standard that respond effectively to the guidance received.  To repeat the words of 
 
280 Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Sector Plans and Sector 
Councils Continue to Evolve, 3-6. 
 131
Alexander Haig, “When there is confusion in the center, there is chaos at the periphery.”  
If DHS cannot implement an integrated department-wide risk assessment and risk 
management program, how can it be expected that industry sector coordinating councils 
will be able to effectively implement and sustain sector-specific programs, compatible 
within the
her.” 281  The March 2007 DHS 
report to Congress in compliance with its request was largely unresponsive.   
                                                
mselves, across other sectors, and with DHS?  Despite the incredible 
accomplishment achieved in the establishment of the NIPP sector partnership model, and 
the delivery of initial sector-specific plans, the realization of the overarching goal of the 
NIPP will be slowed unless there is accelerated and compatible progress in the 
implementation of the risk management framework that is so central to its success.  The 
risk management framework is the proverbial “long pole in the tent” when it comes to 
national CI/KR protection.  It is what everything else hinges on.   
The 2007 Homeland Security Appropriations Bill states, “Unfortunately, the 
fiscal year 2007 budget request offers no details of how risk assessment was used in its 
formulation or even which DHS agency was tasked with prioritizing risks and assigning 
them resources….The Committee directs DHS to report by January 16, 2007, on the 
direction that will be taken to make certain all elements of the Department involved in 
risk assessment activities are using compatible risk assessment methodologies including 
risks from all hazards and are coordinated with each ot
Though the DHS report to Congress did indicate that progress had been made, and 
identified the responsibilities and efforts of individual DHS components, it outlined no 
plan for integration or the implementation of compatible risk methodologies as directed.  
Though the report acknowledged general agreement within DHS that standardization of 
policies, definitions, methodologies, and metrics were needed, it also acknowledged a 
lack of internal agreement over the particulars of how that standardization should be 
achieved.  The report correctly asserted that there is no one “right way” to assess risk and 
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that DHS manages risk differently across different operating environments. 282  However, 
this masks the fact that, particularly within the area of critical infrastructure protection, 
there is still a great degree of compatibility that can be achieved, as reinforced by GAO 
audits cited earlier in this paper as well as the independent progress made by individual 
components, like the Coast Guard and its Maritime Security Risk Assessment 
Methodology (MSRAM) and Maritime Assessment and Strategy Toolkit (MAST) 
programs.   
The DHS report to Congress itself cited a December 2005 GAO audit that stated, 
“Success will depend partly on continuing to improve various technical and management 
processes that are part of risk management... In the longer term, progress will depend 
increasingly on how well risk management is coordinated across agencies, because 
current
 reviews of 
assessment processes; and embracing a mechanism that permits credible comparison. 285  
Howev
 approaches in many ways are neither consistent nor comparable.” 283  The GAO 
went on to say that the “danger in using different methods is that if agencies develop 
systems and methodologies without some overall coordination, they may end up with 
redundant or incompatible systems that have little or no ability to inform one another. 
Even more important, these systems may provide decision makers with unreliable or 
incomplete data.” 284  In response, DHS indicated steps it intends to take, to include 
validating existing risk assessment methods; providing a conceptual foundation, 
guidelines, and defined processes for developing new methods; conducting
er, these steps have not been implemented, more than a year and a half later.   
Clearly DHS has been challenged to implement risk policies, concepts, standards, 
and methodologies that provide for an appropriate level of compatibility and integration.  
It is suggested here that despite heroic efforts to wrestle with this challenge, conventional 
program management approaches have thus far failed.  Only through a candid assessment 
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of how it manages strategic change will the department come to grips with this very 
complex and wicked problem.  The following pages attempt to consider implementation 
of the NIPP risk management framework as strategic change, and apply a basic set of 
questions, adapted from the research, as a way to assess opportunities for improvement.  
Information available to support this research was limited, and thus the analysis that 
follows is intended to only be representative of how homeland security leaders may apply 
change man
 
agement, public policy, and complexity theory to better organize and 
facilita
and th
What is being done to ensure the need and establish a sense of
te large-scale strategic change.  It is hoped that this work will spur further research 
into the development of change management models for homeland security.   
2. Assessing Management of the Strategic Change Process 
This section attempts to apply the questions for Assessing Leadership of Strategic 
Change outlined earlier in this chapter to the implementation of major homeland security 
policy, as represented by the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) risk 
management framework.  These questions have been adapted from the work of John 
Kotter and his Eight-Stage Process of Creating Major Change, and Sergio Fernandez and 
Hal Rainey in their synthesis of the research resulting in the Determinants of Successful 
Organizational Change in the Public Sector.  The combined work of these researchers, as 
presented here, has significant empirical and theoretical support and can be applied with a 
high degree of confidence by homeland security leaders when considering the basic steps 
to employ in organizing, implementing, and assessing large-scale strategic change.  
However, given the political and bureaucratic nuances of public policy implementation, 
e additional challenges involved in addressing issues of high ambiguity and 
complexity, it is suggested that the questions outlined here be augmented with alternative 
perspectives from both the public policy and complexity theory disciplines.  Accordingly, 
additional questions from these perspectives are posed in sections 3 and 4 that follow.  
 urgency? 
The basic need and sense of urgency for the application of risk management 
approaches as national policy to guide homeland security decision-making and resource 
allo n 
e 
cation has been well established in directives from the president, in federal legislatio
by the Congress, and in strong and frequent statements of strategic intent by th
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Homeland Security secretary himself.  This sense of urgency has been echoed in 
numerous reports published by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS).  Moreover, in statements before Congress and 
elsewhere, experts from DHS, prestigious research institutions, academia, other 
government agencies, and the private sector have reinforced the basic wisdom of 
applying risk management and risk assessment approaches to homeland security. 
Has a guiding coalition been established and policy-maker commitment obtained? 
Despite its complexity and the extensive impact it will have on the entire 
homeland security community, there is not yet a multi-disciplinary, public/private sector 
govern e bo ent framework 
and gu
 
Programs, with membership from the various DHS components.   The creation of 
t may ultimately 
           
anc dy to establish the long-term vision for a NIPP risk assessm
ide the planning and implementation efforts necessary to achieve that vision.  
Largely in response to stakeholder concerns, the department implemented an internal 
Risk Assessment Policy (RAP) working group.  The purpose of RAP was to exchange 
information among DHS components and address compatibility issues across 
methodologies.  Based on GAO assessments to date, the group apparently made little 
headway.  It had no authority and was typically attended by lower-level staff that had no 
measurable influence on DHS risk policy.  The RAP group has since shifted focus to the 
integration of risk assessment results across DHS for purposes of internal priority setting 
and budgeting under the Risk Assessment Process for Informed Decision-making 
(RAPID), jointly managed by the Policy Directorate and Chief Financial Officer. 286
Until just this year, with the creation of the Office of Risk Management and 
Analysis (RMA), DHS did not have a central body solely focused on coordinating and 
integrating its risk assessment efforts.  Guidance to RMA is provided by an internal Risk 
Steering Committee (RSC), chaired by the undersecretary for National Protection and
 287
RMA is clearly an important step forward.  However, other than wha
                                      
286 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Improving Use of Risk-Informed Decision-Making in 
DHS - Report to Congress in Response to House Report 109-476 to the Fiscal Year 2007 Department of 
Homeland Security Appropriations Bill,” 3-4. 
287 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “National Protection and Programs Directorate – Office of 
Risk Management and Analysis,” 9-14. 
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surface through the NIPP sector partnership model, there is no external participation in 
homeland security risk policy decision-making from academia, the private sector, state 
and local government, or professional associations representing related disciplines.  
Failure to effectively tap these constituencies may inadvertently slow the implementation 
of the NIPP risk management framework and work against broad-based acceptance and 
commitment to the goals of this important evolution in homeland security policy. 
Has a refined vision been developed, and a change strategy and plan prepared? 
The vision for risk management, at least as it pertains to critical infrastructure and 
key resource (CI/KR) protection, is outlined in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan 
(NIPP).   The description of the NIPP risk management framework defines the basic 
elements of the risk management process and assigns roles and responsibilities for DHS, 
federal Sector-Specific Agencies (SSAs), state and local government, and the private 
sector.  In an effort to bolster a sense of urgency and advance this vision, DHS required 
SSAs to develop Sector-Specific Plans (SSPs) that were to include measures to 
implement risk management practices within each sector.  However, as discussed in 
previous chapters, results have been mixed and GAO has raised questions concerning the 
completeness of the plans and the ability of DHS to integrate the results of sector-based 
risk assessments, given the absence of compatible methodologies. 288  These results seem 
to indicate that there is not the degree of readiness or commitment needed to fully 
implement risk management approaches across private sector industry and state and local 
government.  This may stem from the advancement of the vision in a way that outpaced, 
or neglected, the involvem
organized, no such supporting structure has been established for risk management as the 
cor d 
ent and influence of important non-DHS stakeholders. 
Under considerable pressure to advance a national risk assessment framework, 
DHS may be inadvertently outrunning the very stakeholders essential to its execution —  
public and private sector CI/KR owners and operators who have a huge stake in the 
game. Though a governance structure for overall NIPP implementation has been 
e element of the NIPP.  Absent a guiding coalition with the requisite authority an
                                                 
288 Government Accountability Office, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Sector Plans and Sector 
Councils Continue to Evolve, 3-6. 
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expertise to steer the change effort, DHS lacks a detailed change management plan with 
specific objectives, strategies, milestones, accountabilities, and measures for success.  
Beyond setting a vision, that plan must focus attention not only on important technical 
issues, like how compatibility across risk assessment methodologies will be resolved, but 
also on how the political and social dynamics of change will be managed.  This includes 
how the buy-in and commitment of non-federal partners will be achieved.   
How is the vision being communicated and broad-based action mobilized?  
The secretary for Homeland Security has been an energetic advocate of risk-
supported decision-making for homeland security throughout his tenure.  Reference to his 
strategic intent in this regard is made in almost every public statement.  To advance the 
implementation of the NIPP, the department has organized a groundbreaking partnership 
with the private sector and other governmental agencies.  Through that partnership, it has 
communicated not only the vision for national CI/KR protection, but the vision for a 
national risk management framework as well.  In DHS sponsored conferences, sector 
council meetings, and in an extensive array of print and electronic media, DHS has 
worked hard to get the word out about the NIPP and its risk management framework.  
But that, it seems, is as far as it goes concerning the risk management framework.  SSAs 
have been delegated the responsibility for pursuing the advancement of SSPs to include a 
sector-specific approach to risk management, consistent with the overall NIPP 
framework.  But unlike the general administrative support provided to the councils by 
DHS, there is little, if any support evident for the coordinated pursuit of sector-specific 
risk management programs.   
It appears that SSAs and industry Sector Coordinating Councils (SCCs) are on 
their own, and even those within DHS do not appear to be working together to advance 
compatible risk assessment regimes, according to recent GAO and CRS reports.  Risk 
management expertise in DHS is limited to a select few people in key roles, and most 
such work is actually performed by various consultants working for different DHS 
components, using different methodologies.  With notable exceptions (i.e., the nuclear 
industry), such expertise is likely minimal or nonexistent in the SCCs.  Without a guiding 
coa to lition, a change management plan, and a support network of like-minded experts 
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energize and coordinate grass-roots risk management efforts, it will be difficult, if not 
impossible, to mobilize broad-based action to implement national risk policy.   Active 
engagement across all stakeholder groups by leaders in the guiding coalition is especially 
important to demonstrate commitment.  Leaders must walk-the-talk, breaking deadlocks, 
uncovering and removing obstacles, encouraging risk-taking and innovation, and visibly 
promoting success.  This is too large a task for DHS leaders alone.  A top-level, multi-
disciplinary, public-private, coalition is needed to build broad-based support. 
Are needed resources and support being marshaled to overcome resistance? 
As John Kotter points out, the nature of strategic change is that the lack of one or 
more steps in the process can have a cascading effect and decide the ultimate success of 
the change itself.  Absent a guiding coalition, a change management plan, and broad-
based support, there is little foundation for deciding on where and how to apply limited 
leadership time and resources to build the momentum necessary to overcome resistance.  
Given the state of risk management activities within DHS, and the fact that SSAs and 
SCCs are on their own in establishing risk programs, it would seem that few if any 
resources are being applied to front-line implementation of the risk assessment 
framework.  Those resources are not just financial and technological but human as well.  
Implementing the risk policy will require a tremendous commitment of leadership time, 
and a support network of risk experts, that can assist grassroots implementation.  There is 
significant leadership potential and knowledge resident across the entire sector 
partnership.  Identifying these leaders, providing the needed resources, and developing a 
cadre of like-minded risk experts must be important parts of any change management 
strategy. 
Are steps being taken to breed success by generating short-term wins?  
Nothing breeds success like success.  A key role of change leaders is to model and 
promote desired behavior.  Risk management is not only central to the implementation of 
the NIPP, but is a key pillar for everything that DHS does in the name of homeland 
security.  Nonetheless, this significance does not seem to be reflected in the level of 
activity among DHS risk professionals in national conferences, professional associations, 
or in academic or research forums.  For example, at the 2006 Grants & Training 
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Conference attended by the author and hundreds of other homeland security leaders from 
across the country, there was not one DHS risk professional on the only panel dealing 
with the subject.  Moreover, DHS has not sponsored a conference devoted to this issue as 
a way to stimulate the sharing of best practices.  Despite successful risk programs by the 
Coast Guard and the former Office for Domestic Preparedness, there appears to be little 
promotion of these successes, no assessment of their performance, and little sharing of 
lessons learned.  Nor have any additional resources been devoted to reinforcing “change 
leaders” who exemplify the spirit of the change vision and goals. 
How are gains being consolidated to expand and sustain the change? 
rts are underway to anchor the new approaches in the system
There does not seem to be a deliberate effort to leverage change by capitalizing on 
the success of existing CI/KR risk assessment programs.  Both the Coast Guard and the 
Office of Grant Programs have been advancing risk assessment for the port and transit 
sectors respectively since shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 2001.  Though 
there is much in both of these programs that can be applied generically across sectors, 
their success, it seems, has been all but ignored in the pursuit of a single cross-sector 
approach in the Risk Analysis and Management for Critical Asset Protection (RAMCAP) 
program.  With the exception of the creation of RMA, there is little to suggest that DHS 
has begun to aggressively institutionalize risk management as general policy, skill, or 
discipline, though the NIPP does indicate that a CI/KR protection qualification course is 
in development.  There are only two risk assessment courses currently offered for non-
DHS personnel by the DHS Training and Education Division (TED), and these were 
developed independently from all other DHS risk assessment programs. 289  
What effo ? 
k-based decision-
making
Though it may have made progress in advancing the use of ris
 within DHS, it is not apparent that the department has attained any measure of 
success in going beyond risk assessment and running the full risk management cycle.  
This is essential if it is to demonstrate the efficacy of the policy to stakeholders and 
generate enduring support in a way that will help anchor the change.  RMA is still new, 
                                                 
289 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Training and Education Division - Course Catalog,” 
10, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/TED_Course_Catalog2007.pdf [Accessed august 10, 2007]. 
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and its initial focus appears to be on getting the DHS house in order before expanding its 
reach outside to things like the CI/KR risk assessment.  It could not be determined, either 
from discussions with DHS staff and consultants, or from the available literature, how 
RMA, or DHS as a whole, plans to align or realign organization or processes to further 
advance its risk management policy.  Lessons from the Coast Guard’s experience with 
institutionalizing risk management throughout the service may be instructive for the 
entire department, and merit study and consideration as a possible model to follow. 
How well are the organization’s systems and subsystems aligned? 
The prior question, as adapted from the research of Kotter and Fernandez and 
Rainey, deals with the work of making system-wide adjustments in the way the 
organization functions as necessary, to anchor and sustain the change over the long-term.  
This work does not just occur at the end of the implementation process, but is continuous 
throughout.  An organization’s systems and subsystems must be in alignment with the 
purpose of the change, and each other, if the change is to be successful.  One way to 
consider this alignment is through Noel Tichy’s Technical, Political, and Cultural (TPC) 
Framework.  Though certainly not intended to be a comprehensive assessment, the 
following provides a representative look at NIPP risk management implementation across 
the various elements of the TPC Framework in a way that demonstrates its utility. 
External Environment – The cost of homeland security is enormous, and the 
administration is increasingly challenged to manage discretionary spending while 
balancing national security needs with other domestic priorities.  Congress has become 
impatient with DHS on the matter of risk management decision-making to guide 
ing reports from 
GAO 
homeland security investments, and this impatience is fueled by recurr
and CRS that point to the pace of progress and the challenges that must be 
overcome.  State homeland security directors feel they have been left out of the policy-
making process and that they lack an understanding of the DHS approach to risk.  Private 
sector partners in NIPP implementation question the utility of Sector-Specific Plans and 
have not uniformly implemented risk management regimes within their industry sectors.   
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Mission and Strategy – The strategic intent to implement risk-based decision-
making to guide homeland security priorities and investment has been clear and emphatic 
– from the president, the Congress, and the secretary for Homeland Security.  A plan for 
organizing national CI/KR protection efforts has been developed to include a vision for 
risk management.  The description of the NIPP risk management framework defines the 
basic elements of the risk management process and assigns roles and responsibilities to 
various stakeholders.  However, it does not clarify what specific changes are necessary in 
the way things are being done now, and simply leaves it up the stakeholders to figure out 
ange management 
plan th
how to implement their part of the change.  Absence of a definitive ch
at specifies objectives, strategies, milestones, accountabilities, and measures for 
success will hamper the definition of tasks and ultimate accomplishment of the change. 
Tasks – If the mission and strategy are out of alignment, so too will be the tasks 
necessary to carry them out.  In implementing the NIPP risk management framework, 
various tasks must be performed by a large and diverse number of stakeholders, both 
across DHS and the larger CI/KR protection community.  It is not enough to identify and 
assign a task and expect it to be executed in harmony with the rest of the system, 
particularly if the owner is not even in the same organization.  The capability and the 
means to carry out the task must also be considered.  At present, risk management tasks, 
and especially risk assessment methods, are inadequately defined, and the capability to 
carry these out at the grassroots level is open to question.  The complexity of these tasks, 
and the uncertainty involved, have significant implications for the alignment of the 
structures, processes, and people, essential to implementing the vision for change.    
Prescribed Networks – Once tasks, and what is needed to carry them out, are 
known, the prescribed networks of jobs and their interrelationships can be defined.  Two 
key factors here are the division of labor, or differentiation among units, and how these 
units interact to integrate their work.  Though the NIPP defines basic division of labor for 
risk management, it does not define well how the efforts among stakeholders will be 
integrated to accomplish its goals.  Nor does it appear from the NIPP or SSPs that the 
relationships to support risk management within sectors have been identified to include 
the type and placement of new capabilities that will surely be needed.  The prescribed 
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network of the sector partnership model provides DHS with a unique framework through 
which to engage industry and other stakeholders.  Building on and extending that network 
to adequately support sector risk management will be vital to the success of the NIPP. 
Organizational Processes – Particularly in networks such as the NIPP sector 
partnership model, common processes for communication, management control, and 
problem solving are what bind the network together.  As the sector partnership model 
evolves, the processes for administering the risk management framework will need to 
evolve with it.  That partnership relies on a hierarchy of sector councils and crosscutting 
councils to manage communications across the network.  Communications and 
management control through such a structure may not be the most effective way to 
develop and implement complex and still uncertain risk management practices.  A new 
network of subject matter experts may be needed that is more agile in advancing sector-
based risk management programs, driving technical compatibility and integration with 
DHS, and pursuing policy issues like information security and private sector incentives. 
People – Almost exclusive responsibility for CI/KR protection rests on the 
shoulders of owners and operators.  Motivation to participate in NIPP risk management 
efforts is largely voluntary and assumed to come from good corporate citizenship and 
enlightened self-interest.  DHS has been very successful in motivating high-level private 
sector participation in the NIPP sector partnership.  However, there are significant legal 
and economic concerns, and the burdens of risk management bureaucracy and perception 
of uncertain returns could dampen commitment.  New incentives are needed, and DHS 
must demonstrate the efficacy of its risk management framework or stand to lose much of 
what it has gained.  Accelerating its efforts will require not only new risk processes, but 
also a new cadre of security risk managers across government and industry.  This will 
mean the creation of an entirely new professional discipline and national network.   
Emergent Networks – Concurrent with the prescribed networks of any enterprise 
are unanticipated informal networks that emerge as people and groups react to and in one 
way or another attempt to influence (or hold the potential to influence) the direction of 
change.  The NIPP sector partnership is so large and complex that emergent networks, 
which could either help or hinder risk management implementation, may go unnoticed or 
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simply be neglected.  Neutralizing the effects of negative influences and capitalizing on, 
and even encouraging, positive ones could help accelerate the pace of change.  Likely 
sources within the sector partnership include trade groups, industry associations, and 




ional associations like the Security Analysis and Risk Management Association 
(SARMA), or in academic partnerships among risk analysts and researchers.  Wherever 
these networks lie, they should be considered, and when possible, exploited.  There is no 
indication that NIPP implementation considers the implications of emergent networks. 
3. Assessing Change as Public Policy Implementation 
In many ways, the implementation of public policy can be more challenging and 
conflict-ridden than almost any other type of strategic change.  Risk management for 
homeland security is an example of just such a policy.  Given the high degree of 
ambiguity, extreme complexity, and high potential for conflict, homeland security leaders
ot only consider the mechanics of the change process, but also its political and 
social context, and factor these into any change management strategy.  The questions 
below are derived from the summary of high ambiguity - high conflict policy 
implementation in Chapter IV.  These questions, and the brief analysis that follows each, 
are offered as representative of the kind of self-assessment homeland security leaders 
might make when considering the implementation of a major public policy initiative.  
The analysis that follows is limited by the availability of information from open sources. 
What local or execution-level coalitions exist; what are their positions on the matter of 
the policy to be implemented; what power or influence do they exert; and what relative 
effect might they have on the implementation process? 
Though SSAs are responsible for coordinating CI/KR protection planning, in 
reality it is the SCCs and CI/KR owners and operators who must implement industry and 
asset-level risk management activities.  Though the NIPP, sector partnership model, and 
SSP process were an imposition from above, there was a remarkable degree of 
cooperation across the board.  However, advancement of the risk management framework 
by the SSAs, absent any global coordination and resolution of risk assessment 
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compatibility issues (i.e., terminology, metrics, standards, methods, training etc.), is 
bound to lead to friction as DHS continues to strive for a more integrated and compatible 
framework overall.  Moreover, as a higher degree of granularity is obtained concerning 
sector vulnerabilities and risks, it is possible that additional conflict between DHS and 
private sector stakeholders will emerge as pressure mounts for industry-wide application 
of countermeasures.  Given that much of the burden will fall on their shoulders, industry 
stakeholders can exert powerful influence on the outcome of the NIPP risk management 
framework.  It will be important, therefore, to facilitate development and implementation 
of risk management and assessment methods in a way that justifies industry confidence.   
ty for coordinating 
CI/KR protection initiatives within their st
through their governors and state congressional delegations.  Having them onboard in 
State Homeland Security Advisors (HSAs) have responsibili
ates.  Most have ongoing programs to work 
with CI/KR owners and operators on security efforts, and some have advanced state 
legislation to enforce security standards.  They are the conduits for data into the DHS 
National Asset Database (NADB), which is used to assess national-level risk and to 
inform risk-based grant allocation.  These officials also drive state-level homeland 
security planning and provide stewardship for risk-based grant requests for CI/KR 
protection.  However, the majority feels insufficiently involved in the policy-making 
process and that DHS has not adequately explained how to calculate risk.  Though SCCs 
have been in operation for over a year, DHS has just recently organized the State, Local, 
Tribal, Territorial Government Coordinating Council (SLTTGCC) to represent the states 
in NIPP implementation.  HSAs are powerful stakeholders and wield considerable clout 
support of risk policy implementation as well as advancing the use of compatible 
methodologies within their states would be a force-multiplier to the overall effort. 
Building industry confidence in the efficacy of national risk management policy 
and obtaining strong HSA commitment will require devoting sufficient resources and 
expertise to working with and in support of SSCs and the states in their individual risk 
management efforts, while simultaneously advancing the state-of-the-art in risk 
management practice to include pursuit of national standards. 
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What expert professional or academic stakeholders may be involved; what are their 
positions on the matter of the policy to be implemented; with what local- or execution-
level coalitions might they be aligned with and supporting? 
Though individual academic institutions are independently providing various 
levels of research support to CI/KR protection efforts, there does not seem to be any 
national-level academic network sponsored by DHS to advise on the overall problem of 
homeland security risk management policy, integration, and standards.  The first DHS 
funded “center-of-excellence,” the Center for Risk and Economic Analysis of Terrorism 
Events at the University of Southern California, is devoted to developing models and 
tools for evaluating the costs and risks of terrorism.  The Center for Risk Management of 
Engine
nalysis 
and Risk Management Association (SARMA).  SRA is a multi-disciplinary organization 
whose 
                                                
ering Systems at the University of Virginia is also a source of top-level risk 
expertise with a highly regarded research program.  The Wharton Risk Management and 
Decision Processes Center is yet another such institution.  However, it does not appear 
that these schools are being tapped in an integrated way to help guide national risk 
management policy and practice.  The exception is the Critical Infrastructure Protection 
Program at George Mason University, which is providing direct advisory assistance to 
the Office of Infrastructure Protection (OIP), the Partnership for Critical Infrastructure 
Security (PCIS), and select SCCs in support of NIPP implementation. 290
The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) strongly supports the 
application of risk management approaches to design and decision-making.  In 2004, 
ASME was tapped by DHS to develop the Risk Analysis and Management for Critical 
Assets Protection (RAMCAP) methodology, cited in the NIPP as a principal approach to 
analyzing CI/KR risks across sectors.  Two associations specifically devoted to the risk 
analysis profession are the Society for Risk Analysis (SRA) and the Security A
members and interests span the entire risk analysis spectrum.  The mission of 
SARMA is devoted entirely to advancing the standing and competency of security and 
risk analysts focused on risks from man-made threats.  By far, the largest group 
representing public and private sector security professionals is the American Society for 
 
290 George Mason University, “Externally Funded Projects,” http://cipp.gmu.edu/projects/ [Accessed 
July 10, 2007] 
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Industrial Security (ASIS), with 35,000 members worldwide.  ASIS sponsors training and 
credentialing programs and is advancing its All Hazards Risk Management Best Practices 
Standard.  Among its members are those on the front line of CI/KR protection efforts.
Academic institutions and professional associations can add considerable value to 
NIPP risk management implementation.  This includes the advancement of common 
practices and standards and the education and certification of the next generation of 
security and risk analysts needed to ensure the long-term success of national CI/KR 
protection policy.  Fully harnessing this capability will require creation of new national-
level councils dedicated to guiding the development of risk practices, technologies, 
education, and certification as an integral part of the NIPP sector partnership model.  
What steps are being taken to reduce the ambiguity surrounding the policy’s goals by 
working with both the originating policy-makers and political stakeholders on one end, 
and the various local- or execution-level constituencies on the other? 
Managing the process of change as public policy is mostly about managing 
ambiguity and conflict.  Reducing uncertainty about the vision and clarifying specific and 
realistic goals and objectives for policy implementation are essential to setting 
expectations and winning the support of elected officials and other senior policy-makers.  
It is also e
It is not evident from any of the materials openly available that DHS has a 
deli  
ssential to obtaining the commitment and active contribution of those who must 
execute the policy at the grassroots level.  If you don’t have the first, you are unlikely to 
get much of the second.  The NIPP, for the first time, sets out a national vision for risk 
management.  Though the NIPP risk management framework defines the basic elements 
of the risk management process, and assigns roles and responsibilities for governmental 
and private sector partners, the NIPP itself says little about the “how” or specifically 
“what” will be implemented.  The details have essentially been left for the SSAs to work 
out with their respective SCCs and reflect in their individual sector plans.  Based on GAO 
assessments, and the author’s review of the sector plans recently issued, there is still 
ambiguity about how, if at all, DHS will be able to measure and aggregate risk within and 
across sectors.  As the saying goes, you can’t manage what you can’t measure. 
berate change management plan with objectives and milestones that describe how it
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will facilitate the realization of the risk management framework outlined in the NIPP.  If 
you don’t know where you are going, any road will take you there.  It is reasonable to 
assume that the lack of a definitive change management plan, and the wherewithal to 




entation to date.  A considerable amount of planning, outreach, and promotion has 
gone into the advancement of the NIPP and SSPs.  But the “long pole in the tent” is still 
the risk management framework and, within that, the compatible risk assessment 
methodologies that must be at its core.  As in the development of the NIPP, the 
implementation planning process becomes the medium for dialogue with policy-makers 
on one side and policy-executers on the other.  Unless conditions have changed with the 
creation of Risk Management and Analysis (RMA), a review of the March 2007 DHS 
report issued to Congress on the status of efforts to date did not provide assurance that a 
plan for implementation of risk management policy yet exists; no plan, no basis for 
dialogue.  With no basis for dialogue, ambiguity and conflict persist and the vicious cycl
es.  Time goes by, leadership changes, policy shifts, and the process repeats itself.   
As difficult as it has been to establish the NIPP sector partnership model and 
deliver SSPs, it will be even more challenging and complex to realize a national 
framework for CI/KR risk assessment as envisioned by DHS.   It will require, at 
minimum, the same sort of planning and stakeholder engagement that has made the NIPP 
initiative itself so successful to date.   In harmony with the existing sector partnership 
model, a new set of players will need to be brought to the table; ones who can help untie 
the Gordian Knot that has become homeland security risk management policy.  
What change management framework has been established to manage ambiguity and 
conflict by coordinating implementation efforts across governmental agencies, among 
execution-level coalitions, and among expert professional stakeholders? 
One strategy to deal with the complexities of advancing public policy, finding 
solutions to implementation challenges, and building commitment to the intended change 
is a process that “gets all the players in the room” called the Stakeholder Council Model.  
This model has been used with great effect thus far in the advancement of the NIPP 
through the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC).  CIPAC 
provides the structure through which different levels of government and the private sector 
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now collaborate on CI/KR protection planning and initiatives.  As described in Chapter 
III, it is a far-reaching collaborative network-of-networks that is largely self-managed, 
diverse in character, and national in scope.  It is a remarkable unsung achievement of 
DHS and its CIPAC members, and likely one of the most innovative government/industry 
collaborations since World War II.  Cross-sector coordination and integration is to be 
achieved through government and private industry cross-sector councils that span the 
CIPAC.  This sort of framework is vital to overall NIPP governance.  However, it is 
questionable whether the CIPAC alone, as structured, is adequately suited to resolving 
the highly complex technical aspects of developing and installing risk management and 
assessment programs within individual industry sectors in a way that ultimately leads to 
internal, cross-sector, regional, and national integration.  Moreover, the evolution of 
CIPAC initially emphasized the DHS and SSA relationship with industry sectors and has 
largely left state and local governments out of the picture.  This is notwithstanding the 
fact that much DHS focus is otherwise targeted on CI/KR protection efforts at a state or 
urban region level as part of the Homeland Security Grant Program (SHGP), which is 
increasingly becoming a risk-driven process.  
 these on 
their own.  A variety of risk assessment methodologies already exist, but were developed 
 problematic, as 
pointed
It is important to note the fact that risk management and assessment for high 
consequence-low probability events, especially terrorism, is a brand new field.  There is 
no common lexicon; there are no common practices; and there are no professional 
standards or training programs to provide for consistency and compatibility, unlike the 
fields of accounting or engineering.  The implementation of the NIPP risk management 
vision cannot assume that individual sectors will be able to nurture and grow
for specific applications and in isolation from one another.  Though different settings may 
require different approaches, the general lack of compatibility is still
 out on numerous occasions by GAO. 
If the NIPP vision is to be realized, it will be incumbent on DHS to invest in and 
accelerate the development of this new professional field at the same time it is working to 
foster technical integration.  DHS cannot do this in isolation.  New alliances and 
networks will need to be established with academia and professional associations like 
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SARMA and ASIS for harmonization of professional practices, the development of 
standards, and the training and education of CI/KR risk management and security 
analysts and leaders.  Just as the sector partnership model was an innovative solution to a 
new and complex problem, DHS will need to think anew about how it partners with 
subject matter experts from academia, the professional associations, and the practitioner 
community to address this need, which is on the critical path to NIPP implementation.  It 
will also require engaging state and local government as important allies in the process.  
State and local governments are closest to CI/KR owners and operators in their respective 
jurisdictions and are in the best position to facilitate asset-based and regional risk 
assessment and management. 
4. Assessing Change in Complex Adaptive Systems 
CIPAC and the sector partnership model is by definition a complex adaptive 
system that has been organized by DHS to respond to a truly wicked problem – that of 
securing the nation’s vast and highly interdependent critical infrastructure and key 
resources.  As Garnett Williams defines them, the properties of complex adaptive systems 
include
ands, and levels of 
commit
 a) a large number of similar but independent elements or agents; b) persistent 
movement and responses by these elements to other agents; c) adaptiveness so that the 
system adjusts to new situations to ensure survival; d) self-organization, in which order in 
the system forms spontaneously; e) local rules that apply to each agent; and f) 
progression in complexity over time so that the system becomes larger and more 
sophisticated.  Accordingly, the behavior of such complex systems cannot be predicted 
and may evolve to a point somewhere between order and chaos. 291
Though CIPAC appears to be very orderly when presented in the NIPP, it is likely 
to be anything but that in reality, as different sector councils are at different stages of 
maturity, with different cultures, perspectives, industry dem
ment and leadership.  As CIPAC matures, DHS must be open to the dynamic and 
seemingly chaotic nature of complex adaptive systems and understand that the behavior, 
direction, and evolution of such systems can never be fully planned or controlled.  
                                                 
291 Garnett Williams, Chaos Theory Tamed, 234. 
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Influencing the performance of these systems has perhaps more to do with facilitating the 
natural process of learning and adaptation than trying to steer the actual content of the 
work itself.   The following questions are derived from the discussion of open systems, 
complexity, and networks in Chapter IV.  They are presented here as yet another lens 
through which homeland security leaders may assess strategic change in a highly 
networked environment.  Adapted by the author from a blending of emerging theory, they 
are only representative of how leaders may think about these issues from another 
perspective.  Different situations may prompt different questions.  The supporting 
analysis is restricted to what information was immediately available from open sources at 
the time of this writing, and the author’s own limited exposure to the problem space. 
What s egie  terms and concepts; trat s are in place to achieve shared meaning for key
clarify organizational and participant roles and responsibilities; ensure a common 
understanding of the problem; and generate a shared commitment to implementation? 
Absent forces to the contrary, the complexity of wicked problems tends to move 
an organization or system toward increasing degrees of fragmentation, where information 
and knowledge are scattered and isolated.  The larger the system, the greater the tendency 
toward complexity, and the more there will be the potential for fragmentation.  As an 
organization fragments and tends closer to chaos, it attempts to self-regulate and adapt to 
cope in a way that brings greater order.  Leaders can facilitate this process by helping to 
bring coherence to the system.  DHS and the SSAs walk a fine line as responsible 
delegates at a federal level for critical infrastructure and key resource protection, but 
absent the firm hand of regulation, have correspondingly little control over the ground-
level security of most of the nation’s critical assets, particularly the large majority of 
infrastructure resources in private sector hands.  Too firm a hand and voluntary industry 
particip
and organizes the complex adaptive system that is now CIPAC.  This coherence is further 
adv d cross-sector councils that support self-
ation will begin to evaporate.  No influence at all and the sectors will evolve in 
isolation and, as complexity grows, so too will the fragmentation level and a tendency 
toward chaos.   
The NIPP brings coherence to the national effort to protect critical infrastructure.  
It establishes common goals, definitions, and concepts; defines roles and responsibilities; 
anced by the activities of the SCCs an
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governance and intra- and inter-sector coordination and information sharing.   The irony 
here is that the very structure that gave the CIPAC life can also be the thing that strangles 
it if the structure is too restrictive and not itself open to change and adaptation.  The more 
CIPAC members accept the mantel of self-governance, the more the SCCs will tend to 
evolve in unanticipated ways, and possibly not consistent with the view from the ivory 
tower.  DHS must support and accelerate this evolution and not restrain it.  It must also 
be prepared to change and adapt itself accordingly. 
Given uncertainty and complexity, implementation of the risk management 
framework as a cornerstone of the NIPP will require change and adaptation in CIPAC 
and possibly DHS itself.  DHS must facilitate this adaptation if it has any hope of 
influencing CIPAC behavior in the direction of a common, compatible, well integrated, 
structur
and yet differentiated risk management framework.  At present, there does not appear to 
be an overarching plan for risk management implementation, and it seems there are no 
es or mechanisms in place to bring coherence and influence the direction of risk 
management efforts by SCCs and industry partners.  Like the larger problem of CI/KR 
protection, implementation of a national risk management framework is a wicked 
problem, one requiring its own complex adaptive system, its own network-of-networks. 
How are networking and collaboration being structured and facilitated; which groups, 
organizations, and individuals are involved; how is leadership being defined and 
distributed; and how are emergent networks being accommodated and encouraged?  
The sector partnership model is the primary organizational structure for 
coordinating national CI/KR protection activities.  The model is based on voluntary self-
governance, with DHS providing overall guidance, tools, and support consistent with the 
NIPP.  At the core of the partnership are the SCCs as the principal entity for coordinating 
with the government on CI/KR protection initiatives.  SCCs are self-organized and self-
managed enterprises that represent the interests of the broad base of owners and operators 
in a sector. 292   DHS and SSA leadership from the federal side is determined by assigned 
roles and responsibilities within the federal agency hierarchy.  Leadership from within 
the cro
 
ss-sector councils and the SSCs is largely self-determined and/or self-selected.  
Rules governing membership and leadership are typically spelled out in a council charter.   
                                                 
292 Garnett Williams, Chaos Theory Tamed, 54.  
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While the sector partnership model provides a formal networking structure, it is 
unclear how it facilitates flexibility for timely adaptation and change, or how it deals with 
emergent networks that may be a precursor to the need for that change.  One example of 
the need for change is the process necessary to implement sector-specific risk programs 
consistent with the overall vision for a risk management framework.  The NIPP 
essentially assigns out the task of advancing sector-specific risk programs to the SSAs. 
However, as Laurence O'Toole points out in his discussion of wicked problems in public 
admini
k 
management).   Likewise, ODP’s work with the Port Authority of New York and New 
s an 
emerge
                                                
stration, such problems cannot be addressed simply by dividing up the pieces and 
delegating authority. 293  If DHS lacked the internal knowledge and expertise to address 
the challenge of risk management implementation within the department until now, as 
evidenced by repeated GAO reports cited earlier in this paper, why would farming out the 
problem to the SAAs under the sector partnership model get better results?  The only 
exception thus far may be the Coast Guard with its MSRAM and MAST programs.  
The Coast Guard and its risk management partners work with individual port 
communities, and can be viewed as an emergent network that responded, on its own, to 
changing environmental conditions (i.e., the need and overarching policy for CI/KR ris
Jersey in 2002 to develop a risk assessment model that morphed into the successful Port 
and Transit Risk Assessment Technical Assistance Program can also be viewed a
nt network. The work of George Mason University with the National Capital 
Region on regional CI/KR protection is yet another.  DHS must examine how existing or 
new emergent networks are accommodated in the sector partnership model and, perhaps 
more importantly, how these networks may be exploited to accelerate the pace of change 
toward a national risk management framework.  Especially important here is what can be 
learned from emergent networks and how DHS and industry sectors exchange lessons 
learned and manage knowledge transfer.  Under conditions of complexity, shared 
knowledge provides the basis for addressing ambiguity, lessening fragmentation, and 
achieving greater coherence in the system. 
 
293 Laurence O'Toole, Jr., “Treating Networks Seriously: Practical and Research-Based Agendas in 
Public Administration,” 45-52. 
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What mechanisms have been established for communication and information sharing; 
how are research, emerging concepts, and lessons-learned being propagated; and what 
framework has been set up for organizational learning and knowledge management?  
Cross-sector government and industry coordinating councils are one means by 
which the NIPP sector partnership model attempts to provide for communication and 
information sharing across sectors.  The previously established Information Sharing and 
Analysis Centers (ISACs) have also provided and continue to provide this function within 
individual industry sectors.  In addition, DHS has implemented the Homeland Security 
Information Network (HSIN) in an effort to interconnect and provide information sharing 
among homeland security communities of interest.  HSIN is identified in the NIPP as yet 
another possible method for CI/KR collaboration.  Procedural or transactional methods 
such as these and other “publish and subscribe” formats for information sharing may 
facilitate the cataloging and storage of information, but do little to advance organizational 
learning.  As discussed earlier, learning is a key characteristic of an adaptive 
organiz
ent strategy for implementation of the national 
risk management framework.  As important as that work may be, absent an integrated 
risk assessment and management framework, it may not achieve its full potential. 
ation.   
It is not apparent from a review of the open source material that risk assessment 
and management research, emerging concepts, and lessons learned are being effectively 
directed, coordinated, shared, and applied as a part of an integrated overarching strategy 
within DHS or across the NIPP sector partnership model.  What is apparent is that 
different DHS components have at different times, and with different kinds of outside 
expert assistance, advanced independent efforts absent any unifying risk schema.  Some 
of these efforts have blossomed into apparently successful large-scale risk assessment 
programs within a given industry sector or sub-sector (i.e., U.S. Coast Guard MSRAM 
and MAST programs), while others have not matured beyond initial fielding.  Though 
there is apparently some significant research underway to address discrete analytical 
challenges, academic research and development in support of homeland security risk 
assessment initiatives does not seem to flow from a coherent research and development 
plan specifically tied to a change managem
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In his assessment of wicked problems and social complexity, Jeff Conklin 
suggests that complexity, problem solving, and learning are closely interdependent, and 
the flow of this learning is a social process that is collaborative and opportunity driven.294   
In a com
g collective organizational learning within the sector partnership model 
will be essential to advancing the change and adaptation necessary to implement the 
NIPP risk m
plex adaptive system, like the sector partnership model, control is highly 
dispersed and distributed throughout the network; there is no hierarchical command and 
control, and behavior is unplanned and for the most part uncontrollable.  In such a 
system, leadership is about influencing behavior in the desired direction by facilitating 
the process of organizational learning and adaptation.  In 1990, Peter Senge described the 
“leader’s new work” in learning organizations as “the ability to build shared vision, to 
bring to the surface and challenge prevailing mental models, and to foster more systemic 
patterns of thinking.  In short, leaders in learning organizations are responsible for 
building organizations where people are continually expanding their capabilities to shape 
their future – that is, leaders are responsible for learning.” 295  
Fosterin
anagement framework.  Like CI/KR protection in general, implementing a 
national risk management framework across 17 industry sectors, in a way that can 
provide risk comparisons both within and across those sectors, is a very complex and 
wicked problem.  There is still no common risk lexicon and no common and compatible 
set of methodologies for CI/KR risk assessment.  Developing these, and building a new 
profession around CI/KR risk assessment and management at the same time, is beyond 
the capacity of DHS and the current members of the partnership alone.  It will require 
effectively tapping and networking, in a more coordinated and integrated way, the 
expertise and problem-solving capability that resides in research and academic 
institutions, in professional associations, and in an emerging network of risk practitioners 
in both government and the private sector.  Now that the CIPAC is substantially formed, 
and the first iterations of SSPs have been submitted, this should be the primary focus of 
effort for DHS and the SSAs.  It will require developing a knowledge management 
                                                 
294 Jeff Conklin, “Wicked Problems and Social Complexity,” 3-9. 
295 Peter Senge, “The Leader’s New Work: Building Learning Organizations,” Sloan Management 
Review 32, no. 1 (Fall 1990): 7-23. 
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framework for risk assessment and risk management best practices as well as the training 
and education channels and curricula necessary to produce a new generation of CI/KR 
security and risk management leaders. 
How much time and attention are leaders devoting to nurturing the social process of 
change as opposed to its mechanics, and how are leaders being prepared to lead others in 
a highly complex, often ambiguous, and potentially conflict-prone environment? 
Establishing a vision, organizing resources, motivating and guiding participation, 
overcoming resistance, and maintaining motivation for success are all vital leadership 
tasks.  The importance of these tasks is even more acute when leading without formal 
direct authority, such as within a complex adaptive system like the NIPP sector 
partnership model.  Chris Huxham and Siv Vangen cite research studies verifying that 
active involvement (or the absence of it) by top executives has a determining influence on 
the success or failure of any collaboration initiative. 296  Accordingly, they conclude that 
successful collaboration requires significant 
                                                
energy, commitment, skill, and continual 
nurturing on the part of the leaders involved.  Huxham and Vangen state that wherever 
leaders achieved success, it was due to the significant personal attention they paid to 
championing the cause and managing the media of collaborative leadership. 297   
It is clear from public statements and congressional testimony from various senior 
DHS officials, and the author’s own experience in various coordinating council meetings, 
that considerable DHS and SCC leadership time and attention has been, and continues to 
be, devoted to NIPP implementation and CI/KR protection initiatives in general.  It 
would likely not have been possible to achieve the successful implementation of the 
sector partnership model to this point without such a commitment.  However, as the 
partnership expands and the network of relationships and extent of activity grows, this 
level of DHS senior executive involvement is probably not sustainable over the long 
term.  DHS will need to increasingly rely on an expanded network of leaders across the 
various coordinating councils and within the various sectors.  Ensuring a common vision, 
 
296 Chris Huxham and Siv Vangen, “Leadership in the Shaping and Implementation of Collaboration 
Age -1175. 
n 
ndas: How Things Happen in a (Not Quite) Joined-Up World,” 1159
297 Chris Huxham and Siv Vangen, “Leadership in the Shaping and Implementation of Collaboratio
Agenda, 1168-1171. 
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leadership competence, and alignment with overall national CI/KR objectives will 
continue to be a challenge without a comprehensive training and education program. 
Regular meetings of council leadership groups sponsored by DHS helps to 
are already seasoned executives in industry or government, and so are not new to the 
task.  
ent and 
risk management, risk management cost-benefit analysis, resource allocation based on 
risk ma
will be important for DHS to establish collaborative alliances among select academic 
inst t 
      
increase coherence and provide opportunities to exchange leader experiences and discuss 
associated challenges in the search for shared solutions.  Most if not all of these leaders 
However, joint development and implementation of a comprehensive change 
management plan for advancing the NIPP risk management framework will tend to 
challenge even the most able executives, who, though experts in their own particular 
industries or government roles, are likely not sufficiently schooled in what is a still the 
complex and emerging field of CI/KR risk management, with little or no guidance to 
draw on.  Moreover, the cadre of CI/KR security and risk analysts that these leaders will 
rely on does not currently exist.  Nor do the common tools, standards, and practices exist 
that are necessary, if the NIPP risk management vision is to be realized.   
The NIPP recognizes the importance of education and training, and generically 
describes the types that are unique or essential to CI/KR protection: risk assessm
nagement priorities, CI/KR interdependency analysis, and best practices in CI/KR 
protection programs. 298  The challenge is that in the absence of better definitions of risk 
assessment and risk management as applied to homeland security, there does not seem to 
be significant movement on what the NIPP describes as an education and training effort 
that will be national in scope.  As a strategy for sustainable CI/KR risk management and 
protection over the long-term, DHS must begin work now to advance risk assessment and 
risk management standards development and associated training, education, and 
certification programs, all of which will take time to develop.   
To advance comprehensive training and education and certification programs, it 
itutions at the forefront of developing practices in this area.  It will also be importan
                                           
298 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 79-82. 
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to directly engage and network professional associations like SARMA, SRA, and ASIS 
around professional standards development, training, and certification criteria for CI/KR 
security and risk analysts, leveraging existing capabilities, delivery mechanisms, and 
membe
                                                
rship to the greatest extent possible.  Finally, the Homeland Security and Defense 
Education Consortium (HSDEC) is another possible vehicle for advancing both CI/KR 
leadership development and technical skills education, to include risk assessment and 
management.  HSDEC is a nationwide network of teaching and research institutions 
focused on promoting education, research, and cooperation related to and supporting the 
homeland security and homeland defense missions. 299
 
 
299 Homeland Security and Defense Education Consortium, “Introduction,” 
http://www.hsdec.org/default.aspx, [Accessed August 21, 2007]. 
 157
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 158
VI. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. FINDINGS  
1. The Sector Partnership Model is a Remarkable Success 
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) is a translation of the strategic 
intent of both the president and the Congress as national policy for critical infrastructure 
and key resource (CI/KR) protection.  The highly networked nature of the nation’s 
critical infrastructure itself is reflected in the complex adaptive network formed under the 
NIPP – the sector partnership model and the Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory 
Council (CIPAC).  This nationwide network of over five hundred member entities spread 
across thirty-six different councils and seventeen different CI/KR sectors, representing 
thousands of CI/KR owners and operators nationwide, requires public/private sector 
collaboration on a s  author’s view, the 
implementation of CIPAC as a self-managed, collaborative, network-of-networks has 
been a remarkable success thus far for the Department of Homeland Security and its 
CIPAC partners.   
. Implementation of Risk Management Policy is Problematic 
Over the years, DHS has been challenged to develop and implement a consistent 
and coordinated approach to risk assessment and risk management.  For the first time, the 
NIPP establishes an initial vision for risk management as applied to CI/KR protection.  
Unfortunately, DHS has left the development and implementation of sector-specific risk 
management programs largely up to the Sector-Specific Agencies (SSAs).  This, it 
appears, leaves SSAs and their industry partners on their own to develop what DHS has 
yet been unable to provide thus far.  Risk management is the cornerstone of the NIPP.  
Risk assessment methodologies are the most vital elements of that process, and possibly 
the Achilles heel to risk management policy implementation.  If compatibility of risk 
assessment approaches cannot be resolved, then implementation of the risk management 
framework will be hindered, and achievement of NIPP goals will be compromised. 




The protection of the nation’s CI/KR assets, to include assessment and 
 and the priority application of resources in response, is a complex 
wicked problem.  As discussed earlier in this paper, most strategic change efforts tend not 
to achieve their initial intent, o anagement of 
strategi
 risk management policies and practices since its creation.  Much of 
this wo as e help of a 
variety of consultants, not all necessarily working in harmony.  Though it is a large and 
comple
Absence of a Change Management Plan Risks Failure 
management of risks
r fail entirely, because key steps in the m
c change were either omitted or not sufficiently executed.  As a wicked problem, 
implementation of risk management policy will require the same creative thinking about 
public/private partnership, networking, and collaboration that has made the CIPAC so 
successful to date.  There does not appear to be any structure or organizing schema to 
assist the SSAs or otherwise coordinate and integrate efforts across sectors or between 
levels of government.  Absence of a guiding coalition, a comprehensive change 
management plan, and associated structure and resources to steer implementation of the 
risk management framework will likely result in a failure to realize its achievement.  
4. Not all Essential Resources are being Applied to the Problem 
DHS has been valiantly wrestling on its own with the challenge of implementing 
risk assessment and
rk h been within the department and among its components, with th
x problem, it does not appear that the resources applied to date have been either 
appropriately organized or sufficient given the scope and scale of the problem.  There has 
not been a broad-based effort to engage external stakeholders, other subject matter 
experts, or non-federal practitioners on the matter of national risk assessment and risk 
management policy and practice. The implementation of the NIPP risk management 
framework will have far reaching implications for CI/KR owners and operators, industry 
sectors, state and local government, other federal agencies, and the protection of U.S. 
citizens.  An entirely new network of partners must now be created and brought into the 
mix, necessitating change and adaptation for both CIPAC and DHS.    
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5. Application of Change Management Models can be Useful 
.  It 
is hope is w ent 
theory and practice in the development and implementation of homeland security policy 
and pro
e formulation of a 
generic homeland security change management model to guide future change initiatives.  
 
Implementation of the NIPP is  a unique large-scale strategic change in public 
policy, and is representative of subsequent homeland security initiatives of similar scope 
and scale that are also complex wicked problems.  Unlike strategic change in the 
corporate world, failure to successfully implement new homeland security policies and 
programs could have catastrophic consequences.  A primary purpose of this paper was to 
assess the implementation of the NIPP risk management framework as strategic change in 
homeland security policy through the lens of change management, public policy, and 
complexity theory.  In reviewing the literature, basic elements were explored and a 
modest list of questions reflecting core tenants from each set of theories were tailored and 
applied to the problem.  The product was a hybrid change management model developed 
from a blending of these theories which can be useful to homeland security leaders in the 
process of either planning for or evaluating the success of large-scale strategic change
d th ork will spur additional study into the application of change managem
grams. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Candidly Assess Approach to Change Management  
Given all that is at stake, and the external stakeholder perceptions of DHS risk 
management policy and program implementation efforts to date, it is recommended that a 
comprehensive and candid assessment be made of how these initiatives have been 
handled as large-scale strategic change.  The findings of this assessment should be 
immediately used to guide the development and implementation of the NIPP risk 
management framework and the risk management and risk assessment programs of 
individual industry sectors.   The results may also be instructive in th
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2. Establish a Nonaligned Risk Management Advisory Board 
The implementation of the NIPP risk management framework has far-reaching 
implications for the entire critical infrastructure and key resources protection (CI/KR) 
community, and stakeholders range across all levels of government and private sector 
industry.  The stakes are high, the issues complex, and the consequences of failure great.  
Accordingly, it is recommended that DHS establish a senior-level, independent, non-
aligned Risk Management Advisory Board to advise on the direction of national risk 
management policy for CI/KR protection, provide strategic direction for implementation 
planning efforts, and ensure accountability and oversight for DHS risk management 
activities. Both the National Infrastructure Advisory Council 300 and the Congressional 
Research Service 301 have recommended similar boards.  
3. Organize a Risk Management Coordinating Council 
The scope, scale, and complexity of implementing and sustaining a national risk 
management framework for CI/KR protection is beyond what DHS or the Sector-Specific 
Agencies alone can do.  The sector partnership model must now adapt to accommodate 
 management stakeholders and subject matter experts 
that can facilitate the development of risk management practices, tools and techniques.  It 
is recom ende ed to assist in the 
development of the recommended change management plan and be the primary 
implem
the introduction of a network of risk
m d that a Risk Management Coordinating Council be form
entation mechanism for the NIPP risk management framework, to include 
assisting SSAs and SCCs with sector-specific risk management programs.  In addition to 
representation from the individual sector councils, participation must be sought from 
academia, research centers, professional associations, and the practitioner community. 
 
                                                 
300 National Infrastructure Advisory Council, Risk Management Approaches to Protection - Final 
Report and Recommendations by the Council, 19. 
301 Congressional Research Service, The Department of Homeland Security’s Risk Assessment 
Methodology: Evolution, Issues, and Options for Congress, 26. 
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4. Develop a Comprehensive Change Management Plan 
It is recommended that a comprehensive change management plan be developed 
to guide the implementation of the NIPP risk management framework, particularly as it 
relates to facilitating and influencing the direction of the individual risk programs of the 
industry sectors.  It should be based on strategic guidance provided by the Risk 
Management Advisory Board and developed with the participation and input of members 
of the Risk Management Coordinating Council.   The plan must translate the vision and 
policy goals into specific objectives, strategies, milestones, accountabilities, and 
measures for success.  It must also demonstrate a sound causal link between the actions 
outlined and the outcomes desired to ensure consistency in approach, as well as provide a 
means for managing coordination and congruence among all parties involved. 
A ntialing 
ee 
programs at leading colleges and universities.   
as of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The 
occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion.  
As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew.  We must 
5. ccelerate Standards, Training, Education, and Crede
As strategy for sustainable CI/KR risk management and protection over the long 
term, DHS must begin work now to advance risk assessment and risk management 
standards development and associated training, education, and certification programs, all 
of which will take time to develop.  It is recommended that DHS pursue strategic 
alliances with professional associations such as Security Analysis and Risk Management 
Association (SARMA), the Society for Risk Analysis (SRA), and the American Society 
of Industrial Security (ASIS) to advance the development and delivery of training and 
certification programs for CI/KR security and risk analysts.  It is also recommended that 
the Homeland Security and Defense Education Consortium (HSDEC) be engaged to take 
on the task of working with its members to formulate risk management curricula for 
incorporation into homeland security executive leadership development and career degr
 The dogm
disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country.  
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